A conceptual model for proactive detection of potential fraud enterprise systems: exploiting SAP audit trails to detect asset misappropriation by Singh, Kishore Harichunder
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND 
 
 
 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR PROACTIVE DETECTION  
OF POTENTIAL FRAUD IN ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS: 
EXPLOITING SAP AUDIT TRAILS TO DETECT  
ASSET MISAPPROPRIATION 
 
 
A dissertation submitted by 
KISHORE HARICHUNDER SINGH 
 
 
For the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
2012 
 
  
 - i - 
ABSTRACT 
Fraud costs the Australian economy approximately $3 billion annually, and its 
frequency and financial impact continues to grow. Many organisations are poorly 
prepared to prevent and detect fraud. Fraud prevention is not perfect therefore fraud 
detection is crucial. Fraud detection strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently 
identify frauds that circumvent preventative measures so that an organisation can 
take appropriate corrective action. 
 
Enhancing the ability of organisations to detect potential fraud may have a positive 
impact on the economy. An effective model that facilitates proactive detection of 
potential fraud may potentially save costs and reduce the propensity of future fraud 
by early detection of suspicious user activities. Enterprise systems generate millions 
of transactions annually. While most of these are legal and routine transactions, a 
small number may be fraudulent. The enormous number of transactions makes it 
difficult to find these few instances among legitimate transactions. Without the 
availability of proactive fraud detection tools, investigating suspicious activities 
becomes overwhelming. 
 
This study explores and develops innovative methods for proactive detection of 
potential fraud in enterprise systems. The intention is to build a model for detection 
of potential fraud based on analysis of patterns or signatures building on theories and 
concepts of continuous fraud detection. This objective is addressed by answering the 
main question; can a generalised model for proactive detection of potential fraud in 
enterprise systems be developed? The study proposes a methodology for proactive 
detection of potential fraud that exploits audit trails in enterprise systems. The 
concept of proactive detection of potential fraud is demonstrated by developing a 
prototype. The prototype is a near real-time web based application that uses SAS for 
its analytics processes. The aim of the prototype is to confirm the feasibility of 
implementing proactive detection of potential fraud in practice. Verification of the 
prototype is achieved by performing a series of tests involving simulated activity, 
followed by a full scale case study with a large international manufacturing 
company. Validation is achieved by obtaining independent reviews from the case 
study senior staff, auditing practitioners and a panel of experts. Timing experiments 
confirm that the prototype is able to handle real data volumes from a real 
organisation without difficulty thereby providing evidence in support of 
enhancement of auditor productivity. This study makes a number of contributions to 
both the literature and auditing practice. 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.0. Background 
According to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) Report to the 
Nations on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, "a typical organisation loses five percent of 
its annual revenue to fraud. Applied to the estimated 2009 Gross World Product of 
$58.07 trillion, this figure translates to a potential total fraud loss of more than $2.9 
trillion" (ACFE 2010 p.4). Within Australia this figure is approximately $3 billion 
annually (Standards Australia 2008). These figures are clear evidence that fraud is a 
major problem, which requires serious study by researchers to minimise illegal 
activities. A fundamental first step in studying the fraud problem is to 
unambiguously define fraud itself. 
 
There are two principal methods of getting something from others illegally. They can 
either be physically forced, or they can be deceived into giving up their assets. The 
first type is called robbery and the second is fraud. Albrecht et al. (2009) defines 
fraud as a deception made for personal gain. "Deception" is key. The most common 
definition of fraud according to Webster's Dictionary (2001 p.380) is: 
 
"Fraud is a generic term that embraces all the multifarious 
means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted 
to by one individual, to get an advantage over another by 
false representations. No definite and invariable rule can be 
  
 - 17 - 
laid down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it 
includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which 
another is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those 
which limit human knavery." 
 
Australian Government Fraud Control Guidelines define fraud as (ComLaw 2011 
p.4):  
"theft; accounting fraud (false invoices, misappropriation etc); unlawful use 
of, or obtaining property, equipment, material or services; causing a loss, or 
avoiding and/or creating a liability; providing false or misleading 
information, or failing to provide it when there is an obligation to do so; 
misuse of assets, equipment or facilities; making, or using false, forged or 
falsified documents; and wrongfully using information or intellectual 
property." 
 
Furthermore, the Government identifies fraud as targeting revenue, benefits, 
property, information and intelligence, funding and grants, entitlements, facilities, 
and money or property. Benefits obtained fraudulently are not restricted to monetary 
or material benefits, and may be tangible or intangible, including unauthorised 
provision of access to or disclosure of information.  Benefits may also be obtained by 
third parties in addition to the fraud perpetrator. 
 
Two types of fraud can be distinguished: misappropriation of assets; and fraudulent 
financial reporting (Casabona and Grego 2003 ; ASB 2002). Misappropriation of 
assets is often referred to as 'employee fraud' and involves theft of an organisation's 
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assets. Fraudulent financial reporting involves deliberate misstatements or omissions 
of amounts or disclosures of financial statements to deceive investors and creditors, 
increase share price, meet cash flow needs or hide company losses and problems 
(Romney and Steinbart 2009 ; Wells 2008 ; Casabona and Grego 2003). The ACFE 
extends this definition by classifying frauds and the methods used to commit them. 
 
The ACFE (2010 p.6) defines occupational fraud as: 
"…the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the 
employing organization's resources or assets…"  
 
Occupational fraud is very broad and it encompasses a range of transgressions by 
employees at all levels of an organisational hierarchy. These include i) asset 
misappropriations, which involve theft or misuse of an organisation's assets; 
ii) corruption, in which employees wrongfully use their influence in business 
transactions to gain some benefit for themselves or another person, contrary to their 
duty to their employer; and iii) fraudulent statements, which usually involve 
falsification of an organisation's financial statements. 
 
Fraud can be committed by anyone. Perpetrators cannot usually be distinguished 
from other people on the basis of demographic or psychological factors. Individuals 
involved in fraud are regular people that have compromised their integrity and 
become involved in fraud. Several theories exist in the literature as to why 
individuals commit frauds. A common theme in each of the theories is one of conflict 
of interest. If this situation arises between the owner(s) and employees, it may lead to 
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dissatisfaction among employees. Affected employees may seek relief by resorting to 
fraudulent behaviour when an opportunity presents itself.  
 
Owners incur costs in order to monitor opportunistic behaviour of employees. By 
implementing an accounting system, owners are able to leverage an essential in-built 
business function of providing adequate controls to safe guard organisational assets. 
An accounting system provides a means of implementing and improving the internal 
control structure of an organisation (Romney and Steinbart 2009). An effective 
accounting system provides an audit trail that allows frauds to be discovered and 
makes concealment difficult. Potential fraud can be discovered in accounting records 
by examining transactions that are anomalous or appear otherwise unreasonable.  
 
Implementing a well-designed internal control policy enables an organisation to 
reduce opportunities for employees to commit occupational fraud. Further reduction 
in fraud may be achieved by introducing proactive fraud detection mechanisms that 
use computer-based technology (Broady and Roland 2008) to monitor and analyse 
business processes at an "unprecedented level of detail"  (Alles et al. 2006 p.138).  
 
1.1. Research problem  
Fraud within organisations is a multi-billion dollar industry Consequently, it is of 
major concern to industry and government (Goode and Lacey 2011 ; Best et al. 
2009). Fraud costs the Australian economy approximately $3 billion annually, and its 
frequency and financial impact continues to grow (Standards Australia 2008 ; KPMG 
2008). Many organisations are poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud (KPMG 
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2009). Fraud prevention is not perfect, therefore fraud detection is crucial. Fraud 
detection strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently identify those frauds that 
have circumvented preventative measures so that an organisation can take 
appropriate corrective action (Standards Australia 2008). 
 
A review of various fraud surveys reveals that fraud is a crisis that is being faced by 
organisations internationally. Of all frauds detected in organisations, only 17% were 
attributed to the internal audit function (PwC 2009). According to PwC, internal 
audit is the primary method of detecting frauds, however the trend is that fewer 
frauds are being consistently detected. Opportunities to commit fraud are increasing, 
yet insufficient resources are being deployed to improve internal controls. Many 
organisations are considering the use of data analytics and information technology 
(IT) to detect fraud (KPMG 2008). Using IT to proactively detect fraud enables 
organisations to monitor and analyse large transaction datasets in real or near real 
time, a task that cannot be accomplished, practically, if done manually (Alles et al. 
2006). 
 
A study of the literature reveals that given the pervasiveness of enterprise systems 
additional research is necessary to advance the awareness, relevance, and practicality 
of continuous detection of potential fraud that uses technology to rapidly analyse 
large sets of transaction data (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010 ; Singleton and Singleton 
2007 ; Debreceny et al. 2005). It appears that prior research on continuous auditing 
does not appear to deliver a model that facilitates proactive and continuous 
monitoring for potential fraud without difficulties. Research is required to develop 
approaches of continuous auditing that are specifically applicable to auditing of 
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financial transactions in enterprise systems (Kotb and Roberts 2011 ; Debreceny and 
Gray 2010 ; Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010).  
 
An issue often raised in the literature relates to information overload from alerts 
when implementing continuous fraud detection systems (Alles et al. 2008 ; Alles et 
al. 2006 ; Kuhn and Sutton 2006 ; Hunton et al. 2004). A related issue deals with the 
integrity of data used for continuous fraud detection (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). 
These are important issues, as there appears to be potential demand for efficient and 
effective implementation of continuous fraud detection in organisations. 
 
The modern global digital economy has significantly changed the way business is 
conducted and therefore the traditional approach to auditing can no longer be of real 
value to business performance or regulatory compliance. Most organisations conduct 
their business activities online and in real-time. This necessitates continuous 
monitoring and auditing thereby enabling internal auditors to perform their analyses 
of key business systems in real- or near real-time (Kotb and Roberts 2011 ; Kuhn Jr 
and Sutton 2010 ; Alles et al. 2006 ; Coderre 2005 ; Alles et al. 2002 ; Rezaee et al. 
2002 ; Kogan et al. 1999).   
 
The fraud landscape is dynamic, fast-moving and ever changing. Fraudsters are 
becoming more sophisticated in their use of technology and in their ability to commit 
and conceal fraudulent activities. As a result, fraud detection techniques must 
continue to evolve (Gill 2009 ; Singleton and Singleton 2007). With the advent of the 
digital economy and global market place employees now need only push a few keys 
on a computer keyboard to misdirect payments of vendor invoices, misplace 
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company assets or bribe suppliers. Physical possession of stolen property is no longer 
required and it is just as easy to program a computer to embezzle $1 as it is $1 
million. Consequently, the best way to reduce the incidence of fraud is to implement 
fraud prevention and detection mechanisms. Industry intelligence (by means of 
Google searches and literature review) indicates that several accounting systems 
have integrated fraud prevention mechanisms built-in to software. However, there 
appears to be a lack of generic tools that proactively detect potential fraud in 
enterprise systems. The focus of this research is therefore on developing a generic 
model for proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems. Actual fraud 
occurring can only be confirmed once potential fraudulent activities are fully 
investigated. Thus, the primary research question for this study is: 
 
Can a generalised model for proactive detection of potential fraud 
in enterprise systems be developed? 
 
1.2. Study design 
This research aims to answer the question whether "a generalised model for 
proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems can be developed".  The 
research methodology for this study consists of the following separate yet 
interdependent stages. 
 
i). Literature review – to recognise theories and concepts that underpin this 
research and to identify gaps in the literature. 
ii). Create a catalogue of fraud symptoms (critical combinations and known 
fraud symptoms). 
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iii). Identify data requirements to detect fraud in enterprise systems, in 
general and SAP, in particular. 
iv). Design, develop and implement prototype software on a stand-alone 
computer system. 
v). Perform experiments with simulated test data and case study data to 
verify program functionality of the prototype. 
vi). Seek support from experts for validity of the prototype. 
 
The primary objective of this research is to explore and develop innovative methods 
for proactively detecting potential fraud in enterprise systems. The intention is to 
build a model for detection of potential fraud based on analysis of patterns or 
signatures1. This research proposes a methodology for proactive detection of 
potential fraud that exploits audit trails in enterprise systems. The concept is 
demonstrated by developing a prototype. The aim of the prototype is to confirm the 
feasibility of implementing proactive detection of potential fraud in practice. The 
prototype is a software application that analyses transaction data from an SAP 
enterprise system for indicators of potential fraud. Reports and visualisations 
highlighting anomalous activities are produced. Further investigation of these 
findings may be initiated at the discretion of an auditor. 
 
1.3. Key definitions 
(In alphabetical order) 
To ensure that terms used throughout the thesis are understood, they are defined here. 
 
                                               
1 The term 'pattern or signature' is used interchangeably throughout the thesis. This term refers to 
'known or pre-existing' sequence of activities that may be used to help detect potential fraud. 
Activities performed by users' in an enterprise system may be recognised as anomalous by comparing 
them to these 'known patterns'. 
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Audit trails – provide a record of users' activities within an information system. They 
provide a means to accomplish several security related goals such as review of 
access, review of changes in security, review of attempts to bypass security and fraud 
detection. For the purpose of fraud detection they can be used to identify 'red flags' or 
anomalous activities perpetrated by real users acting in their own name, acting in 
collusion with other users, or by real users masquerading  as others. In each case, the 
actions of these 'users' are recorded in audit trails (Albrecht et al. 2009). 
 
Asset misappropriation – includes schemes in which perpetrators steal or misuse 
organisational resources, for example, skimming cash receipts, falsifying expense 
reports, shell company schemes, or payments to non-existent or ghost employees 
(ACFE 2010). 
 
Billing schemes – perpetrators use false documentation, such as invoices, purchase 
orders or credit cards, to cause their employer to issue payments for some fraudulent 
purpose. Disbursement of funds is performed by an organisation in the same manner 
as a legitimate disbursement. The key to this scheme is the ability of a perpetrator to 
deceive an employer into willingly and unwittingly making a bogus payment (ACFE 
2010). 
 
Dashboard - a user interface that organises and presents information in a way that is 
easy to read. The aim is to integrate information from multiple sources into a unified 
display. For example, a product might obtain data from the local operating system in 
a computer, from one or more applications that may be running, and from one or 
more remote sites on the web and present it as though it all came from the same 
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source. Dashboards may be customised in a multitude of ways and named 
accordingly, for example the fraud analytics dashboard developed in this research 
organises and presents data about various indicators in the accounts payable system 
(Marane 2008). 
 
Data - qualitative or quantitative attributes of a variable or set of variables. Data are 
typically the results of measurements and can be the basis of graphs, images, or 
observations of a set of variables. Data are often viewed as the lowest level of 
abstraction from which information and then knowledge are derived. Raw data or 
unprocessed data refers to a collection of numbers, characters, images or other 
outputs from devices that collect information to convert physical quantities into 
symbols. Data on its own carries no meaning. For data to become information, it 
must be interpreted and take on a meaning (Oxford 2012). (Also see information). 
 
Data analytics - is a process of examining raw data with the purpose of drawing 
conclusions about that data. It is used in many industries to allow organisations to 
make better business decisions. Data analytics focuses on inference, to derive 
conclusions based on what is already known by the researcher. Banks and credit 
cards companies, for example, may analyse withdrawal and spending patterns to 
prevent fraud or identity theft. In the context of this research, analytics involves 
acquisition and analysis of electronic data to identify transactions that are anomalous 
or appear otherwise unreasonable. Data analytics often use dashboards that involve 
dynamic analysis and reporting, of real- or near real-time data obtained from a 
system (Nigrini 2011 ; Marane 2008 ; NIST 2003). 
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Embezzlement – an employee wilfully takes company's money or property by reason 
of employment or position of trust. Embezzlement may be direct or indirect. Direct 
embezzlement involves theft of company cash, inventory or other assets. Indirect 
embezzlement occurs when an employee establishes a shell corporation and issues 
false invoices to their employer for payment of goods and/or services that are not 
actually delivered (Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Wells 2008). 
 
Enterprise systems – also referred to as enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, 
integrate internal and external management information across all areas of an 
organisation. Business areas may include financial, accounting, manufacturing, sales, 
customer relationship management, human resources and so on. These systems 
facilitate flows of information within organisational boundaries and manage 
connections to external business partners (Kamhawi 2008 ; Koch and Wailgum 2008 
; Norris et al. 2000). 
 
Information – as a concept has a diversity of meanings, from everyday usage to 
technical settings. In its most restricted technical sense it is an ordered sequence of 
symbols that can be interpreted as a message. Information can be recorded as signs, 
or transmitted as signals. It is any kind of event that affects the state of a dynamic 
system. Conceptually, information is the message (utterance or expression) being 
conveyed. The concept of information is closely related to notions of constraint, 
communication, control, data, form, instruction, knowledge, meaning, mental 
stimulus, pattern, perception, and representation (Oxford 2012). (Also see data). 
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Internal controls – are controls within an organisation that ensure data is processed 
correctly. They perform three important functions. Preventative controls deter 
problems before they arise. Detective controls discover problems as soon as they 
arise. Corrective controls remedy problems that have been discovered. Internal 
controls are an integral part of any organisations operating activities. They provide 
reasonable, rather than absolute assurance because providing complete assurance is 
difficult to achieve and prohibitively expensive (Romney and Steinbart 2009). 
 
Materiality – the importance or significance of an amount, transaction, or 
discrepancy. The objective auditing financial statements is to enable an auditor to 
express an opinion whether financial statements are prepared in conformity with an 
identified financial reporting framework such as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). The assessment of what is material is a matter of professional 
judgment. Information is considered material if its omission or misstatement could 
influence the economic decision of users taken on the basis of financial statements 
(CPA 2009). 
 
Middleware – is a software layer that provides a link between separate software 
applications'. It provides a common set of services that mediate interaction between 
these applications and computing resources. Initially middleware was intended to 
link newer applications to older systems, however, it also used to facilitate 
connections to multiple applications over computer networks. Organisations 
frequently use middleware to link data from databases distributed across an 
enterprise (Krakowiak 2007 ; Bouguettaya et al. 2006). 
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Module – in software, a module is part of a larger program. Modules are 
interchangeable components that perform specific functions. An individual module 
contains everything needed to accomplish a specific function. Modules may be 
integrated into larger programs through interfaces (Velastin 1991).   
 
Ponzi scheme – a type of fraudulent investment scheme that pays investors returns 
from their own money or monies paid by subsequent investors, rather than from 
profits earned by an individual or organisation running an investment scheme. The 
purpose of the scheme is to entice new investors to hand over funds by offering high 
short-term returns (Albrecht et al. 2009).  
 
Red-flags – early warning symptoms or indicators of fraud. These symptoms may 
include changes in an employee's lifestyle, a general ledger being out of balance, an 
employee behaving suspiciously, or an anonymous tip that fraud is occurring. 
Investigation of these fraud symptoms may result in early detection of frauds 
(Albrecht et al. 2009).  
 
Segregation of Duties – separating of accounting functions of authorisation, custody, 
and recording so as to minimise an employee's ability to commit and conceal fraud. 
Authorisation relates to approval of transactions. Recording relates to preparation of 
source documents, data entry and preparing of reconciliations and reports. Custody 
relates to handling cash or other assets, receiving and issuing payments (Romney and 
Steinbart 2009). 
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Shell corporation – a company which serves as a mechanism for business 
transactions without itself having any significant assets. They are not in themselves 
illegal and have legitimate business purposes; however, fraudsters use them to 
commit fraud. Fraudsters create these fictitious entities and submit false invoices, in 
the name of the entity, to an employer for payment (Wells 2008). 
 
Validation - is an attempt to ensure that the right product is built and that it fulfils its 
specific intended purpose (IEEE 2004). 
 
Vendor fraud - includes a broad range of schemes, from perpetrators that create 
fictitious shell companies and submit invoices for payment, to trusted suppliers that 
overcharge an organisation for more than is actually supplied or done.  Some vendors 
may even collude with an organisation's own employees to help commit the fraud as 
part of a kickback scheme. An example of a non-accomplice vendor fraud scheme is 
when a perpetrator changes vendor payment details to a personal account, submits 
invoices for payment, and subsequently changes payment details back to the original 
values, causing payment to be misdirected to a personal bank account (Best et al. 
2009 ; Wells 2002a).  
 
Verification - is an attempt to ensure that a product is built correctly and that outputs 
of activities meet specifications imposed on them during the design phase (IEEE 
2004). 
 
Visualisation - is a general term used to describe any technology that enable users to 
'see' data in order to help them better understand and put it in an appropriate context. 
  
 - 30 - 
Visualisation tools go beyond standard charts and graphs, displaying data in more 
sophisticated ways such as dials and gauges, heat maps, tree maps and detailed bar 
and pie charts. Visualised data is frequently displayed in dashboards (TechTarget 
2010). 
 
White collar crime – a crime committed by a respectable person in a high position in 
an organisation during the course of their occupation. An individual personally 
benefits from the crime to the detriment of an organisation (Wells 2008). 
 
1.4. Delimitations of scope 
There is some delimitation of scope of this study to ensure that it concentrates on the 
research questions, propositions and objectives only. When considering an automated 
solution for proactive fraud detection, the focus has to be on questions that can be 
answered with the aid of computerised tools (Lanza 2007). Some questions are too 
subjective, for example, "Are the vendor's goods or services of good quality?" Any 
effort to develop an automated solution will require evidence that is documented in 
an enterprise system's audit trails and that can be investigated using data analytics 
tools. Transactions that occur outside an enterprise system cannot be investigated 
using this methodology.   
 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) classifies occupational fraud 
into three broad categories; asset misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent 
statements. Several fraud surveys have found asset misappropriation to be the most 
common category of fraud perpetrated by non-management employees (ACFE 2010 
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; KPMG 2009 ; PwC 2009). Cash assets were more frequently targeted than non-cash 
assets and billing schemes were the most common method used to misappropriate 
cash assets.  This research examines the feasibility of developing a model for 
proactive detection of potential billing fraud schemes involving shell companies and 
non-accomplice vendors within accounts payable. Hereinafter these schemes are 
referred to as ‘vendor frauds.’ 
 
Large scale implementations of enterprise systems have resulted in many 
organisations being highly automated and fully integrated. The development of this 
enterprise system environment provides the necessary infrastructure for the effective 
evolution of the auditing function from a periodic event to an ongoing process 
through the use of computer-based technology. Enterprise systems software are 
available from several vendors, including SAP, Oracle and Microsoft, and 
collectively has 71% of market share world-wide. For several years, however, 
Germany-based enterprise software company SAP has consistently been the market 
leader (SAP 2010 ; Lager and Tsai 2008). In 2010 Gartner (2010) recognised SAP as 
the leading vendor of enterprise systems software accounting for 22% of the market.  
Many organisations have realised that SAP solutions are important to their success. 
Several Fortune 500 companies, including IBM, Toyota, Apple, Coca-Cola, and 
Google use SAP exclusively for their core day to day operations including 
accounting and financial applications, procurement, order processing and supplier 
management, inventory management, and HR management and payroll functions 
(CMU 2011 ; Gartner 2010 ; BOS 2009). The prototype software being developed by 
this research exploits SAP audit trails for proactive detection of potential vendor 
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fraud schemes. [Testing and evaluation of the prototype will provide evidence that 
the concept of proactive detection of potential fraud is feasible in practice.] 
 
The prototype developed in this research is intended to address the primary research 
question by providing evidence that "a generalised model for proactive detection of 
potential fraud in enterprise systems can be developed". Such a prototype is meant to 
demonstrate that the "concept of proactive detection of potential fraud" is feasible in 
practice. It is a limited version meant for showcasing the concept and for testing 
purposes only. Some functions may be incomplete, not implemented or may not even 
work at all. 
 
The prototype makes no assumption about individual SAP installations. It relies 
exclusively on transaction data obtained from the financial module to perform its 
analysis. Other factors that are not considered by the prototype include; 
sophistication of fraudsters, posting of transactions by system and security 
administration staff, collusion between fraudsters to circumvent internal controls, and 
organisations wherein segregation of duties may not be feasible due to small 
numbers of staff. These situations require additional compensating manual processes 
to safeguard against inappropriate activities. 
 
The scope of this study is therefore limited to detection of potential vendor fraud 
schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors in an SAP 
enterprise system using prototype software developed for this purpose. The study 
makes no claims to be able to identify any 'actual' fraudulent activities but is limited 
to extracting data that provide symptomatic evidence that fraudulent activities might 
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have occurred, Throughout this thesis the term 'fraud', 'fraud detection', or 'fraud 
detection tool' means 'potential' fraud not 'actual' fraud.  
 
1.5. Research significance 
Australia has an estimated $3 billion per year financial fraud problem that continues 
to worsen (Standards Australia 2008). This research directly addresses the national 
research priority of safeguarding Australia, in particular the priority goals of critical 
infrastructure and protecting Australia from terrorism and crime (ARC 2011). 
Australian criminal codes define fraud as 'crime' and prescribe prison terms of up to 
ten years where fraud is committed by an employee or company director.  
 
Although fraud surveys reveal that fraud is increasing, it is difficult to know for sure. 
It is impossible to know what percentage of perpetrators are caught. There may be 
frauds that are never discovered. Many frauds that are detected are handled quietly 
by the victim organisations as they are more concerned about reputation, and costs 
associated with fraud investigations 
 
Enhancing the ability of organisations in the private and public sectors to detect fraud 
is important for the following reasons: 
· Detecting financial fraud will enhance the stability of businesses and the 
economy. Extraordinary impacts have been observed on stock exchanges both 
in the United States and Australia following major financial frauds (for 
example, Enron, WorldCom, HiH Insurance and Lehman Brothers). 
· Losses incurred from fraud reduce a firm's income on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 
This means that for every $1 of fraud, net income is reduced by $1. If a firm's 
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profit margin at the time of the fraud was ten percent, the firm would have to 
generate ten times more revenue to restore the effect on net income.  
· Outcomes of this research will enhance protection for stakeholders 
(shareholders, lenders, and employees) that stand to lose a great deal when 
major financial frauds are detected. 
· This research is of particular relevance to financial institutions and the retail and 
public sectors (for example, Queensland Health Hohepa Morehu-Barlow 
Fraud Case) as they appear to be major financial fraud targets in Australia. 
These organisations represent a major component of the nation's critical 
infrastructure. 
 
 
This research extends prior research that focuses principally on fraud prevention 
rather than its detection (Goode and Lacey 2011 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Coderre 
2005 ; Best 2005). Preventative fraud controls are intended to reduce or eliminate 
opportunities to perpetrate fraud by: i) implementing segregation of duties; ii) having 
a system of proper authorisations; ii) implementing physical safeguards; iv) 
implementing independent system checks; and v) having audit trails (COSO 1992). 
Once a system is violated, detective controls may help in identifying the occurrence 
of harm (Abu-Musa 2007). The objective of this research is therefore, to explore and 
develop innovative methods to proactively detect potential fraud by continuous 
monitoring and analysis of audit trail data in enterprise systems. Continuous 
monitoring enables an auditor to provide a degree of assurance on information 
shortly after disclosure  (Rezaee et al. 2002). This enables an organisation to quickly 
and efficiently identify activities that circumvent preventative measures and take 
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appropriate corrective action thereby reducing the propensity for losses associated 
with future fraud.  
 
1.6. Structure of dissertation 
Chapter 1 - Introduction. This first Chapter discusses the background to this study 
which includes the research problem, study design, definitions of key terms used 
throughout this dissertation, delimitation of the scope, and significance of this study.  
  
Chapter 2 - Literature review. This Chapter discusses the relevant literature on fraud, 
its theoretical underpinnings that constitute this research and its detection in 
enterprise systems.  Previous studies in this area of research are discussed and 
relevant gaps in the literature are identified. The primary research question is 
developed from the gaps identified in the literature.  
 
Chapter 3 - Research methodology. Based on the literature review, a theoretical 
framework is developed and discussed in this Chapter. The research methodology 
used during the course of this study for data collection, methods to detect fraud, and 
analysis are also discussed. An expert panel protocol and instrument for collecting 
evidence for validation of the prototype are also developed.  
 
Chapter 4 - Prototype design. This Chapter addresses research propositions RP1a, 
RP1b and RP1c. The SAP enterprise system is investigated to determine whether it 
documents adequate data in its audit trails to allow retrospective monitoring of user 
activities. A conceptual design of a prototype is proposed. Detailed design 
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specifications are produced. A logical design and detection algorithms are 
subsequently developed from the design specifications.  
 
Chapter 5 - Prototype implementation and testing. This Chapter addresses research 
propositions RP2a, RP2b and RP2c. Implementation and test results of the prototype 
are described with reference to a number of appendices. Verification of the prototype 
is achieved by performing a series of tests using test data involving simulated 
activity. Case study data from a large international manufacturing company is 
processed using the prototype, exposing it to live data. Validation is achieved by 
obtaining independent reviews from auditing practitioners and an expert panel 
demonstration. Timing experiments are conducted to provide evidence in support of 
auditor productivity.  
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion and future research. The final Chapter summarises 
conclusions of this study, contributions to the literature and auditing practice, 
limitations, and recommendations for future research and extensions to the prototype. 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
Given the pervasiveness of enterprise systems there is limited research regarding 
proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems. There appears to be no 
research in developing a generalised model for proactive detection of potential fraud 
in enterprise systems. Additional research is necessary to advance the awareness, 
relevance, and practicality of continuous fraud detection in enterprise systems. 
Limited research has been conducted in the use of embedded audit modules within 
enterprise systems, however, it does not appear to deliver a model that facilitates 
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proactive and continuous monitoring for potential fraud without difficulties.  
Research is required to develop innovative approaches for proactive detection of 
potential fraud, and to demonstrate how this can be done efficiently and effectively. 
Information overload from alerts produced by automated fraud detection systems 
also appears to be a problem.  
 
These are important issues, as there appears to be potential demand for efficient and 
effective implementation of proactive detection of potential fraud in organisations. 
The research conducted in this study will make a contribution to the literature by 
seeking to address these gaps, and to enhance the body of knowledge in the area of 
proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Literature Review 
2. Literature Review  
2.0. Introduction 
Fraud is inherent in all organisations. Edwin H. Sutherland, a criminologist at 
Indiana University, coined the phrase "white-collar crime" in 1939 (Sutherland 
1940). Donald R. Cressey, a student of Sutherland, was especially interested in 
embezzlers, whom he referred to as "trust violators". He was intrigued by what led 
these people to be overcome by temptation. Upon completion of his work, Cressey 
developed the classic model for the occupational offender. This model, more 
commonly referred to as the 'fraud triangle', underpins the theoretical foundation for 
this study (Cressey 1950). 
 
According to the ACFE's Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, "a 
typical organisation loses five percent of its annual revenue to fraud. Applied to the 
estimated 2009 Gross World Product of $58.07 trillion, this figure translates to a 
potential total fraud loss of more than $2.9 trillion" (ACFE 2010 p.4). Consequently, 
it is of major concern to industry and government (Goode and Lacey 2011 ; ACFE 
2010 ; Best et al. 2009). Fraud costs the Australian economy approximately $3 
billion annually (Standards Australia 2008), and its frequency and financial impact 
continues to grow (Standards Australia 2008 ; KPMG 2008). Many organisations are 
poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud (KPMG 2009 ; KPMG 2008 ; KPMG 
  
 - 39 - 
2007 ; KPMG 2004). Fraud prevention is not perfect therefore, fraud detection is 
crucial. Fraud detection strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently identify 
those frauds that have circumvented preventative measures so that an organisation 
can take appropriate corrective action (Standards Australia 2008).  
 
A review of various fraud surveys revealed that fraud is a crisis that is being faced by 
organisations internationally. Of all frauds detected in organisations, only 17% were 
attributed to the internal audit function (PwC 2009). According to PwC, internal 
audit was the primary method of detecting fraud, however the trend was that fewer 
frauds are being consistently detected. With advances in information technology and 
emergence of electronic business, modern enterprise systems may record millions of 
transactions annually. An auditor may extract a small sample of these during a 
financial audit. Suppose a fraudster perpetrates only a few frauds annually, it is 
plausible that none of them may be discovered by the financial audit.  Many 
fraudsters rely on this to conceal fraud. Thus, while opportunities to commit fraud 
continue to increase, it appears that insufficient resources are being deployed to 
improving internal controls. Many organisations are considering the use of data 
analytics and information technology (IT) to detect fraud (KPMG 2008). Using IT to 
proactively detect potential fraud enables organisations to monitor and analyse large 
transaction datasets in real- or near real- time (Edge and Falcone Sampaio 2009 ; 
Alles et al. 2006), a task that cannot practically be accomplished by an internal 
auditor. A study of the literature reveals that there is a need for further research into 
proactive detection of potential fraud that uses technology to rapidly analyse large 
sets of transaction data (Kotb and Roberts 2011 ; Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010 ; 
Debreceny and Gray 2010). This research aims to explore and develop innovative 
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methods of using information technology to proactively detect potential fraud in 
enterprise systems. A fundamental first step in studying the fraud problem is to 
unambiguously define fraud itself. 
2.1. Definition of fraud  
There are two principal methods of getting something from others illegally. They can 
either be physically forced, or they can be deceived into giving up their assets. The 
first type is called robbery and the second is fraud. Albrecht et al. (2009) defines 
fraud as a deception made for personal gain. "Deception" is key. The most common 
definition of fraud according to Webster's Dictionary (2001 p.380) is: 
 
"Fraud is a generic term that embraces all the multifarious 
means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted 
to by one individual, to get an advantage over another by 
false representations. No definite and invariable rule can be 
laid down as a general proposition in defining fraud, as it 
includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which 
another is cheated. The only boundaries defining it are those 
which limit human knavery." 
 
Australian Government Fraud Control Guidelines define fraud as (ComLaw 2011 
p.4):  
"theft; accounting fraud (false invoices, misappropriation etc); unlawful use 
of, or obtaining property, equipment, material or services; causing a loss, or 
avoiding and/or creating a liability; providing false or misleading 
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information, or failing to provide it when there is an obligation to do so; 
misuse of assets, equipment or facilities; making, or using false, forged or 
falsified documents; and wrongfully using information or intellectual 
property." 
 
Furthermore, the Government identifies fraud as targeting revenue, benefits, 
property, information and intelligence, funding and grants, entitlements, facilities, 
and money or property. Benefits obtained fraudulently are not restricted to monetary 
or material benefits, and may be tangible or intangible, including unauthorised 
provision of access to or disclosure of information.  Benefits may also be obtained by 
third parties in addition to the fraud perpetrator. 
 
Two types of fraud can be distinguished: misappropriation of assets and fraudulent 
financial reporting (Casabona and Grego 2003 ; ASB 2002). Misappropriation of 
assets is often referred to as 'employee fraud' and involves theft of an organisation's 
assets. Fraudulent financial reporting involves deliberate misstatements or omissions 
of amounts or disclosures of financial statements to deceive investors and creditors, 
increase share price, meet cash flow needs or hide company losses and problems 
(Romney and Steinbart 2009 ; Wells 2008 ; Casabona and Grego 2003). The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) extends this definition by 
classifying frauds and the methods used to commit them. The term fraud is therefore 
used to describe a wide variety of crimes and swindles that range from Ponzi 
schemes, identity and data theft to falsification of financial reports.  
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The ACFE (2010 p.6) defines occupational fraud as: 
"…the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the 
employing organization's resources or assets…"  
 
Occupational fraud is very broad and it encompasses a range of transgressions by 
employees at all levels of an organisational hierarchy. Occupational fraud can be 
divided into three categories: fraudulent statements, corruption and asset 
misappropriation (ACFE 2010) (Figure 2.1). 
 
The three broad categories of occupational fraud generally correspond to the three 
broad levels of hierarchy in an organisation. The production of fraudulent statements 
is often orchestrated at board/executive-level, while corruption mostly affects people 
in management positions, i.e. people who have the power to influence company's 
decisions in favour of the corrupting party. Asset misappropriation is most common 
among non-management employees, primarily because these employees do not have 
opportunities to commit fraud at the previous two levels (ACFE 2010 ; KPMG 2010 
; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Wells 2008).  
2.1.1. Asset misappropriation 
Asset misappropriation is the most common category of fraud (ACFE 2010). This is 
consistent with studies that show fraud by non-management employees is most 
common (ACFE 2010 ; KPMG 2010 ; KPMG 2009 ; KPMG 2008). This is, 
primarily because most organisations employ more non-management than 
management employees.  
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Figure 2.1: Categories of occupational fraud 
Source: (ACFE 2010) 
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Asset misappropriation involves the misuse and appropriation of company assets for 
personal gain. It is divided into two subcategories: a) misappropriation of cash, and 
b) misappropriation of inventory and other assets that can usually be turned into 
cash. Cash schemes involve larceny, skimming and fraudulent disbursements. Non-
cash schemes involve misuse and larceny (ACFE 2010 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; 
Coenen 2008 ; Wells 2008 ; Potla 2003).  
 
Larceny involves taking an employer's cash or other assets without the consent and 
against the will of the employer, after it has been recorded in the company's records. 
The two main methods are: a) theft of cash on hand, and b) theft from the cash bank 
deposit. In order to prevent detection, the fraudster will have to create or modify 
accounting documents explaining the cash shortage. Skimming schemes are schemes 
where cash is stolen before a book entry is made. This may involve not recording or 
understating of sales. Receivables schemes involve write-off and lapping schemes. 
In write-off schemes an employee collects money for receivables but writes off the 
receivables instead of recognising them as paid. In lapping schemes an employee 
steals one client's payment and later covers it by paying their account with another 
client's payment. This type of fraud is difficult to perpetrate as it requires ongoing 
maintenance. Fraudulent disbursements are methods where the misappropriation of 
funds appears to be for legitimate business events. There are five groups under 
fraudulent disbursements i.e. billing schemes, payroll schemes, expense 
reimbursement schemes, and cheque tampering and register disbursements. 
 
Billing schemes involve making payments for inaccurate or false expenses or 
payments for personal purchases. The aim of false or inaccurate payments is to 
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redirect the money back to oneself. Billing schemes may involve the use of a shell 
company (i.e. a company created for the sole purpose of committing fraud) which 
submits fictitious invoices for payment. The fraudster must be able to influence 
approval of vendors and invoices. Non-accomplice vendors may also be used by 
intercepting payments to them, intercepting refunds or by stealing legitimate 
payments made to them. Purchasing (credit) cards are another method for making 
personal purchases at the company's expense. Payroll schemes may involve ghost 
employees being entered into the system. This scheme is similar to shell vendors. 
Alternatively, employees may falsify the amount of hours they work or inflate the 
commission they should be paid for sales. Another method involves claiming 
compensation for fictitious injuries. 
 
Expense reimbursement schemes involve submitting false expenses and then being 
reimbursed for them. Methods include expense schemes, overstated expenses, 
fictitious expenses, and multiple reimbursement schemes. In cheque tampering 
schemes a perpetrator is actually involved in the issuing of a cheque. The signature 
of the person/s that normally approves a cheque is forged. Another method is to 
claim to be the party written on a legitimate cheque or to change the payee written 
on the cheque. In the concealed cheque technique the perpetrator submits a 
fraudulent cheque amongst legitimate cheques so that the cheque will be 'rubber-
stamped' signed. In authorised marker schemes a fraudster is the person who can 
approve and issue cheques. This situation makes it quite easy to issue cheques to a 
perpetrator as it relies on weak and ineffective controls. In register disbursement 
schemes cash is removed from a cash register and recorded on the system using 
techniques such as false voids or false refunds. This kind of fraud occurs in cash 
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businesses such as retail, restaurants or bars where employees may void an order 
provide customers with ordered goods and keep monies for themselves.  
 
Non-cash assets such as inventory and equipment may be misappropriated in a 
number of ways that can range from taking home a box of pens to theft of millions 
of dollars of property. Company assets may be misused ('borrowed') or stolen. 
Assets such as company vehicles, supplies, computers and other office equipment 
may be misused by employees to do personal work during company time. Costs of 
non-cash asset misuse are difficult to quantify. Company assets may also be stolen. 
Employees may create false documentation to ship company merchandise to 
personal addresses, or they may simple take company assets without trying to 
account for their absence. 
2.1.2. Corruption 
While misappropriating assets sees a physical reduction of assets, such as cash, 
corruption schemes involve employees using their influence or official position in 
organisations to unlawfully obtain benefits for themselves or other persons, contrary 
to the rights of others (ACFE 2010 ; Wells 2008). Corruption schemes are divided 
into bribery, conflict of interest, economic extortion and illegal gratuity. Bribery 
involves offering something of value in order to influence a business decision. 
Illegal gratuities involve giving an employee something of value to reward a 
decision rather than to influence it. Economic extortion occurs when one person 
demands payment from another, for example an employee demands payment from a 
supplier before awarding them a contract. Conflicts of interest arise when an 
employee has an undisclosed economic or personal interest in a transaction that 
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adversely affects an organisation, for example the employee has a stake in a 
company that his employer is transacting with possibly through a family relationship 
i.e. spouse, uncle, cousin, and so on. 
2.1.3. Fraudulent financial statements 
Financial statement fraud is the intentional misstatement or omission of material 
information from an organisation's financial statements with the intention of 
deceiving investors and creditors (ACFE 2010 ; Wells 2008). Common schemes 
involve recording of fictitious revenues, concealing liabilities or expenses and 
artificially inflating reported assets. 
 
 
This section provides a definition of fraud that is applicable to this research. 
According to various fraud surveys (ACFE 2010 ; KPMG 2010), asset 
misappropriations appear to be perpetrated most frequently. It is most common 
among non-management employees, primarily because these employees do not have 
opportunities to commit fraud at the previous two levels (ACFE 2010 ; KPMG 2010 
; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Wells 2008). Consequently, the broad area of investigation 
for this research is 'Asset Misappropriation' with a specific focus on 'Billing 
Schemes' within accounts payable (AP).  Fraud can occur through a variety of 
schemes that may be perpetrated by employees at all levels of an organisational 
hierarchy. Fraud is perpetrated in secret and concealed by an employee, this action 
results in a direct or indirect benefit to a perpetrator, while a victim organisation may 
suffer a loss of assets, revenue or business opportunity.  
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2.2. Occurrence and cost of fraud 
The number and value of fraud incidents in Australia and New Zealand continues to 
increase significantly (ACFE 2010 ; KPMG 2008). Forty five percent of 
organisations experienced incidents of fraud between 2006 and 2008. The level of 
fraud suffered was higher in large organisations. Sixty-two percent of organisations 
with 1,000 to 10,000 employees experienced at least one fraud, while 89% of 
organisations employing more than 10,000 people experienced at least one fraud 
(KPMG 2008). The median loss suffered by organisations worldwide annually was 
$139,000 for organisations with 1,000 to 10,000 employees, and $164,000 for 
organisations with more than 10,000 employees. More than 40% of privately owned 
companies and more than 30% of publicly owned companies were victims of fraud 
(ACFE 2010). 
 
Asset misappropriation is the most common type of fraud, occurring in more than 
86% of all cases (ACFE 2010) (Table 2.1). The median loss from asset 
misappropriation was $135,000. (Note: the sum of percentages in Table 2.1 exceeds 
100% because several cases involved schemes from more than one category). 
 
Table 2.1: Categories of occupational fraud and abuse 
Category % of all Cases Median Loss 
Asset Misappropriation 86.3% $135,000 
Corruption 32.8% $250,000 
Fraudulent Statements 4.8% $4,100,000 
 
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
 
Asset misappropriation schemes involve the theft of cash and non-cash assets. Cash 
assets i.e. cash receipts, cash disbursements and cash on hand (such as petty cash and 
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cash in vault) were more frequently targeted (83.7%) than non-cash assets i.e. 
inventory, supplies, fixed assets, intellectual property, investments and proprietary 
information (16.3%)  
 
Fraudsters use various schemes to misappropriate assets from their employees. The 
ACFE (2010) survey classified asset misappropriation into nine sub-categories i.e. 
cash larceny, skimming, billing, payroll, expense reimbursements, cheque tampering,  
cash register disbursements, cash on hand misappropriation and non-cash 
misappropriation.  Of all cases reported in the United States of America, billing 
schemes occurred most frequently (26%).  
 
Table 2.2: Sub-categories of asset misappropriation (US Data) 
Category % of all Cases Median Loss 
Billing 26.0% $128,000 
Non-Cash Misappropriations  16.3% $90,000  
Expense Reimbursements 15.1% $33,000 
Skimming  14.5%   $60,000 
Cheque Tampering 13.4% $131,000 
Cash on Hand Misappropriations 12.6% $23,000 
Cash Larceny  9.8% $100,000  
Payroll 8.5% $72,000 
Cash Register Disbursements 3.0% $23,000 
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
 
A billing scheme is any scheme in which an employee causes their employer to issue 
payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated invoices or 
invoices for personal purchases (Wells 2008 ; Coenen 2008 ; ACFE 2010). The 
median loss suffered from billing schemes was $128,000 (Table 2.2).A similar trend 
was observed in cases reported from Oceania (Australia, Fiji, Micronesia and New 
Zealand) (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3: Sub-categories of asset misappropriation (Oceania Data) 
Category % of all Cases 
Non-Cash Misappropriations  30.0% 
Billing 27.5% 
Cheque Tampering 17.5% 
Skimming  12.%%  
Expense Reimbursements 10.0% 
Cash on Hand Misappropriations 10.0% 
Cash Larceny  7.5% 
Payroll 5.0% 
Cash Register Disbursements 2.5% 
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
The main factor that contributed to fraudulent activities in an organisation was a lack 
of internal controls (37.8%) e.g. poor segregation of duties. The second highest 
contributing factor was overriding existing internal controls (19.2%) (Table 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4: Control weakness that contributed to fraud 
Category % of all Cases 
Lack of Internal Controls 37.8% 
Override of Existing Internal Controls 19.2% 
Lack of Management Review 17.9% 
Poor Tone at the Top 8.4% 
Lack of Competent Personnel in Oversight Roles 6.9% 
Lack of Independent Checks/Audits 5.6% 
Lack of Employee Fraud Education 1.9% 
Lack of Clear Lines of Authority 1.8% 
Lack of Reporting Mechanism 0.6% 
 
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
Non-management employees were found to be the largest group of fraud perpetrators 
(42.1%). Managers perpetrated 41% of occupational frauds and owners perpetrated 
16.9% (Figure 2.2). The median loss suffered from frauds perpetrated by non-
management employees was $80,000. This amount increased to $200,000 for 
managers and to $723,000 for owner-related frauds.  
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Figure 2.2: Position of fraud perpetrator  
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
More than 80% of all frauds were committed by employees in six departments, 
namely accounting, operations, sales, executive/upper management, customer service 
and purchasing. The frauds in these six departments accounted for 95% of all losses 
(Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: Fraud cases based on perpetrator's department  
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
Among the six departments with the highest frequency of fraud cases, upper 
management ($829,000) and purchasing ($500,000) caused the highest median losses 
(Figure 2.4). 
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Median Loss by Department
Executive/Upper 
Management, $829,000.00
Operations, $105,000.00
Accounting, $180,000.00
Purchasing, $500,000.00
Customer Service, 
$46,000.00
Sales, $95,000.00
 
 
Figure 2.4: Median loss by perpetrator's department  
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
The most common fraud schemes perpetrated in the accounting department were 
cheque tampering (33.2%) and billing fraud (30.8%). In the operations department 
corruption (30.8%) and billing fraud (22.1%) were the top two schemes. In the sales 
department it was corruption (33.8%) and theft of non-cash assets (23.6%). 
Executives mostly engaged in corruption (48.7%), billing (40.6%) and expense 
reimbursement schemes (29.9%). Corruption (21.7%), skimming (19.2%), theft of 
cash on-hand (18.3%) and fraudulent register disbursements (8.3%) were the top 
ranked fraud schemes perpetrated by customer service employees. 
 
From the above analysis of the occurrence and cost of fraud in organisations, asset 
misappropriation is identified as the most common type of fraud perpetrated. 
Employees at all levels of an organisational hierarchy were involved in perpetrating 
frauds, however the largest group are non-management employees. These employees 
used billing schemes to perpetrate fraud against organisations. Two weaknesses 
exploited by fraudsters were the lack of internal controls and overriding of existing 
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internal controls. According to KPMG (2010), there was a 6% increase in poor 
internal controls as a contributing factor to fraud when compared to their previous 
fraud survey (KPMG 2008). Identifying the underlying reasons that motivate these 
individuals to deliberately violate their position of trust is essential in understanding 
the concept of fraud and its detection. 
2.3. Motivation to commit fraud 
Human needs can be satisfied by either honest or dishonest means. What is it that 
motivates an employee to choose dishonest methods to meet or satisfy their needs 
within an organisation? A factor in understanding human behaviour in organisations 
is why organisations exist in the first place. 
 
Organisations exist because entrepreneurs identify and exploit market opportunities 
to create wealth (Coase 1937). As an organisation grows the entrepreneur can no 
longer manage the business alone. The roles of ownership and management need to 
be separate (Berle and Means 1932) with operational decisions becoming the 
responsibility of management (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  With management 
dispersed, conflicts of interest may arise between management and the owner(s) 
leading to the 'principal-agent' problem (Fama and Jensen 1983 ; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  In these situations management may use organisational resources 
to resolve conflicts in their favour (Demsetz 1983).  If management is motivated by 
selfish and opportunistic behaviour, then owners interests will not be served (Berle 
and Means 1932).   
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Owners' abilities to effectively identify selfish and opportunistic behaviours by 
management are diminished because of information asymmetry i.e. the 'principal-
agent' problem. Information asymmetry occurs as a result of agents (management) 
having more information about operational activities of an organisation than a 
principal (owner) (Fama and Jensen 1983 ; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Contractual 
relationships exist between principal and agent in an organisation (Adams 1994 ; 
Jensen and Meckling 1976). Both parties use this relationship to maximise their 
wealth. This means that agents with self-centred motives may violate their position 
of trust by acting against the interests of the principal (Adams 1994). 
 
Behaviours of individuals in organisations are a set of complex social interactions 
which is explained by Frederick Herzberg's 'Theory of Motivation' (1959) and 
Abraham Maslow's 'Hierarchy of Needs' (1943). Herzberg's (1959) two factor theory 
(motivation-hygiene theory) examines factors that affect people's attitudes about 
work. Factors such as company policy, supervision, interpersonal relations, working 
conditions, and salary are hygiene factors i.e. factors that do not give positive 
satisfaction although their absence results in dissatisfaction. Conversely, motivators 
such as achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility, and advancement, 
determine job satisfaction. Some of his key findings were:  
 
i). people become dissatisfied by a poor environment, but they are seldom 
satisfied by a good environment;  
ii). preventing dissatisfaction is just as important as encouragement of 
satisfaction; and  
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iii). hygiene factors operate independently of motivation factors; an 
individual could be highly motivated in his job yet dissatisfied with his 
work environment.  
 
Maslow's (1954) 'Hierarchy of Needs'2 describes how people satisfy various personal 
needs within contexts of their jobs. There is a general pattern of needs recognition 
and satisfaction that people follow in the same sequence. A person cannot recognise 
or pursue the next higher need in the hierarchy until their current need is satisfied 
(Maslow 1943).  Individuals in an organisation commonly have difficulty expressing 
what they want from their job. Employers may impose conditions that they believe 
to be in the best interests of employees (Green 2000), leading to dissatisfaction 
among employees They may seek relief and satisfy their needs by violating their 
position of trust and resorting to fraudulent behaviour. 
 
Donald R. Cressy was interested in studying employees that violate their position of 
trust to satisfy to satisfy their needs. He was especially interested in identifying 
circumstances that led employees to be overcome by temptation. Cressey 
hypothesized that (Cressey 1953 p.30): 
"Trusted persons become trust violators when they conceive of 
themselves as having a financial problem which is non-
shareable, are aware this problem can be secretly resolved by 
violation of the position of financial; trust, and are able to 
apply to their own conduct in that situation verbalizations 
which enable them to adjust their conceptions of themselves 
                                               
2 Maslow's hierarchy of needs is represented by a pyramid, with the physiological need at the bottom, 
and the self-actualisation need at the top. The other three are safety, love and esteem, moving up the 
pyramid respectively. 
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as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves as 
users of entrusted funds or property." 
 
Cressey's work provided valuable insight into why people commit fraud and it led to 
the development of the 'fraud triangle' (Figure 2.5) (Cressey 1950). The three key 
elements of the fraud triangle are pressure (an un-shareable need), rationalisation (of 
personal ethics), and opportunity (lack of adequate controls and knowledge to 
commit a fraud). All three elements must be present in order for a fraud to be 
perpetrated (Albrecht et al. 2008 ; Cressey 1950).  
 
Pressure is related to an employee's perceived immediate need for an asset due 
mainly to financial difficulties. This causes a person to take significant risks in order 
to obtain the desired resource. While it is not within the scope of an auditor's 
responsibilities to resolve issues leading to pressures associated with fraud, it is 
important to bring these situations to management's attention if uncovered. It is a 
reasonable assumption that pressure is not a factor that can be captured in transaction 
data within an enterprise system. It tends to be more a human condition for 
organisational behaviour and psychology researchers to study. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Fraud triangle 
Source: (Albrecht et al. 2009) 
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Opportunities to commit fraud arise when an employee is in a position of trust, 
internal controls are weak or non-existent and when an employee has the applicable 
knowledge to commit a fraud. An employee perceives that an opportunity to commit 
fraud exists, commits it and conceals it. Good controls are important in limiting 
opportunities to commit fraud, but they are not fool proof. Flaws in internal controls 
provide opportunities for committing fraud however digital 'footprints' or 'signatures' 
of these activities are recorded in transaction data and audit trails within an 
enterprise system. These 'footprints' can be analysed in order to determine whether a 
fraud has potentially occurred. Interestingly, the ease with which a fraud can be 
perpetrated in a digital environment provides the tools to investigate and identify 
fraud i.e. computer technology. 
 
Rationalisation or integrity is the third element of the fraud triangle. Individuals do 
not commit fraud unless it is consistent with their own personal code of ethics or 
belief. This limiting factor prevents most employees from committing fraud even 
though an opportunity may exist. When fraud is committed and detected most 
perpetrators rationalise their behaviour to match with their personal beliefs and/ or 
pressures they face. Again, this factor cannot be captured in transaction data within 
an enterprise system.  
 
Several theories have been identified that inform and underpin this research 
(Figure 2.6). A common theme in each of these theories is that if a conflict of 
interest arises between owner(s) and employees, this may lead to dissatisfaction 
among employees. The affected employee(s) may seek relief by resorting to 
fraudulent behaviour when an opportunity presents itself. Each of the theories  
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Figure 2.6: Theoretical foundation for research 
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discussed i.e. organisational behaviour theory, theory of the firm, agency and 
contracting theory, purely inform the research in providing evidence for 
opportunities to commit fraud based on the fraud triangle theory. The concept of 
opportunity is the main factor of the fraud triangle theory that provides a basis for 
this research as this concept and its antecedent characteristics are identifiable in a 
digital environment. These characteristics can be used to proactively detect potential 
fraud in an enterprise system by analysis of its transaction data and audit trails.  
 
Perpetrating a fraud requires more than just an awareness of the types of fraud that 
can occur in an organisation. Even though all of the conditions of the fraud triangle 
may support the occurrence of a fraud, explicit knowledge of how to perpetrate fraud 
is required. Understanding the way fraudsters think after taking the decision to 
perpetrate a fraud is essential in the design and development of an efficient and 
effective model for proactive detection of potential fraud. 
2.4. Framework for perpetrating fraud 
Every organisation is unique. The existence, configuration and proper 
implementation of internal controls vary greatly among organisations and therefore 
no assumptions can be made about any of these characteristics. Some organisations 
may have strong controls in place, others may have weak controls and others yet 
may have none (ACFE 2010).  The challenge in developing a proactive fraud 
detection model is the ability to adapt to the specific organisational situation and to 
effectively identify high probability fraudulent activities. 
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The ACFE Fraud Tree (Figure 2.1) is a helpful tool to understand the various types 
of frauds that occur commonly in an organisation. However, it does not inform 
investigators of how frauds occur in practice and how they can be prevented or 
detected in an organisation. Several cases of fraud are available in the literature 
(Appendix 1) yet it is rare to find a case that mentions exactly how the fraud was 
perpetrated, what business systems were used, and the part they played in the 
perpetration of the fraud. Proactive tests for detecting potential fraud in an 
organisation are also well-documented in the literature (Coenen 2008 ; Singleton et 
al. 2008 ; Wells 2008 ; O'Gara 2004 ; Potla 2003). However there appears to be a 
gap in the area that examines fraud from the perspective of a fraudster, starting with 
the desire to steal assets and ending with actions that are typically performed in an 
enterprise system to perpetrate fraud. 
 
The fraud triangle theory identifies three key elements that need to be present for a 
fraud to occur i.e. pressure, opportunity and rationalisation. Presuming that the 
elements of pressure and rationalisation pre-exist, a fraudster will seek opportunities 
to perpetrate fraud (Murphy and Dacin 2011 ; Cressey 1950). During this process a 
fraudster experiences a series of thoughts related to the imminent fraudulent activity. 
He may enact several fraud scenarios mentally until a suitable one is found. Firstly, a 
fraudster will ascertain what type of asset to steal i.e. services, goods or cash. Once 
the type of asset is identified the next predicament is how to steal it. Up to this point 
a fraudster has made a conscious decision to steal the asset and has identified a 
general scheme to commit the theft (Figure 2.7).   
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Figure 2.7: Fraud perception model (FPM) 
Source: adapted from (Wells 2011 ; ACFE 2010 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Best et al. 2009) 
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The next step is to establish a specific method of perpetrating the fraud. The method 
may entail a series of steps to be taken to achieve the desired outcome of committing 
the fraud, and concealing it to avoid detection. An example of a billing fraud is the 
theft of money (Figure 2.8) that an organisation intends to pay to a vendor namely 
Employee/What do I steal/Money/How do I steal money/divert payments made 
to vendors. Another example is the theft of goods on order by an organisation 
namely Employee/What do I steal/Goods/How do I steal goods/Goods on order 
from vendors (divert to personal address).   
 
The perpetration of billing fraud requires the creation of a shell company and the 
submission of fictitious invoices to an organisation for payment (Best et al. 2009 ; 
O'Gara 2004 ; Greene 2003b ; Wells 2002a ; Bologna 1992). To successfully 
perpetrate a billing fraud a fraudster must be able to:   
 
i). create or modify vendor master records; and 
ii). enter an invoice for payment.  
(Padhi 2010 ; Best et al. 2009 ; SAP-AG 2009 ; Narayan 2008) 
 
Vendor master records can be created or modified in the following ways. 
 
i). Create a fake vendor – a fake vendor is added to the list of vendors in the 
vendor master file. This vendor is not in a legitimate business 
relationship with an organisation.  
ii). Temporarily modify an existing vendor (flipping) – details of an existing 
legitimate vendor are temporarily changed, a payment is processed, and 
details are changed back to their original settings. 
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Figure 2.8: High-level fraud scenarios model (HFSM) 
Source: adapted from (Wells 2011 ; ACFE 2010 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Best et al. 2009) 
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iii). Permanently modify an existing vendor - details of an existing legitimate 
vendor are permanently changed. This method is suited to vendors that 
no longer conduct business with an organisation but their details still 
exist in a vendor master file. 
iv). Use of one-time account – this account is used for vendors that an 
organisation rarely deals with. No vendor specific data is stored in an 
account; it is entered during document entry.  
(Best 2008 ; Singleton et al. 2008 ; O'Gara 2004 ; Wells 2002a) 
 
Invoices may be submitted for processing by: 
i). creating a fake invoice; 
ii). using a legitimate invoice; or 
iii). creating or using a duplicate invoice. 
(Best et al. 2009 ; Singleton et al. 2008 ; Best 2005 ; O'Gara 2004) 
 
In order for a fraud to occur all three conditions of the fraud triangle must be present. 
Once this situation exists a fraudster mentally envisages and plans a fraud as shown 
in the Fraud Perception Model (FPM) as a framework for perpetration of billing 
scheme frauds. (Figure 2.7). The portion of the FPM dealing with vendor fraud is 
extended into the High-level Fraud Scenarios Model (HFSM) (Figure 2.8). Together 
the FPM and HFSM form the framework for perpetrating vendor frauds in 
organisations. Fraud symptoms need to be identified, as recognising and cataloguing 
these symptoms are essential in the development of a model for proactive detection 
of potential fraud. 
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2.5. Fraud scenarios  
Various known fraud scenarios or 'footprints' are used in the design of a prototype 
fraud detection tool in Chapter 4. In the HFSM developed in the previous section 
(Figure 2.8) it is necessary for the fraudster to decide on two issues i.e. "which 
vendor do I use" and "which invoice do I use". These two decisions are integrated 
and the resulting 3X4 Fraud Matrix (FM) (Table 2.5) represents known possibilities 
for compromising vendors and entering compromised invoices into a system. Several 
real cases of these fraud symptoms are provided in Appendix 1. In the following 
paragraphs each of the symptoms of the matrix is examined in more detail. 
 
Scenario 1: Fake invoice for a legitimate vendor 
A perpetrator creates a fake invoice. The fake invoice resembles an invoice from a 
legitimate vendor. Payment details in the vendor master data are temporarily changed 
to the perpetrators. The invoice is processed for payment. Once payment is made 
through an organisation's payment run the vendor's payment details are then changed 
back to their original values. This changing of bank account details is referred to as 
'flipping'. 
 
Scenario 2: Fake invoice for a dormant vendor 
A perpetrator searches through the vendor master data to identify vendors that are 
inactive or dormant. These vendors may be dormant for several reasons e.g. an 
organisation no longer requires their products or services, they may have gone out of 
business or they may have merged with another business. Payment details in the 
vendor master data are changed to a perpetrator's.  A fake invoice is created and 
processed for payment. 
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Table 2.5: Fraud matrix (FM) 
Source: adapted from (Wells 2011 ; ACFE 2010 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Best et al. 2009) 
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Scenario 3: Fake one-time invoice  
A perpetrator creates a fake invoice. The fake invoice resembles an invoice from a 
legitimate vendor but with the perpetrator's payment details. A real non-accomplice 
vendor or fake vendor may be used. The invoice is processed for payment using the 
one-time account. 
 
Scenario 4: Fake invoice for a fake vendor 
A perpetrator creates a master record for a fake vendor with his/her payment details. 
Fake invoices are created for this vendor and submitted for processing. These 
invoices are paid during regular payment runs. 
 
Scenario 5: Legitimate invoice 
A perpetrator uses an invoice from a legitimate vendor. Payment details in the 
vendor master data are temporarily changed to the perpetrators. The invoice is 
processed for payment. Once the payment is made through an organisation's payment 
run the vendor's payment details are then changed back to their original values. 
When the vendor complains about not receiving payment a duplicate invoice is 
requested and it is processed for payment using the vendor's usual payment details. 
 
Scenario 6: Legitimate one-time invoice 
A perpetrator uses an invoice from a legitimate vendor that an organisation deals 
with infrequently. These invoices are processed through the one-time account as no 
vendor master data exists. Invoices are submitted for processing using the 
perpetrator's payment details. When the vendor complains about not receiving 
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payment a duplicate invoice is requested and it is processed for payment using the 
vendor's payment details. 
 
Scenario 7: Duplicate invoice for a legitimate vendor 
An invoice arrives from a legitimate vendor. The invoice is processed for payment. 
Payment is made through an organisation's payment run. A perpetrator then enters a 
duplicate invoice in the system. Payment details are temporarily modified in the 
vendor master data with the perpetrator's details. The duplicate invoice is processed 
for payment and a perpetrator receives the payment. Once the payment is made 
through an organisation's payment run the vendor's payment details are then changed 
back to their original values.  
 
Scenario 8: Accidental duplicate invoice for a legitimate vendor 
A duplicate invoice is accidentally entered into the system and payments are 
scheduled for different payment runs. A perpetrator takes advantage of this duplicate 
invoice. Before payment is made for the duplicate invoice (i.e. before the 2nd 
payment run) the perpetrator temporarily modifies payment details in the vendor 
master data by replacing these details with his own. Once the second payment run is 
made the vendor's payment details are then changed back to their original values.  
 
Scenario 9: Duplicate invoice for a fake vendor 
A perpetrator creates a master record for a fake vendor with his payment details. The 
perpetrator then duplicates an invoice from a legitimate vendor. The duplicate 
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invoice resembles the legitimate invoice but has the perpetrators payment details. 
The invoice is processed and payments are made during the regular payment run. 
 
The perpetration of billing fraud requires creation of a shell company and submission 
of fictitious invoices for payment. The nine scenarios describe various ways 
fraudsters' may successfully perpetrate billing fraud by creation or modification of 
vendor master records, and entering fake invoices for payment. These scenarios are 
the basis for strategies for proactive detection of potential fraud. 
2.6. Proactive fraud detection  
Proactive detection of potential fraud requires continuous monitoring of an 
organisation's transaction data. Continuous monitoring increases the possibility of 
detecting fraudulent activities (Coderre and Warner 1999 ; Potla 2003). The 
traditional or manual audit approach is limited because it reviews only a small 
percentage of a large population of transactions. Large accounting data files with 
several thousands of transactions are difficult to analyse or monitor manually in real-
time. The alternative therefore is to automate this process by using the power of 
information technology (Kotb and Roberts 2011 ; Broady and Roland 2008 ; 
Singleton and Singleton 2007).  
 
Good internal controls require that no single employee be given too much 
responsibility over business transactions as this may place them in a position to 
commit and conceal fraud. Segregation of duties is achieved when the following 
functions are separated (Romney and Steinbart 2009): 
i). authorisation – approving transactions; 
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ii). recording – data entry; and 
iii). custody – receiving and processing payments. 
 
Separation of vendor maintenance, invoice entry and payment can therefore 
significantly reduce the risk of billing frauds in the absence of collusion among 
employees (Best et al. 2009 ; Little and Best 2003 ; Srinidhi 1994). However, weak, 
incomplete or a lack of segregation of duties often provides opportunities for fraud to 
be perpetrated (ACFE 2010 ; KPMG 2010 ; KPMG 2009). Early detection of fraud 
can limit losses and prevent the recurrence of such activities.  Furthermore the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has significantly increased corporate organisations 
responsibility for prevention and detection of financial fraud (Best et al. 2009 ; ITGI 
2006). Therefore business executives are searching for improved ways to detect 
fraud (Tackett 2007) by using information technology. The essential steps in 
detecting fraudulent activities are (Figure 2.9): 
 
i). understanding the business or operations; 
ii). performing a risk analysis to identify the types of frauds that 
can occur; 
iii). cataloguing the symptoms that the most likely frauds would 
generate; 
iv). using computer technology to identify fraud symptoms; 
v). analysing the results; and 
vi). investigating suspicious transactions. 
(Albrecht et al. 2009) 
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Figure 2.9: Fraud detection process 
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A catalogue of fraud symptoms is developed in Chapter 4. This catalogue forms the 
basis of fraud detection strategies used in this study. Audit trail data is analysed for 
symptoms of potential fraud using computer technology. Activities identified as 
potentially fraudulent require further investigation by an internal auditor to determine 
whether actual fraud exists. Using computer technology to analyse audit trail data 
facilitates identification of potentially fraudulent activities from many thousands of 
transactions. 
 
Early identification and reporting of suspicious activities to an auditor may 
potentially reduce the negative impact on an organisation in the form of loss of 
revenue, goodwill or reputation(Coderre and Warner 1999). 
 
Automated systems that continuously monitor for key fraud symptoms can be a 
major deterrent of fraud (Best et al. 2009 ; Potla 2003 ; Coderre and Warner 1999). 
By analysing data and searching for specific patterns or combination of activities, 
potentially fraudulent activities can be identified shortly after they occur.  Data 
analytics can be used to detect suspicious activities that have already occurred as 
well as to proactively determine the propensity for frauds occurring in the future 
(Edge and Falcone Sampaio 2009).  
 
Technology based continuous fraud monitoring and detection is an important area for 
improvement in the fight to reduce fraud in organisations. Using data analytics to 
proactively detect potential fraud is an important priority for many organisations. 
These organisations, however, do not have the expertise and therefore require 
assistance in using technology to identity and detect fraud (KPMG 2010 ; KPMG 
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2009 ; KPMG 2008). Presently only 2.6% of organisations are using data monitoring 
to proactively detect fraud (ACFE 2010) (Figure 2.10) while 53% of organisations 
report fraudulent activities (KPMG 2010). A fraud detection system that is 
innovative, intuitive and simple to use may possibly contribute to an improvement in 
these statistics. 
 
The fraud landscape is dynamic, fast-moving and ever changing. Fraudsters are 
becoming more sophisticated in their use of technology and in their ability to commit 
and conceal fraudulent activities. As a result, fraud detection techniques must 
continue to evolve (Gill 2009). A key element of any effective proactive fraud 
detection system is the continuous monitoring of an organisation's transaction data. 
This increases the possibility of detecting past and future fraudulent activities if 
appropriate strategies for continuous monitoring of an organisation's transaction data 
are put in place. 
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Figure 2.10: Detection of occupational fraud  
Source: ACFE (2010) 
  
 - 74 - 
2.7. Continuous monitoring strategies 
Examining the transaction process from transaction entry through to the posting in 
the general ledger has traditionally been conducted manually, or with Computer 
Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs) (Flowerday and von Solms 2005) on a 
retrospective and cyclical basis, usually many months after business activities have 
transpired. This is a massive task as it may involve millions of transactions hence 
only a sample is examined. Even when using CAATs, transactions are examined in 
batches and generally only sampled. If the transactions are examined in their entirety 
then it is usually done retrospectively.   
 
Increasing use of information technology has made it necessary for auditors to 
perform audits using software tools that run on personal computer systems (Kotb and 
Roberts 2011). Software tools automate standard audit processes and procedures by 
using productivity software such as Microsoft Office, and specialised data analyses 
software such as ACL or IDEA. Using CAATs to conduct audits is termed 'auditing 
through' the computer (Vasarhelyi et al. 2004) as opposed to 'auditing around' the 
computer, which treats the computer as a 'black box' (Matthews 2006). CAATs can 
be very powerful tools that enable auditors to perform various routine audit tasks. 
However, several difficulties exist that impede successful CAAT implementations 
(Arens et al. 2007). Among these are: i) sufficient depth of IT knowledge is required 
to develop complex data extractions and programming tasks; ii) sufficient time and 
skill is required to develop and test a CAAT; iii) development and setup cost of 
CAAT may be prohibitive; iv) access to specialised training by audit staff is required 
in order to create complex CAAT reports; v) audit staff may not have the aptitude or 
interest  in developing CAAT competencies; and vi) CAAT resources may not be 
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available to audit teams when required. Additionally, CAATs are limited because 
they do not take advantage of new technologies to automate and integrate audit 
processes and procedures, and they do not provide sufficient response to the new 
challenges of auditing in the modern global digital economy (Vasarhelyi et al. 2004). 
 
The modern global digital economy has significantly changed the way business is 
conducted and therefore the traditional approach to auditing can no longer be of real 
value to business performance or regulatory compliance (Coderre 2005 ; Rezaee et 
al. 2002).  Most organisations are conducting their business activities online and in 
real-time. This necessitates continuous monitoring and auditing which enables 
internal auditors to perform their analyses of key business systems in real- or near 
real-time (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010 ; Alles et al. 2006 ; Coderre 2005 ; Alles et al. 
2002 ; Kogan et al. 1999).  Therefore, by necessity, the audit process has evolved 
from the traditional manual approach to one that is computer-based. 
 
Continuous auditing was devised in the famous Bell Labs in 1989 as a way to 
provide constant monitoring of AT&T's billing system (Rutgers 2010). Continuous 
monitoring, also referred to as 'continuous auditing', is the analysis of transaction 
data in a real- or near real-time basis against a set of predetermined rule sets (Kuhn Jr 
and Sutton 2010). It enables auditors to provide "some degree of assurance on 
continuous information simultaneously with, or shortly after disclosure of 
information" (Rezaee et al. 2002 p.150). It is a step in the path of the evolution of the 
financial audit from manual to computer-based methods.  Continuous monitoring is 
only feasible if it is implemented as: i) a fully automated process; and ii) a process 
with instant access to relevant events (Kogan et al. 1999). The widespread adoption 
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of computer-based accounting information systems in general, and enterprise 
systems in particular, has contributed to the increasing demand for continuous 
monitoring (Vasarhelyi et al. 2004). 
 
The basic need for continuous monitoring has increased in the new global digital 
economy as organisations become more complex and demand more integrated 
business processes. Many types of management and control information needs exist 
and in the real-time economy these can only be satisfied by continuous monitoring 
and assurance. Collapses of multi-national organisations have imposed strict 
regulatory and legislative requirements on organisations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) of 2002 has highlighted fraud and its detection, with the emphasis being on 
improving internal controls to reduce the risk of financial fraud (Best et al. 2009).  As 
the number of technology-enabled businesses continue to grow, new needs arise for 
continuous monitoring and assurance concerning: i) changes in the environment and 
industry;  ii) the existence and effectiveness of controls; iii) increased human 
resource risks; iv) increased use of outsourced processes; v) process continuity and 
integrity; and vi) coherence between endogenous and exogenous factors (Vasarhelyi 
et al. 2004). 
 
Providing continuous monitoring and assurance in the new technology-enabled 
business environment require a comprehensive understanding of the way businesses 
organise their activities (Alles et al. 2006). While organisations have always had to 
measure and monitor their activities, paper-based systems (i.e. accounting journals 
and ledgers) relied on pre-filtered and aggregated measures which were typically 
recorded after significant time had elapsed. Modern computer-based systems make it 
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possible to measure and monitor business processes at an unprecedented level of 
detail in a real- or near real-time basis.  
 
Large scale implementations of enterprise systems have resulted in many 
organisations being highly automated and fully integrated. The development of this 
enterprise system environment provides the necessary infrastructure for the effective 
evolution of the assurance function from a periodic event to an ongoing process 
through the use of continuous monitoring applications (Goode and Lacey 2011 ; 
Debreceny and Gray 2010 ; Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). Two major approaches to 
continuous monitoring and auditing exist. These are Embedded Audit Modules 
(EAMs), and Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL). 
 
2.7.1. Embedded Audit Modules (EAMs) 
EAMs are Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs) that enable the continuous 
monitoring of enterprise systems (Debreceny et al. 2005). EAMs are software 
modules that are built into application programs and are specifically designed to 
continuously capture and monitor audit related data (Groomer and Murthy 1989). If a 
pre-programmed constraint is violated an alert is produced, an auditor is informed, 
and transaction data are saved in a file (Best et al. 2009 ; Debreceny et al. 2005 ; 
Weber 1999 ; Groomer and Murthy 1989) 
 
Weber (1999) defines EAMs as software modules that are placed at specific points 
within an enterprise system to gather data about transactions or events that auditors 
deem material. EAMs are therefore intended to detect and capture data as 
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transactions are processed in an enterprise system. When a violation occurs the 
offending transaction can either be rejected, or it can be allowed and the error is 
logged. Enterprise systems are designed to process transactions efficiently and 
promptly. It is therefore not practical to disallow every offending transaction from 
being processed. Depending on the severity of a violation, some transactions could 
be conditionally processed whilst others are rejected. The level of severity of errors 
that would cause a transaction to be rejected needs to be negotiated and accepted by 
the client organisation (Groomer and Murthy 1989).   
 
In the context of integration with enterprise systems EAMs should have the 
following characteristics (Debreceny et al. 2005):  
 
i). an end-user environment that allows the auditor to establish a 
set of queries to test transaction integrity constraints either 
from a pre-defined suite of queries, the modification of the 
attributes of pre-defined queries, or by the creation of new 
queries by the construction of simple scripts; 
ii). a process for registration (embedding) and scheduling of these 
queries; 
iii). a method for running these queries against the flow of 
transactions for violations either continuously or temporally 
iv). a capacity for reporting violations electronically (e.g. by 
email); and 
v). an ability to copy the transaction details of the violations to 
secondary storage 
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EAMs have the potential to capture data about all transaction errors and violations. 
Consequently they can be used as compliance or substantive testing tools because of 
their capability to continuously monitor transaction data for errors or violations. If 
EAMs are used throughout an accounting period, they will record data about the 
operation of controls (compliance-testing), as well as data about actual transaction 
errors (substantive-testing). Thus they can facilitate dual-purpose testing and 
constitute a comprehensive auditing tool (Groomer and Murthy 1989). 
 
EAMs and other CAATs are an important step in the advancement of continuous 
monitoring and auditing (Alles et al. 2002 ; Rezaee et al. 2002 ; Kogan et al. 1999 ; 
Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991). When the objective of a continuous audit is clearly 
defined then EAMs can support the process by appropriate monitoring of an 
enterprise system. The requirement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for improved 
prevention and detection of financial fraud (Best et al. 2009 ; ITGI 2006), has 
executives searching for improved ways to detect fraud (Tackett 2007) by employing 
information technology, including EAMs and other CAATs, to monitor internal 
controls (Ernst and Young 2002 ; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2002). 
 
Regarding this approach, its benefits, drawbacks, technologies and processes are 
extensively discussed in the literature (Alles et al. 2006 ; Debreceny et al. 2005 ; Alles et 
al. 2004 ; Groomer and Murthy 2003 ; Groomer and Murthy 1989).  There is limited 
evidence of adoption of EAMs despite several factors that indicate the possibility of 
wide-spread adoption (Debreceny et al. 2005 ; Groomer and Murthy 1989). 
Vasarhelyi and Halper (1991) provided early evidence of the feasibility of 
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continuous  monitoring and auditing. Debreceny et al. (2005) demonstrated the use 
of EAMs in the high-volume transaction flows of a telecommunications enterprise.  
 
Research seems to indicate that the EAM approach runs into several difficulties (Kuhn 
and Sutton 2006 ; Debreceny et al. 2005). Vasarhelyi and Halper (1991) expressed 
several challenges to their development and implementation, including issues related 
to design and utilisation of system resources. Since EAMs are software applications 
they require computer processing time to execute. This imposes an overhead on a 
system which in turn negatively impacts monitoring processes. Although this 
overhead can be overcome by adding additional hardware and software resources, 
these additional investments have costs associated with them. There is also the 
concern about having 'foreign' software embedded within an organisation's enterprise 
system, and this software being the responsibility of a third party (Best et al. 2009 ; 
Alles et al. 2006 ; Debreceny et al. 2005). The maintenance of EAMs can also be 
difficult given the changes, updates and modifications that routinely take place in 
enterprise systems. There is also legal liability issues should an EAM damage a host 
enterprise system in some way, a liability that external auditors may be keen to 
avoid. Implementation of EAMs in the SAP enterprise system requires the writing of 
an Advanced Business Application Programming (ABAP) script at the application 
layer. This requires auditors who wish to make use of EAMs to have expert 
knowledge of ABAP programming and the database structure of an organisation. 
Thus there appears to be considerable technical and legal barriers to the development 
of audit routines that operate continuously on enterprise systems. These factors have 
impeded the adoption of EAMs in enterprise systems (Debreceny et al. 2005; Alles et 
al. 2006). 
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2.7.2. Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) 
The Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) introduced by Vasarhelyi et al. (2004) is 
an alternative continuous monitoring and auditing approach to EAMs. The MCL 
approach does not replace EAMs, instead it offers an alternative solution to cater for 
different circumstances (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). In this approach the continuous 
monitoring and auditing system is separate from a client's enterprise system. The 
MCL approach is a stand-alone system that relies on comparisons of extracted 
transaction data with pre-determined constraints that allow for continuous monitoring 
of systems and identification of violations (Du and Roohani 2007). 
 
The MCL approach uses 'middleware' to extract data from an enterprise system for 
external monitoring and analysis (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010 ; Alles et al. 2008 ; Du 
and Roohani 2007 ; Alles et al. 2006 ; Kuhn and Sutton 2006 ; Murthy and Groomer 
2004 ; Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991). The main elements of the MCL architecture are 
(Vasarhelyi et al. 2004 p.13): "a data capture layer; a data filtering layer; relational 
storage; measurement standards layer; an inference engine; an analytic layer; 
alarms and alerting layer; and a reporting platform." 
 
The MCL primarily operates as a discrepancy-based audit monitoring tool i.e. audit 
by exception (Vasarhelyi et al. 2004).  The MCL continuously captures enterprise 
data and analyses it to detect any deviations from the norm. Whenever a significant 
exception is detected, an alarm is produced and sent to pre-determined compliance 
personnel by using relevant delivery technologies such as emails, telephone calls or 
pagers. When an alarm is delivered, compliance personnel will need to review the 
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evidence in order to identify the underlying problem. Any further investigations are 
at the discretion of internal auditors.  
 
The continuous monitoring system that makes up the MCL (i.e. workstations, 
operating systems, database and application software) resides outside a client's 
network and is controlled by an auditor. The system receives periodic data updates 
from the client enterprise system, (i.e. not in real-time), that is processed inside an 
application. The system monitors key operational analytics, compares them with pre-
defined standards and creates exception reports for any potential problems. Any 
violations that trigger automatic alerts to an auditor are stored inside an application 
and not inside a client's enterprise system. 
 
Systems developed using the MCL approach are intended to match a client’s base 
enterprise system. This improves efficiency and effectiveness of communication 
between systems for the purpose of data extraction and continuous monitoring. 
Whilst this approach provides client-independence, it does impose a significant 
overhead on auditing organisations as they need to acquire significant IT resources to 
develop, maintain, store, and continuously monitor each client's enterprise system 
(Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). Since an organisation and the external environment are 
constantly changing a continuous monitoring MCL system has to be constantly 
updated and improved. Tests and analytics performed by a MCL have to be re-
examined and modified to incorporate the constantly changing environment in which 
firms operate. These changes may range from minor updates of fraud patterns to 
major changes in MCL's structure requiring a complete redesign of a MCL 
(Vasarhelyi et al. 2004).  
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The MCL approach has a long history in the context of accounting information 
systems, dating as far back as 1991 (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010 ; Alles et al. 2008 ; Du 
and Roohani 2007 ; Alles et al. 2006 ; Kuhn and Sutton 2006 ; Murthy and Groomer 
2004 ; Vasarhelyi and Halper 1991). The MCL unites various IT systems in an 
organisation into one integrated platform that allows for seamless real-time data 
exchange.  In organisations using enterprise systems, a MCL would be part of 
auditing systems thereby providing an auditor with the capability to drill down to 
individual transactions and then to roll up data for analysis at any level of 
aggregation. Direct 'read-only' access to enterprise systems data helps maintain 
independence of audits, ensures that data cannot be altered and that data integrity is 
preserved. It is this capability that facilitates real-time identification and confirmation 
of potentially fraudulent activities in an enterprise system. 
 
In summary, the two major approaches to continuous monitoring and auditing are 
Embedded Audit Modules (EAMs) and Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL). 
Monitoring activities conducted in both EAM and the MCL approaches focus on 
transaction data, which is monitored for violations of pre-set standards or unusual 
patterns. EAMs have several critical deterrents to adoption including issues relating 
to system design and maintenance, client independence and legal liability. MCLs are 
separate stand-alone external systems that operate independently of the information 
system to be monitored but are linked into a system. They rely on comparisons of 
extracted transaction data with pre-determined constraints to identify violations. This 
separate design has profound implications for the design of a general model for 
continuous monitoring and auditing as it eliminates any conflict between a MCL and 
an enterprise system. The MCL approach is therefore a major facilitator for 
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implementing continuous monitoring and auditing in enterprise systems. It is also the 
approach used in this research.  
2.8. Enterprise Systems 
Enterprise systems comprise a significant share of the market (Rothenberger et al. 
2010). In 2010, vendors of larger enterprise systems (i.e. SAP, Oracle and Microsoft) 
shared  53% of the ERP market (Panorama 2011).  
 
Enterprise Systems (ES, sometimes also known as enterprise resource planning or 
ERP systems) are integrated or packaged business software systems that are designed 
to streamline the flow of data in an organisation with the intention of matching the 
physical flow of goods from raw materials to finished products. This flow of data 
may extend well beyond the boundaries of an organisation to include the supply 
chain at one end, and the customer at the other (Kamhawi 2008 ; Koch and Wailgum 
2008 ; Presley 2006 ; Norris et al. 2000). Enterprise systems adopt a structured 
approach to optimising an organisation's internal value chain by linking various 
components of an enterprise through sharing of common data. For example, when a 
sale is recorded, this information is used to update other areas in an enterprise such 
as inventory, procurement, invoicing and recording of all related ledger postings 
(Deshmukh 2006 ; Musaji 2002 ; Norris et al. 2000). Enterprise system, therefore  
have several distinctive characteristics (Norris et al. 1998). 
 
i). Multi-functional in scope – it tracks financial results (dollars), 
procurement (material), sales (people and goods) and 
manufacturing (people and resources). 
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ii). Integrated in nature, that is, when a piece of data is entered 
regarding one function, data regarding other functions is 
changed. 
iii). Modular in structure, that is, it can be used in a way that is as 
expansive or narrow as required. 
 
There are five main reasons why an organisation may consider implementing an 
enterprise system (Koch and Wailgum 2008 ; Ehie and Madsen 2005 ; Xu et al. 
2002).  
i). Integration of financial information - many different versions 
of information  may exist e.g. finance has its own set of 
revenue numbers, sales has another version, and different 
business units may each have their own version of how much 
they contributed to revenues. ESs create a single version of 
data across an enterprise because everyone uses the same 
system. Hence, integrity of information is preserved. 
ii). Integration of customer order data—ESs contain a common 
repository for customer orders from the time a customer 
service representative receives it until the loading dock ships 
merchandise and finance sends an invoice. By having this data 
in a common integrated database system, rather than across 
many disconnected systems, organisations can keep track of 
orders more easily, and coordinate manufacturing, inventory 
and shipping among many different locations at the same time.  
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iii). Standardisation of manufacturing processes – ESs provide 
standard methods for automating many of the steps of a 
manufacturing process thereby saving time and improving 
employee productivity.  
iv). Reduction in inventory – by making the manufacturing process 
flow more efficient, ESs can help users' better plan deliveries 
to customers, thereby reducing finished goods inventory at 
warehouses.  
v). Standardisation of human resources (HR) data – in 
organisations that span multiple business units, HR may not 
have a unified method for managing employees' time and 
communicating with them about benefits and services. These 
issues are readily resolved by using ESs.   
 
Essentially enterprise systems are therefore organisation-wide information systems 
that integrate all aspects of a business. Enterprise systems use an underlying database 
system to store business data. All business data associated with a system are stored in 
one database. This ensures that data is consistently shared across an organisation.   
 
Enterprise systems software are available from several vendors including SAP, 
Oracle and Microsoft, collectively having 53% of ES installations worldwide 
(Panorama 2011). However for several years, Germany-based enterprise software 
company SAP has consistently been the market leader (SAP 2010 ; Lager and Tsai 
2008). In 2010 Gartner (Gartner 2010) recognised SAP as the leading vendor of 
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enterprise systems software, accounting for 22.4% of market share. For this reason 
SAP is used in this project. 
2.9. SAP Enterprise System 
Since 1972 SAP-AG has been providing business software solutions to the market, 
starting with SAP R/2, SAP R/3, and the evolution towards mySAP. SAP defines 
mySAP as a complete e-business platform that provides a range of solutions for its 
customers and users. mySAP is therefore the common name that SAP uses for all 
technologies that it produces. It is an open, flexible and comprehensive business 
solution that integrates both SAP and non-SAP applications. mySAP is capable of 
integrating internal business processes as well as providing a collaborative platform 
among business partners (Hernandez 2002).  
 
SAP belongs to the family of enterprise systems or enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) systems. Organisations may develop an enterprise system by acquiring and 
integrating specialised sub-systems (e.g. financials and payroll) with internally 
developed ones (e.g. equipment hiring), thereby producing a 'multi-vendor' solution. 
SAP is a 'single-vendor', packaged enterprise system, but it has the ability to 
integrate with non-SAP systems (Best 2005).  
 
The SAP enterprise system provides the following functionality (Vogel and Kimbell 
2005). 
i). Cross-functional scenarios that match daily business processes.  
ii). Analytics that provide information when and where it is 
required by employees. 
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iii). Dashboards with simple interfaces that place everything an 
employee needs to get their job done in one place.  
iv). Embedded roles that make it easy to provide the information 
and functions each person needs based on their role in an 
organisation.  
v). Industry solutions that extend and customise generic ESs to 
make sense in every industry setting. 
vi). Real-time integration through SAP NetWeaver. SAP 
NetWeaver provides a platform to integrate all internal 
organisational systems as wells as integrating with third-party 
systems. It also acts as a platform on which applications can be 
built.  
 
 
Traditional SAP applications are categorised in three core functional areas: financial, 
human resources, and logistics. SAP also develops and provides special modules that 
complement core modules. These are targeted at vertical industries such as retail, 
manufacturing and government. These packages are known as SAP Solutions for 
Industries (SAP-AG 2009 ; Hernandez et al. 2006 ; Vogel and Kimbell 2005). There 
is a special set of modules, known as cross-application (CA) modules, which is 
positioned between technical and functional areas of the system and cover things 
such as the business workflow, CAD integration, and documents handling. The core 
areas include hundreds of business processes to address all the needs of modern 
business applications. There are many modules within these areas that can work 
equally well as stand-alone products. For instance, there are organisations that might 
decide to use only certain modules of the SAP Core application suite such as 
  
 - 89 - 
accounting, sales and distribution, and manufacturing. Customising is required for all 
modules. 
 
SAP financial modules provide an overall picture of accounting functions, with 
extensive report facilities to allow for fast decision-making support. The financial 
area contains the following module groups: i) FI - Financial accounting, ii) CO – 
Controlling, iii) EC - Enterprise controlling, iv) IM - Capital investment 
management, and v) TR – Treasury. As new versions of the product are released new 
modules are added (Padhi 2010 ; Hernandez et al. 2006 ; Vogel and Kimbell 2005). 
 
The Human Resources (HR) module includes all of the necessary business processes 
required to efficiently manage all the needs of an organisation's human resource 
management. Data is entered once in the HR module and is made available to other 
related applications, namely accounting, plant maintenance, or business workflow. 
The HR module provides support for salary administration and payroll, work 
schedule models, planning, travel expenses, and so on (SAP-AG 2009 ; Hernandez et 
al. 2006 ; Vogel and Kimbell 2005). 
 
The Logistics module manages all processes involved in a supply chain, from 
procurement of raw materials to final delivery and billing of a customer. These 
modules contain comprehensive business processes and several tools for decision 
support. Modules integrate seamlessly with almost every other SAP module, from 
financial and controlling modules to human resources (Padhi 2010 ; Hernandez et al. 
2006 ; Vogel and Kimbell 2005). 
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Many organisations have realised that SAP solutions are important to their success. 
SAP solutions provide an organisation with competitive advantage. Several Fortune 
500 companies use SAP exclusively for their core day to day operations (Gartner 
2010 ; BOS 2009), which include accounting and financial applications, 
procurement, order processing and supplier management, inventory management and 
HR management and payroll functions. SAP enterprise systems are fully integrated, 
enabling transactions to be processed organisation-wide, and consequently they 
contribute to an overall improvement in an organisation's operational efficiency 
(Wailgum 2008).  
 
Enterprise systems generate millions of transactions annually. While most of these 
are legal and routine transactions, a small number may be fraudulent. The enormous 
amount of generated transactions makes it difficult to find these few instances among 
legitimate transactions. An auditor may extract a small sample of these during a 
financial audit. Many fraudsters rely on this to conceal fraud. The problem becomes 
overwhelming and is growing worse. Many organisations are considering using data 
analytics and information technology (IT) to detect fraud. Using IT to proactively 
detect potential fraud enables organisations to monitor and analyse large transaction 
datasets in real- or near real- time, a task that cannot practically be accomplished by 
an internal auditor. The prototype software being developed in this study will exploit 
SAP audit trails for proactive detection of potential fraud.  
2.10. Audit trails  
Audit trails are records of users' activities within an information system (Best 2005 ; 
NIST 2005 ; Gopalakrishna 2000). Audit trails are maintained by operating systems, 
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database systems and enterprise systems (Best et al. 2004). Data captured in an audit 
trail is dependent on what events are being audited by a system (SAP-AG 2009). In 
conjunction with appropriate tools and procedures, audit trails can assist in detecting 
potentially fraudulent activities and anomalous user behaviour. 
 
Audit trails provide a means to accomplish several security related objectives 
including the following (Best et al. 2009 ; Best 2005 ; NIST 2005). 
i). Review of access: Audit trails allow examination of histories 
of access by individual users or groups of users, showing 
actions performed or attempted. Audit trails also can report 
which users have performed specific functions, such as 
changes to vendor master records or entry of vendor invoices. 
Analysis of audit trails may also reveal limitations in an 
organisation's security model and its implementation.  
ii). Review of changes in security: Changes made to the security 
of the system can be reviewed periodically by an independent 
person for authorisation and integrity.  
iii). Review of attempts to by-pass security: Audit trails may be 
reviewed for attempts and repeated attempts by users and 
intruders to perform unauthorised functions.  
iv). Deterrent against attempts to by-pass security: Users should be 
aware of the existence of audit trails and their routine review 
as a deterrent against attempts to by-pass security.  
v). Fraud detection: Audit trails can be used to detect potential 
fraud by searching for 'red flags'. Fraudulent activity may be 
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perpetrated by real users acting in their own name, by users 
acting in collusion with other users, by real users 
masquerading as other users, or by intruders masquerading as 
authorised users. In each case, actions of these 'users' are 
recorded in audit trails and these can be scrutinised for 
activities that are recognised as 'red flags' for particular types 
of fraud. 
 
A system can maintain several different audit trails concurrently. There are typically 
two types of audit records: i) keystroke monitoring; and ii) event-based logs. 
Keystroke monitoring records keystrokes entered by a computer user and a 
computer's response during an interactive session Event-based audit logs contain 
records describing system events, application events, or user events. An audit trail 
should include sufficient data to establish what events occurred and who caused them 
(Broady and Roland 2008 ; NIST 2005). 
 
System audit records are used to monitor and fine-tune system performance. 
Application audit records may be used to detect flaws in applications, or violations of 
security policy within an application. Users' audit records are used to hold 
individuals accountable for their actions. Users' audit trails monitor and log users' 
activities in a system or application by recording events initiated by users. An 
analysis of users' audit records may expose a variety of security violations, which 
may range from simple browsing to detection of attempts to defraud an organisation 
(NIST 2005 ; Gopalakrishna 2000). For the purpose of this research the term 'audit 
trail' will hereinafter refer to 'user audit record.' 
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Audit trails attempt to capture a chronological list of steps that are necessary to start 
a transaction through to its completion. Audit trails can range from being very 
simplistic to extremely complicated. The complexity depends on the number of steps 
involved in a transaction. For example, an audit trail on payment of a vendor invoice 
begins with a receipt of an invoice. The invoice is tracked through accounts payable, 
all the way through to payment in order to settle a debt (Tatum 2010).  
 
The purpose of auditing is to verify that financial information correctly reflects the 
economic condition of an organisation. Audit trails provide an auditor with a detailed 
account of users' activities in an enterprise system and can therefore be an effective 
tool in managing financial resources of an organisation. An auditor reviews 
transaction data to verify its validity, completeness and correctness. There are three 
types of audit trails that record activities at different levels of detail, namely system 
audit trails, application audit trails and user audit trails.  The focus of this research is 
on user audit trails in ESs, as they monitor and record user activity in a system or 
application by recording events initiated by users.  
2.11. Enterprise system audit trails support for fraud detection  
"…the best planned and implemented audit trail is of limited 
value without timely review of the logged data."  
(NIST 2005 p.219) 
 
Understanding the structure of audit trails and data they capture is a key factor in 
designing systems for proactive detection of potential fraud. Denning (1987) 
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introduced the concept of using audit trails to detect anomalous user behaviour. 
Denning's model consists of six main components. 
 
i). Subjects: Initiators of activity on a target system – normally 
users. 
ii). Objects: Resources managed by the system-files, commands, 
devices, etc. 
iii). Audit records: Generated by the target system in response to 
actions performed or attempted by subjects on objects-user 
login, command execution, file access, etc. 
iv). Profiles: Structures that characterise the behaviour of subjects 
with respect to objects in terms of statistical metrics and 
models of observed activity. Profiles are automatically 
generated and initialised from templates. 
v). Anomaly records: Generated when abnormal behaviour is 
detected. 
vi). Activity rules: Actions taken when some condition is satisfied, 
which update profiles, detect abnormal behaviour, relate 
anomalies to suspected intrusions, and produce reports. 
 
Denning's model is rule-based and exploits audit trails to search for and report 
abnormal user behaviour. The basic objective of the model is to monitor audit 
records looking for deviations in usage. Audit records should at minimum include the 
following data: 
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i). Action: Operation performed by the subject on or with the 
object, e.g., login, logout, read, execute. 
ii). Exception-Condition: Denotes which, if any, exception 
condition is raised on the return. This should be the actual 
exception condition raised by the system, not just the apparent 
exception condition returned to the subject. 
iii). Resource-Usage: List of quantitative elements, where each 
element gives the amount used of some resource, e.g., number 
of lines or pages printed, number of records read or written, 
CPU time or I/O units used, session elapsed time. 
iv). Time-stamp: Unique time/date stamp identifying when the 
action took place. 
 
Each audit record specifies a subject (initiator of the action in the target system) and 
an object (receptors of actions, i.e. programs, files, databases, and so on). Each 
activity is observed without regard for authorisation, as the assumption is that access 
controls in the system permitted the action to occur. The target system is responsible 
for maintaining audit records. 
 
Denning also investigated several methods for developing activity profiles. These 
profiles characterise the behaviour of a given subject with respect to a given object. 
This serves as a signature to describe normal activity and a means to detect 
anomalous activity. When a new audit record matches a pattern in an activity profile 
an audit-record rule checks for any abnormal behaviour. If such a behaviour is 
detected an anomaly report is generated. 
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Audit trails may be reviewed: i) periodically; ii) as needed (triggered by a security 
event); iii) automatically in real-time; or iv) some combination of these. Audit trails 
can be used to retrospectively determine or review what events have occurred. 
Reviewers need to know what 'red flags' to look for i.e. what is normal activity and 
what is suspicious activity. Audit trail review is made easier if the audit trail can be 
analysed by user ID, terminal ID, application name, date and time, or some other set 
of parameters to run reports of selected data (NIST 2005).  
 
Enterprise systems maintain several different audit trails concurrently. Security 
audit logs record details of each user action such as successful logins, failed logins, 
starting a transaction, failed attempts to start transactions, automatic locking of a 
user's account because of multiple failed logins, creation of new roles/profiles and 
changes in user master records (Best et al. 2009 ; Best 2005 ; Best 2000). 
Configuration of the security audit log defines what events are recorded e.g. only 
failed activity may be recorded. Audit trails may be retained for periodic review and 
then archived. 
 
Changes to master records, such as those for vendors, are an important aspect in 
detection of fraud. A master record must be created or modified (e.g. temporarily 
changing a vendor's banking details) in order for a system to pay a vendor invoice for 
a shell company electronically or by cheque, Records of such changes in master 
records show user identification, type of change (e.g. create, delete, change), and 
contents of fields created/deleted/changed. These activities should be flagged as 
suspicious and selected for further review.  
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Accounting audit trails facilitate tracing of accounting transactions from a source to 
updating of accounting balances and tracing of account balances back to source 
transactions. They provide an organisation with the ability to maintain sufficiently 
detailed records to answer enquiries from customers or vendors, to produce detailed 
reports and monthly statements. Master record changes and accounting audit trails 
are retained on-line usually for the entire fiscal year, and archived for several years to 
satisfy requirements of taxation and company legislation. 
 
Fraud research in enterprise systems has primarily focussed on fraud prevention 
rather than detection (Goode and Lacey 2011 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Coderre 2005 ; 
Best 2005). Several vendors of enterprise systems software provide Governance, 
Risk, and Compliance (GRC) software tools. These tools are prevention oriented and 
are intended to ensure good internal controls and to automate creation and 
management of these controls (Broady and Roland 2008 ; Hernandez et al. 2006). 
This research aims to make use of various audit trails available in SAP enterprise 
systems, namely security audit logs, records of changes to master records and 
accounting audit trails, to develop innovative methods of detecting and reporting 
fraudulent activities to audit and compliance personnel. 
2.12. Gaps in the literature 
Given the pervasiveness of enterprise systems (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010 ; 
Rothenberger et al. 2010 ; Singleton and Singleton 2007), there are some noticeable 
gaps in the literature regarding fraud detection in ESs. Additional research is 
necessary to advance awareness, relevance, and practicality of continuous fraud 
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detection in enterprise systems (Kotb and Roberts 2011). The study being conducted 
in this research will make a contribution to the literature by addressing gaps 
identified in the literature review. 
 
There appears to be limited research in continuous monitoring and fraud detection 
(Du and Roohani 2007 ; Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). Debreceny et. al. (2005) noted 
that at the time of their study there was limited research to support the use of 
Embedded Audit Modules within enterprise systems. Since their study there has been 
limited research projects (Alles et al. 2006 ; Kuhn and Sutton 2006) that examined 
continuous monitoring and auditing in enterprise systems. Furthermore, there appears 
to be limited research in developing a generalised model for proactive detection of 
potential fraud in enterprise systems (Goode and Lacey 2011). This gap is addressed 
by the primary research question.  
Can a generalised model for proactive detection of  
potential fraud in enterprise systems be developed? 
Prior research on continuous auditing does not appear to deliver a model that allows 
an audit to be carried out proactively and continuously without difficulties (Hunton 
et al. 2004). Additional study is required to develop approaches of continuous 
auditing that are specifically applicable to auditing of financial transactions in 
enterprise systems (Debreceny and Gray 2010). This gap is addressed by research 
sub-question 1 and its research propositions. 
 
SQ1: How do enterprise systems support proactive detection of potential fraud 
 in financial transactions? 
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Research is required in the development of innovative approaches to continuous 
fraud detection in organisations that use enterprise systems, and to demonstrate how 
this can be done efficiently and effectively (Du and Roohani 2007 ; Rezaee et al. 
2002). An issue often raised in the literature relates to information overload from 
alerts when implementing continuous fraud detection systems (Alles et al. 2008 ; 
Alles et al. 2006 ; Kuhn and Sutton 2006). A related issue deals with integrity of the 
data used for continuous fraud detection (Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). Another issue 
evident from fraud surveys is the average time taken to detect fraud appears to be 
increasing (KPMG 2010 ; KPMG 2008). These are  important issues as there appears 
to be a potential demand for efficient and effective implementation of continuous 
detection of potential fraud in organisations (Daigle and Lampe 2004). This gap is 
addressed by research sub-question 2 and its research propositions. 
 
 SQ2:  How can detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems be  
  effectively and efficiently automated to ensure minimal auditor  
  interaction? 
2.13. Conclusion 
Fraud is inherent in all organisations. It is a multi-billion dollar industry that is 
continuing to grow annually. Fraud costs Australia approximately $3 billion 
annually, and its frequency and financial impact continues to grow. Many 
organisations are poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud. Fraud detection 
strategies are intended to complement fraud prevention strategies. They are expected 
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to quickly and efficiently identify those frauds that have circumvented preventative 
measures so that an organisation can take appropriate corrective action.  
 
There are many factors that motivate individuals to commit fraud. Several theories 
that contribute to the perpetration of fraud were identified in the literature.  A 
common theme in each of the theories was that conflict of interest between business 
owners and its employees may possibly lead to fraudulent behaviour when an 
opportunity presented itself. Perpetrating a fraud required more than just an 
awareness of the types of fraud. Explicit knowledge of how to perpetrate a fraud is 
also required. Understanding how fraudsters think is essential in the design and 
development of an efficient and effective model for proactive detection of potential 
fraud. 
 
Proactive detection of potential fraud requires continuous monitoring of an 
organisation's transaction data. Continuous monitoring increases the possibility of 
detecting fraudulent activities. The traditional or manual audit approach is limited 
because it reviews only a small percentage of a large population of transactions. 
Large accounting data files with several thousands of transactions are difficult to 
analyse or monitor manually in real-time. The alternative therefore is to automate 
this process by using information technology. 
 
The basic need for continuous monitoring has increased in the new global digital 
economy as organisations become more complex and demand more integrated 
business processes. The fraud landscape is dynamic, fast-moving and ever changing. 
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Furthermore, fraudsters are becoming more sophisticated in their use of technology 
and in their ability to commit and conceal fraudulent activities.  
 
Large scale implementations of enterprise systems have resulted in many 
organisations being highly automated and fully integrated. The development of this 
enterprise system environment provides the necessary infrastructure for effective 
evolution of the auditing function from a periodic event to an ongoing process 
through use of continuous monitoring applications. 
 
The focus of fraud research in enterprise systems has principally been on fraud 
prevention rather than detection. The focus of this research is therefore, to explore 
and develop innovative methods for proactive detection of potential fraud in 
enterprise systems by continuous monitoring and analysis of its audit trails.  
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CHAPTER 3  
Research Design and Methodology 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
3.0. Introduction 
A review of the literature on fraud and its detection in enterprise systems is 
undertaken in Chapter 2. The primary research question and sub-questions are 
developed from gaps identified in the literature and posted in this Chapter. 
 
A scientific methodology should form the basis of any academic research project 
which claims to add value to the body of knowledge. A scientific methodology is a 
systematic observation of nature (Chadwick et al. 1984). Scientific understanding 
proceeds by way of constructing and analysing models of segments or aspects of 
reality being studied. The purpose of these models is not to give a mirror image of 
reality, nor to include all its elements in their exact sizes and proportions, but rather 
to single out and make available for intensive investigation those elements which are 
decisive (Baran and Sweezy 1970). 
 
A methodology may serve as a set of rules for reasoning whereby evaluation of facts 
can be used to draw inferences. The use of a methodology infers some competence in 
logical reasoning (Remenyi 1990). A researcher may be able to establish or verify 
some theories and these must be validated by some form of empirical evidence.  
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This Chapter discusses the research design and methodology which are adopted by 
this study.   
3.1. Study design 
Research design ensures that the evidence collected enables the researcher to answer 
the research questions in an unambiguous way (De Vaus 2001). Collection of 
evidence requires a researcher to specify the type of evidence needed to answer the 
research questions. Research design refers to the structure of an enquiry and 
therefore it is a logical problem and not a logistical one (Yin 2002).  It is not related 
to any particular data collection method nor any particular type of data (De Vaus 
2001) and can use qualitative or quantitative data. It is inaccurate to equate a 
particular research design with either qualitative or quantitative data as research 
design can use any type of data collection method.  
 
When designing a research project a researcher will bring their particular 
assumptions and beliefs to the research that will influence the approach used in the 
study (Patton 1990). This influence is termed a research paradigm. A paradigm is a 
model or set of values and beliefs that gives direction to the researcher (Creswell 
2005). There are three (3) paradigms: positivism; interpretive and critical (Smith 
2003). Table 3.1 provides a summary of these three paradigms and their key 
characteristics. 
 
A positivist perspective assumes that the method for gaining information and 
knowledge should be independent of a researcher, have certainty through data that 
measures reality composed of discrete elements and be replicable as research is  
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Table 3.1: Research paradigms 
Source: (Smith 2011 p.5) 
Positivist Interpretive Critical 
1. What is the approach modelled on? 
 Classical investigation 
founded in the physical 
sciences. 
Historical, literary and 
existential studies in which 
subjective understandings of 
subjects are significant 
Marxist and interpretive 
studies which focus on the 
insights and judgements 
of the subjects. 
2. What does it assume about reality? 
 Reality is unitary and can 
only be understood by 
empirical and analytic 
methods. 
There are multiple realities 
which require multiple 
methods for understanding 
them. 
There are multiple 
realities which are 
problematic through 
distorted communication. 
3. What is the foundation of data? 
 Disciplined rules for 
observation. 
Meanings are the basis of data: 
meaning precedes logic and 
fact. 
Means are found in 
language and social 
behaviours and they 
precede logic and fact.  
4. How is observation done? 
 Through and unambiguous 
rules which are not modified 
by setting and are totally 
independent of it. 
Through the social, linguistic 
and cognitive skills of the 
researcher. 
Interpretive methods, plus 
critical self-reflection 
concerning the grounds of 
observation. 
5. What is generated? 
 Evidence and generalisable 
laws which are not affected 
by contexts and have nothing 
to do with the way they were 
discovered. Objectivity 
depends on removal of error 
and bias. 
Knowledge which is dependent 
on the process of discovery. 
The integrity of the findings 
depends upon the quality of the 
social, linguistic and cognitive 
skills of the researcher in the 
production of data analyses and 
conclusions. 
Knowledge which falls 
within the interpretive 
framework, but which 
also serves the purposes 
of assisting personal 
liberation and 
understanding, and 
emancipation from forces 
constraining the rational 
independence of 
individuals. 
6. What interests are inherent? 
 Prediction and control, 
technically exploitable 
knowledge, and explanation. 
Understanding at the level of 
ordinary language and action. 
Discovering the meanings and 
beliefs underlying the actions 
of others. 
Interpretive interests and 
those which underlie 
other forms of inquiry. 
Radically improving 
human existence. 
Practical and public 
involvement in 
knowledge formation and 
use.  
7. What values are inherent? 
 Science and scientific 
knowledge are inherently 
value-neutral. 
Science and scientific 
knowledge have both to be 
interpreted in terms of values 
they represent. 
Science and knowledge 
are never value-neutral: 
they always represent 
interests. 
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limited to natural, physical and material approaches. Data collection and analysis is 
structured, with the researcher not intervening in the phenomenon of interest (Perry 
et al. 1999). 
 
An interpretive perspective assumes that human actions occur as a result of external 
influences, having both intentions and reflections. In order to develop an 
understanding of a phenomenon, a researcher may be required to become an active 
participant in it. It is important to understand the process of discovery in order to 
remove any ambiguity that results from a researcher's active participation in it (Smith 
2011). 
 
A critical perspective expands on the scope of an interpretive one. It focuses on 
ownership of knowledge and the associated social, economic and political 
implications. Research enquiries are usually long-tern ethnographic processes and 
structures. Assumptions are subjective and knowledge is grounded in social and 
historical routines and is value-dependent and not value-free (Perry et al. 1999). 
 
In this study, the focus is on using technology to demonstrate the feasibility of 
implementing proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems. It requires 
a systematic, impartial and responsible approach. The positivist paradigm provides 
the required discipline for conducting this study. The study is a classical 
investigation of physical phenomena that can be understood by empirical and 
analytic methods. Rules for observation of data are unambiguous and not affected by 
the environment. The evidence obtained is generalisable and is not affected by 
contexts or the way it was discovered. There are two major processes of reasoning, 
'deductive' (theory to observation) and 'inductive' (observation to theory). Inductive 
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reasoning begins with specific observations (data) from which theories may be 
generated or generalisable patterns may emerge.  Deductive reasoning starts with 
theory and proceeds to predictions that follow from its application Predictions can be 
verified from its application (Smith 2011). Furthermore, fraud theorist Robertson 
(2000) proposes that fraud examinations begin with assumptions, based on available 
data (facts). Assumptions are then tested to determine whether they can be proven or 
not.  Therefore, remaining within a positivist paradigm, this study proposes a 
research design that incorporates laboratory experiments and field research. 
 
Laboratory experiments are designed to measure the effects of experiments precisely 
and under controlled circumstances. These may range from timing aspects of a 
prototype system to measuring the effects of some new product on an intended target 
audience. Field research, being less controlled, is often conducted to observe a 
phenomenon in its natural environment (Oliver 1999). Most field research is cross-
sectional and access of any kind may be opportunistic and subsequently denied. 
Researchers may therefore use a small set of case-data in support of more general, 
theoretical assumptions. However, the ability to make broad generalisations from a 
single study is necessarily limited. When evaluating validity, alternative views of the 
same phenomenon should be offered through a process of 'triangulation'. Combining 
different results from interviews, surveys, archival data collection, and so on, using 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches is termed 'between-methods' 
triangulation (Smith 2011).   
 
Before deciding on what data to collect for a study, and how to collect it, it is 
necessary to decide whether to use quantitative or qualitative research methods, or a 
combination of both. Qualitative research design is commonly used when there is little 
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known about a problem or when a detailed understanding is required of a specific 
phenomenon. Quantitative studies generally use large samples to test numerical data 
by comparing or finding correlations among sample attributes so that the findings 
can be generalised to a population (Creswell 2005).  
 
No one research method is more superior to another. An important determinant, 
however, is obtaining valid and meaningful result for a study by choosing the most 
appropriate method. The quantitative approach tends to collect more limited data about 
a large participant group, while the qualitative approach collects more rich data from a 
small participant group (Creswell 2005). For this study, the following outcomes are 
important: i) experimentation in a laboratory environment; ii) testing in the field; and iii) 
opinions of experts. A mixed approach is therefore suited to this study as it may provide 
more meaningful and valid results. 
3.2. Research design 
This section discusses the research design. The main research question and its sub-
questions are discussed, a conceptual model is developed and propositions are 
formulated. 
3.2.1. Research questions 
This study aims to answer the following primary research question. 
Can a generalised model for proactive detection of  
potential fraud in enterprise systems be developed? 
 
To answer the primary research question, two research sub-questions have been 
developed. 
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SQ1: How do enterprise systems support proactive detection of potential fraud in 
 financial transactions? 
 
This sub-question examines the possibility of detecting potentially fraudulent 
activities in an enterprise system. The enterprise system used for the purpose of the 
study is SAP. In order to answer this question the following issues need to be 
addressed. 
i). Can user activities be identified as potentially fraudulent? 
ii). Can user activities be monitored in an enterprise system? 
iii). What evidence is required to monitor user activities in SAP? 
iv). Can procedures be developed to detect potentially fraudulent 
activities in SAP? 
 
SQ2:  How can detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems be effectively and 
 efficiently automated to ensure minimal auditor interaction? 
 
This sub-question examines the possibility of automating detection of potential fraud 
in an enterprise system, as it is impractical to analyse large accounting data files 
manually. A MCL-based approach is stand-alone and client independent. It enables 
auditors to perform analyses with minimal interaction with an organisations 
enterprise system. In order to answer this sub-question the following issues need to be 
addressed. 
i). Can software be developed to automate detection of potential 
fraud? 
ii). Can the software be implemented on a stand-alone computer 
system that is separate from a SAP enterprise system? 
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3.2.2. Conceptual model 
This research develops a conceptual model for proactive detection of potential fraud 
in enterprise systems. This model is derived from i) the Fraud Perception Model; ii) 
the High-level fraud scenarios model (HFSM); and iii) the Fraud Matrix from 
Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. The six essential steps in detecting fraudulent activities are 
discussed in Section 2.6 and Figure 2.9 (Albrecht et al. 2009). The conceptual model 
in Figure 3.1 incorporates the following four steps to detect fraud in enterprise 
systems:  
  
i). identify types of frauds that can occur; 
ii). catalogue fraud symptoms;  
iii). use computer technology to detect fraud symptoms; and 
iv). analyse results. 
 
This study proposes a Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) based model for 
proactive fraud detection through continuous monitoring and analysis of enterprise 
systems' audit trails. The proposed model has the following inherent characteristics. 
 
i). It is not limited to sampling a subset of an organisation's 
transactions, as is the case with a traditional manual audit. 
Therefore there is no sampling risk.   
ii). It provides frequent opportunities for identifying potential 
fraud. This will most likely lead to a reduction in the time 
taken to detect fraud, from several months to days or hours. 
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual model 
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iii). In-built data analytics will assist in determining the propensity 
for frauds occurring in the future. This attribute may be used in 
identifying, and proactively correcting deficiencies in internal 
controls thereby leading to a possible reduction in fraud in an 
organisation. 
iv). Access to an enterprise system is only required for data 
extraction purposes. A separate system is used for continuous 
monitoring and data analytics.  Impact on the enterprise 
system being monitored is therefore negligible as there is no 
overhead of running additional software. Independence of 
enterprise systems' from audit computer systems is maintained. 
 
The conceptual model represents: i) the fundamental nature of fraud; and ii) its 
detection. Firstly, the model incorporates factors that motivate an individual to 
perpetrate fraud. It identifies mental states that fraudsters experience prior to 
perpetrating frauds. A fraudster may mentally enact several fraud scenarios until a 
suitable one is found. Once a fraudster determines 'what to steal', the next decision is 
'how to steal it'. A fraudster has to determine a specific method of perpetrating fraud. 
The chosen method may entail a series of steps taken to achieve the desired outcome 
of; i) perpetrating a fraud and, ii) concealing it to avoid detection. The key concept 
identified in this part is opportunity. Secondly, the model focuses on detection of 
potential fraud in an organisation. This is achieved by: 
i). creation of a catalogue of fraud symptoms; 
ii). translation of fraud symptoms into detection strategies that can be 
implemented in a prototype; 
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iii). design and development of a prototype; and 
iv). experimentation with enterprise system (for example,  SAP) data. 
 
The conceptual model for this research integrates components of fraud discussed in 
preceding sections. The model provides an understanding of the nature of fraud 
symptoms and its detection in enterprise systems (for example, SAP). Fraud is a 
complex social condition that evolves from underlying factors such as dissatisfaction 
or despair. The eventual outcome is that an individual is motivated to misappropriate 
assets that belong to an organisation.  
3.2.3. Research propositions 
To facilitate answering of the research sub-questions, propositions have been 
formulated. Each of the propositions directs attention to a specific issue that needs to 
be examined within the scope of the research sub-question (Figure 3.2). The 
propositions assist in directing the study towards the desired outcome of answering 
the primary research question and proving the conceptual model. The propositions 
are discussed below. 
 
SQ1: How do enterprise systems support proactive detection of potential fraud in 
 financial transactions? 
 
To answer this research sub-question, three propositions have been formulated.  
 
RP1a: Enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
 retrospective monitoring of user activities. 
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Fundamental data required to monitor user activities in an enterprise system is 
established in section 3.2.3 and explained further in section 4.2. The SAP enterprise 
system is subsequently examined, in Chapter 4, to determine the level of support it 
provides for proactive detection of potential fraud. 
 
 
RP1b: Violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit 
 trails for critical combinations of user activities. 
 
A catalogue of critical combinations of user activities, and procedures to identify user 
activities that violate of segregation of duties are developed in section 4.4.1.  
 
 
RP1c: Potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating user 
 activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
 symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. 
 
A catalogue of fraud symptoms and procedures to identify potentially fraudulent 
transactions that occur as a result of violation of segregation of duties are developed 
in section 4.5. The rationale is that a user performing any critical combination of user 
activities may be involved in perpetrating a fraud against an organisation.  
 
SQ2:  How can detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems be effectively and 
 efficiently automated to ensure minimal auditor interaction? 
 
To address this research sub-question, three propositions have been formulated. 
 
  
 - 114 - 
RP2a: Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities and 
report these using an intuitive visual interface. 
 
  
 
Figure 3.2: Research propositions 
 
Prototype software for detection of potential fraud is designed in Chapter 4 and 
implemented in Chapter 5. Tests are performed with the prototype using simulated 
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test data and case study data from a SAP enterprise system. The prototype is 
demonstrated to independent reviewers and a panel of experts. It is refined based on 
the results of experimentation with test data. Reports and visualisations produced by 
experimenting with the prototype provide evidence in support of the feasibility of 
implementing proactive detection of potential fraud in practice. 
 
RP2b: Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on a
 stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an 
 organisation's enterprise system. 
 
Prototype software is developed as a stand-alone application and installed on a 
separate computer system in Chapter 5. Experiments using test data and case study 
data are performed on a laptop computer, independent of an organisation's SAP 
enterprise system. Tests are conducted on a variety of data-sets to determine whether 
the prototype is able to handle real data volumes from a real organisation without 
difficulty. Feedback is sought from independent reviews and expert panel members 
to determine desirability for a proactive tool for detection potential fraud 
implemented on a stand-alone computer system. 
 
RP2c: Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by using 
 technology to perform continuous monitoring of an organisation's  enterprise 
 system. 
 
Experiments using test data and case study data are performed with the prototype to 
provide information on processing times in Chapter 5. Results obtained from these  
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Table 3.1: Mapping of research questions, propositions and process 
 
 
…continued on next page 
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…Table 3.1 continued from previous page 
 
 
 
 
  
 - 118 - 
tests and feedback from independent reviewers and expert panel members are used to 
establish support of this proposition.  
 
Table 3.1 summarises the relationships among research questions, research 
propositions and the process required to answer research questions. 
3.3. Research methodology 
The conceptual fraud detection model developed in this study proposes that a 
generalised model for proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems can be 
developed. 
 
The methodology consists of the following separate yet interdependent stages 
(Figure 3.3).  
i). Literature review – to recognise the theories that will guide this study and 
to identify gaps in the literature. 
ii). Create a catalogue of fraud symptoms (critical combinations and known 
fraud symptoms). 
iii). Identify data requirements to detect fraud in enterprise systems, in 
general and SAP, in particular. 
iv). Design, develop and implement prototype software on a stand-alone 
computer system. 
v). Perform experiments with simulated test data and modify prototype to 
ensure it produces correct results. 
vi). Perform experiments with case study data to obtain proof that the 
prototype can detect potential fraud in a real organisation.  
vii). Seek support validating the prototype. 
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Figure 3.3: Methodology  
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The concept of proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems is 
demonstrated by developing a prototype. The aim of the prototype is to confirm the 
feasibility of implementing proactive detection of potential fraud in practice. It is a 
software application that performs data analytics on transaction data obtained from a 
SAP enterprise system. Reports and visualisations indicating potentially fraudulent 
or anomalous activities are produced as output.   
3.3.1. Scope of fraud categories  
It was noted in the literature review that 'asset misappropriation' is the most common 
category of fraud in organisations.  Furthermore, non-management employees are the 
largest group involved in perpetrating this fraud against organisations. These 
employees used billing schemes primarily to perpetrate fraud against organisations. 
Two of the most widely exploited weaknesses are the lack of internal controls and 
overriding of existing internal controls, resulting in a violation of segregation of 
duties. 
 
When considering an automated solution for proactive detection of potential fraud, 
the focus has to be on questions that can be answered with the aid of computerised 
tools (Lanza 2007). Some questions are too subjective, for example, "Are the 
vendor's goods or services of good quality?" Any effort to develop an automated 
solution will require evidence that: i) is documented in an enterprise system's audit 
trails; and ii) can be investigated using data analytics tools. Transactions that occur 
outside an enterprise system cannot be investigated using this methodology.   
 
The focus of this research is on 'asset misappropriation' in general, and billing 
schemes, namely i) shell company; and ii) non-accomplice vendor schemes within 
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accounts payable, in particular. Hereinafter these billing schemes are collectively 
referred to as vendor fraud. These schemes are among the most costly of all asset 
misappropriation schemes in organisations (ACFE 2010 ; Wells 2008). Furthermore, 
these schemes leave 'footprints' in audit trails of an enterprise system that can be 
detected using appropriate computerised analytics techniques. The measures used in 
this study to detect potential fraud will therefore focus on these schemes. 
3.3.2. Measures to detect fraud 
Methods developed in this study to detect fraud are based on prior work conducted 
by several researchers (ACFE 2010 ; Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Singleton et al. 2008 ; 
Wells 2008 ; Lanza 2007 ; O'Gara 2004 ; Greene 2003a ; Lanza 2003 ; Little and 
Best 2003). These methods are grouped into two categories:  i) critical combinations; 
and ii) known fraud symptoms. They are used in the development of prototype 
software for detection of potential fraud.  
 
Critical combinations 
Many frauds occur because fraudsters exploit the lack of internal controls or they 
may override existing internal controls that are poorly implemented. The fraud 
detection prototype aims to detect user activities that violate segregation of duties. 
Further analysis will then be undertaken to identify any anomalous symptoms that 
arise due to these violations. For example, an employee that creates or modifies a 
vendor master record should not be able to enter an invoice. Having this capability 
does not indicate that a fraud has taken place, but it does create an opportunity for a 
fraud to be perpetrated. By detecting these critical combinations of user activities: i) 
an auditor can further investigate transactions that match known fraud symptoms, or 
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appear otherwise anomalous; and ii) an organisation can take steps to correct the 
situation thereby reducing the possibility of future fraud. The concept of separating 
critical business activities in order to reduce fraud is termed 'segregation of duties'. In 
its simplest form, the segregation of duties (SoDs) principle states that sensitive tasks 
should be divided into two or more steps with each step being performed by a 
different user. SoDs reduces conflicts of interest and enables detection of user 
activities that result in a breach of its principles   (Best et al. 2009 ; Coleman 2008 ; 
Li et al. 2007 ; Srinidhi 1994). 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Critical AP activities model 
Source: adapted from Little and Best (2003) 
 
This study supports the following principles of segregation of duties within an 
accounts payable (AP) function as proposed by Little and Best (2003) (Figure 3.4): 
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i). users who can create and modify master records should not be 
able to post transactions; and 
ii). payments should be performed by someone other than the 
person who enters vendor invoices.  
 
Known fraud symptoms 
Billing fraud schemes occur when a fraudster causes an organisation to issue a 
payment by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated invoices, or 
invoices for personal purchases (these were discussed in section 2.5). The prototype 
will identify user activities that violate segregation of duties. The following analyses 
may be performed to identify anomalous user and vendor transactions: 
 
i). bank account flipping – checks for changes to banking details, a change 
back to original, with transactions processed in the interim period; 
ii). duplicates testing -  checks for any duplicates, for example, invoices, 
payments or vendors;  
iii). trend analysis - compares activities over two or more periods, to identify 
variances over time, for example, vendors with minimal payments in 
prior periods but large payments in current period may be fraudulent 
payments; 
iv). Benford's Law - gives expected frequencies of digits in numerical data; 
spikes may be indicative of fraud and require further investigation; 
v). stratification - identifies the number and dollar value of vendor payments 
that occur within a specified interval, for example 5% below an approval 
limit; and 
vi). graphing - provides a visual means of documenting anomalous activities. 
  
 - 124 - 
 
A sample of methods to detect symptoms of known shell company and non-
accomplice vendor schemes is further described in Table 3.2 (Lanza 2003; Wells 
2008; Best et al. 2009). 
3.3.3. Data requirements to detect potential fraud 
To detect potentially fraudulent activities in an enterprise system, some fundamental 
data is required. At a minimum to detect fraud schemes listed in Table 3.2, an MCL-
based application will require access to generic data items that define the event (who, 
when, where, and how) as well as specific data items relating to each scheme. 
Accordingly, this data should minimally include: 
i). user name – name of the user that performed the transaction; 
ii). date – that the transaction was performed; 
iii). time – that the transaction was performed; 
iv). computer workstation – that the transaction was performed on; 
v). transaction  performed - the specific transaction that the user 
performed (e.g. entering an invoice, posting a payment); and 
vi). transaction details – data relating to the transaction performed 
(e.g. vendor bank details, invoice amount). 
 
Furthermore, historical data is required to detect frauds that are perpetrated over a 
period of several days, weeks, or months. An example of such a scenario is a change  
in vendor payment details followed by a change back to the original after a period of 
time has elapsed, with payment(s) made in the interim period (Figure 3.5).  
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Table 3.2: Methods to detect known fraud symptoms 
 
 
Source: adapted from (Lanza 2003 ; Wells 2008 ; Best et al. 2009) 
…continued on next page 
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…Table 3.2 continued from previous page 
 
 
Source: adapted from (Lanza 2003 ; Wells 2008 ; Best et al. 2009) 
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Figure 3.5: Flipping vendor bank account details 
 
In this scenario a fraudster uses legitimate, fake or duplicate invoices to redirect 
payments to a personal bank account by temporarily changing a vendors payment 
details. In order to effectively detect this fraud scenario, data spanning the duration 
of the fraud is required. 
 
3.3.4. Prototype 
A prototype is a partial or simplified implementation of a complete system (Davis 
1992 ; Asur and Hufnagel 1993) built for a specific purpose such as: 
i). formulating and evaluating requirements, specifications and 
designs; 
ii). demonstrating feasibility, system behaviour or performance; 
iii). identifying and reducing risks of system mis-development; 
iv). communicating ideas, especially among diverse groups; and 
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v). answering questions about specific properties of proposed 
systems. 
(Luqi and Steigerwald 1992) 
 
Prototyping applies to all kinds of systems, such as software, hardware, people or a 
combination thereof. A prototype is a low cost representation of a system that 
displays selected aspects of the proposed system. Within the information systems 
domain, prototypes provide: i) an operational model of the application that 
implements certain aspects of the future system; ii) a concrete basis for discussions 
between developers, users and management; and iii) a basis for subsequent 
prototypes or for the application system. Prototypes may also be used: i) to clarify 
any relevant specification or development problems; ii) to serve as a basis for 
discussion and as an aid to decision-making; and iii) for experimental purposes and 
for gaining practical experience (Budde and Zullighoven 1990). 
 
Two key advantages for constructing software prototypes that are relevant to this 
study are: i) to provide users with a 'tangible' idea of the problem solution being 
sought after; and ii) to demonstrate the technical feasibility of a specification (Asur 
and Hufnagel 1993 ; Budde and Zullighoven 1990). 
 
There are four steps in developing a software prototype (Figure 3.6).   
 
i). Identify a user's needs - meet with users to agree on what elements the 
system should include and exclude. The emphasis is on what the 
system should produce and not on how it should be produced. 
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Figure 3.6: The prototype model 
Source: (Naumann and Jenkins 1982 p.31) 
 
ii). Develop a working prototype –initial prototype is built in a short time, 
meeting the agreed-on user's requirements. The goal of this stage is 
speed; non-essential aspects of the system are not included in this 
stage. 
iii). Implement and use the prototype – 'hands-on' use of the system. Users 
are provided with tentative versions of data entry screens, menus, 
prompts and documents. They are also required to respond to prompts, 
query the system, judge response times and issue commands.  
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iv). Revise and enhance the prototype - any undesirable or missing features 
are identified and corrected.  
(Romney and Steinbart 2009 ; Asur and Hufnagel 1993 ; Naumann and Jenkins 1982) 
 
This study proposes a two phase process for automated detection of potential fraud 
using a prototype. In phase one, data is extracted from a SAP enterprise system. 
Phase two is sub-divided into two stages. In stage one, surveillance of data is 
conducted to identify user activities that violate segregation of duties. In stage two, 
user activities that violate segregation of duties are investigated in detail to identify 
transactions that match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous 
(Figure 3.7).   The prototype utilises a catalogue of critical combinations and known 
fraud symptoms (section 3.3.2) to detect potentially fraudulent transactions. 
Anomalous and potentially fraudulent activities are identified; and reports and 
visualisations are produced.  
 
1. Violation of
Segregation of Duties
2. Fraudulent Activities
Prototype
(Proof of Concept)
Data
Evidence
input output
input input
Critical
Combinations
Known
Fraud Symptoms
 
Figure 3.7: Prototype input requirements 
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The prototype provides evidence in support of the concepts proposed in the research. 
It allows the research to make the statement "…and it is feasible to practically 
implement proactive detection of potential in enterprise systems."  
 
Test Data 
Test data covering a period of one (1) month is generated to simulate user activities 
in a SAP enterprise system. The following activities are embedded in the test data. 
i). User activities - simulated user activities include vendor maintenance; 
invoicing; and payment transactions.  
ii). Critical combinations -  user activities violating SoDs principles, namely, 
users  creating and modifying master records and posting transactions; 
and users entering invoices and processing payments.  
iii). Anomalous user transactions - 'flipping' of vendor bank account details 
while payments are processed in the interim period; duplicate invoices 
and payments; round dollar invoices and payments. 
iv). Anomalous vendor transactions - vendors with similar names; vendors 
posting transactions after being dormant for long periods; vendors sharing 
bank accounts; vendors having multiple bank accounts; and vendors 
having multiple master records. 
 
A series of 'manual' experiments are performed on the test data to establish a set of 
'control' values using Microsoft Excel. The same experiments are conducted with the 
prototype and 'experimental' values produced are reconciled with 'control' values. 
Inconsistencies in results are used to correct errors in the prototypes syntax, program 
logic, and knowledge base. 
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3.3.5. Data collection 
Data is obtained from a single embedded case study. Audit trails are extracted from a 
SAP enterprise system and exported to a separate personal computer system for 
analysis.  These audit trails routinely capture activities that are performed within a 
SAP enterprise system. Evidence supporting the primary research question is 
obtained by analysis of archived enterprise system audit trails.  
 
Case study 
"A case study is an empirical study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident"  (Yin 2002 p.13).  
 
The case study is an ideal method when an in-depth investigation of a real-life 
phenomenon is required (Yin 2002 ; Feagin et al. 1991). It is the preferred method 
when  the research wants to deliberately investigate contextual conditions that may 
be pertinent to the phenomenon being studied (Yin 2009).  
 
There are four types of designs for case studies - single-case holistic designs, single-
case embedded designs, multiple-case holistic designs, and multiple-case embedded 
designs. Prior to data collection a researcher needs to decide between using a single 
or multiple case design to address research questions (Yin 2002). 
 
This study uses a single-case embedded design. The rationale is that transaction data 
from the same single case is examined to determine how it changes over time, i.e. a 
longitudinal case study.  An embedded design uses multiple units of analysis. In this 
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study, the main unit of analysis is an organisation and intermediary units are 
employees and vendors. This design is justifiable because data from the same case 
will be investigated to determine how it changes over time and whether these 
changes are indicative of potentially fraudulent activities. 
 
There are at least six sources of data when using case studies:  i) documentation; ii) 
archival records; iii) interviews; iv) direct observation; vi) participant observation; 
and vii) physical artefacts  (Yin 2002 ; Stake 1995). The primary source of data for 
this study is 'archival records'. These archival records are in the form of audit trails 
of transactions processed in an enterprise system (Figure 3.8).   
 
 
Figure 3.8: Source of data 
 
3.3.6. Proof of conceptual model 
Evidence supporting the research is obtained by analysing data obtained from an 
enterprise systems audit trails. Analysis is performed on the data in two stages. In 
stage one, the data is analysed to determine if any critical combinations of user 
activities are present. These activities violate segregation of duties and require 
further investigation. In stage two, user activities that violate segregation of duties 
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are investigated in detail to determine whether they match known fraud symptoms, or 
appear otherwise anomalous. Each of these stages is discussed below. 
 
Stage one analysis 
The purpose of this stage is to identify any critical combinations of user activities. 
These activities violate segregation of duties and need further investigation. The 
activities include: 
i). users who can create and modify master records should not be able to 
post transactions and; 
ii). in accounts payable, payments should be performed by someone other 
than the person who enters vendor invoices.  
 
Stage two analysis 
The purpose of this stage is to identify potentially fraudulent transactions that match 
known fraud symptoms, or are otherwise anomalous. In this stage analyses for 
known fraud symptoms described in section 3.3.2 and Table 3.2 are performed. 
3.3.7. Expert panel validation of model 
A panel of experts are requested to observe and provide feedback on performance of 
the prototype. Their feedback is obtained on issues such as operation, reporting and 
visualisations, accuracy and efficiency, and impact on auditor productivity. This 
feedback provides evidence demonstrating validation and acceptance of the 
prototype. 
 
An expert panel consists of a group of selected individuals that have extensive skill 
or knowledge in a particular field (Collins 2000 ; Fuller 2002).  An expert panel 
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provides the researcher with an opportunity to discuss issues and to get expert 
feedback on issues relevant to the research topic. The research interest directs the 
discussion while data comes from interactions between members (Morgan 1997). A 
researcher takes on the role of moderator in these interactions (Parker and Tritter 
2006). These sessions provide an efficient means of observing a large amount of 
interaction on a topic in a limited amount of time. Interaction produces data and 
insights that would otherwise be less attainable in the absence of such an interaction. 
(Farnsworth and Boon 2010 ; Morgan 1997).  
 
Expert panels are intended to elicit in-depth information, viewpoints, and opinions 
from experts (Moy 2008). Panel members are independent experts, recognised in the 
field of study being evaluated. They examine all the information on the topic and 
provide their expert feedback and answers to evaluative questions. The panel does 
not fully explain its judgement, but credibility of the evaluation is guaranteed by the 
fact that conclusions result from consensus between members that are specialists in 
their field (EC 2011). 
 
Participants in an expert panel are selected based on the purpose of the study 
(Robinson 1999). Random selection is not critical because the intent is to understand 
how experts in the panel think and talk about the topic being studied (Krueger and 
Casey 2000). It is therefore important to recruit participants that have experience and 
interest in the topic being studied.  The terms of reference given to the panel may 
include presentations, questions, and an estimation of real or probable effects (EC 
2011). Homogeneity of participants (for example, similar backgrounds and 
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experiences) is recommended (Plummer-D'Amato 2008) as randomly selected 
participants may not be interested in research.  
 
Expert panels require a central topic. In order to direct interactions it is essential for a 
moderator to prepare a series of questions to be answered by panel members. The 
process of reaching conclusions by an expert panel involves the following stages. 
Firstly, presentation of the research and any results or questions to be answered. 
Secondly, experts, either individually or in small groups, conduct their own 
examination of the research. Finally, an expert panel provides their interpretations 
and findings in a balanced and impartial way. This may be recorded in a survey. 
 
In the context of this study, an expert panel consisting of 20 experts in the domain of 
auditing is used. All members of CPA Australia (Queensland Division - IT 
Discussion Group) and ISACA3 (Queensland Chapter) are invited to participate in 
the expert panel. A short presentation on the research topic and demonstration of the 
prototype is given (20 minutes) and members have a hands-on session using the 
prototype. Their feedback is sought using a survey (Appendix 3) on the following 
key issues, namely operation, reporting and visualisations, accuracy and efficiency, 
and impact on auditor productivity. Feedback from the panel is used to validate the 
prototype (Figure 3.9). 
 
Expert panels are useful to explore participant's thoughts, ideas and experiences in 
relation to a topic of study. To maximise success the researcher must carefully 
consider the composition of the panel and be suitably prepared with a series of 
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questions to ensure that discussion progresses naturally towards answers being 
sought. The expert panel protocol for this study is shown in Appendix 2. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Expert panel interaction and feedback 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This research aims to answer the primary research question whether "a generalised 
model for proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems can be developed".  The 
approach to answering this question is to develop a prototype. The prototype 
provides support for the statement "…and it is feasible to practically implement 
proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems." The prototype analyses data from 
audit trails of a SAP enterprise system. A catalogue of critical combinations of user 
activities and known fraud symptoms are used in conjunction with various analysis 
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techniques to detect and report potentially fraudulent symptoms. Evidence 
supporting the research is obtained as output from the prototype. Feedback is sought 
from an expert panel to establish validity of the prototype. Results from data analysis 
provide further support for the prototype.   
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CHAPTER 4  
Prototype Design 
4. Prototype Design 
4.0. Introduction 
This research proposes that a generalised model for proactive detection of potential 
fraud in enterprise systems can be developed. In order to achieve this outcome a 
prototype is developed. The aim of the prototype is to test the feasibility of 
implementing proactive fraud detection in practice. The prototype analyses data 
extracted from a SAP enterprise system to identify user activities that violate 
segregation of duties. Users and vendors may be further investigated at the discretion 
of an auditor to identify activities that match known fraud symptoms, or appear 
otherwise anomalous. A catalogue of fraud symptoms informs this process.  
 
The previous Chapter discusses the research design and methodology used in this 
study. In this Chapter design specifications for the prototype is produced. This 
Chapter focuses on: 
 
i). identifying data required to detect fraud in enterprise systems, in general, 
and SAP in particular;  
ii). creating a catalogue of fraud symptoms, i.e. critical combinations of user 
activities,  and known fraud symptoms; and 
iii). designing strategies to detect fraud. 
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This Chapter also addresses the following three research propositions. 
 
§ RP1a: Enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
 retrospective monitoring of user activities. 
§ RP1b: Violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit 
 trails for critical combinations of user activities. 
§ RP1c: Potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating 
 user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known 
 fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. 
 
The following sections provide a detailed discussion of the prototype design. 
 
4.1. Prototype design 
The prototype consists of four interrelated modules (Figure 4.1). 
i). Input - data extraction and preparation.  
ii). Process - fraud detection engine – pre-processing data for 
fraud symptoms and production of reports and visualisations. 
iii). Storage – of input and historical data and data tables produced 
during pre-processing. 
iv). Output - display reports and visualisations in a web-based 
interface.  
 
Data is extracted from an organisation's SAP enterprise system and prepared by the 
input module for incorporation into storage. This module specifies data requirements 
for fraud detection. The process module is the fraud detection engine. It analyses 
transaction data and reports on fraudulent activities that have occurred. Three 
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essential elements make up this module; a catalogue of critical combinations, a 
catalogue of known fraud symptoms, and fraud detection strategies. The storage 
module stores data required for fraud detection, including input data, historical data 
and storage of data tables. The output module provides summarised and detailed 
reports and visualisations.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Prototype conceptual design  
 
The requirements and design specifications for each of the modules is discussed in 
the following sections. 
4.2. Data requirements for fraud detection 
Fundamental audit trail data required to detect fraud symptoms in an enterprise 
systems is discussed in Chapter 3. In this section, fraud detection methods developed 
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in Chapter 3 are examined in detail to identify data sources, and data extraction 
requirements for a SAP Enterprise System (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1).  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Input specifications 
 
The principal sources of data for detection of fraud symptoms in enterprise systems, 
in general, are:  
i). vendor master file 
§ vendor name 
§ street address 
§ P.O. box address 
§ telephone 
§ tax number 
§ bank BSB 
§ bank account 
§ created/ modified by 
§ creation date 
§ creation time 
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ii). invoice payment file 
§ vendor name 
§ invoice number 
§ invoice date 
§ posting date 
§ payment date 
§ amount 
§ user name 
 
iii). employee master file (optional) 
§ employee first name 
§ employee last name 
§ telephone 
§ address 
§ bank BSB 
§ bank account 
 
The employee master file is optional. The rationale is that enterprise systems such as 
SAP are modular in structure. As a result of this modular structure organisations may 
choose not to implement the human resources (HR) module. In this situation an 
employee master file is not available in an enterprise system. Although an employee 
master file may or may not be available, user names of employees are documented in 
the vendor master and invoice payment files. This may be used to identify users that 
perform suspicious activities.  A SAP enterprise system is examined next to 
determine the level of support it provides for fraud detection. 
4.3. SAP support for fraud detection  
A SAP enterprise system provides audit trails that, in the context of fraud detection, 
may be used to monitor user activities. SAP audit trails consist of security audit logs, 
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records of changes to master records and, accounting audit trails (Best et al. 2009). 
The following discussion examines how these audit trails may support fraud 
detection.  
4.3.1. SAP audit trails   
SAP audit trails provide detailed descriptions of functions performed within an 
enterprise system.  Each function in SAP has a transaction code associated with it. A 
transaction code (or t-code) consists of letters, numbers, or both (for example, FB60 
– Enter Vendor Invoice). A transaction code is a shortcut that takes a user directly to 
a SAP application rather than having to navigate through the menu system (Padhi 
2010). Each transaction code executed by a user is recorded in an audit trail (Best 
2000). Audit trail data required for this research is stored in several tables within a 
SAP enterprise system (Figure 4.3). 
 
Changes to master records are stored in two tables (Figures 4.4 and 4.5) namely 
CDHDR Change Document Headers and CDPOS Change Document Items (Padhi 
2010 ; Best et al. 2009 ; Hirao 2009 ; Best 2005). Changes to master records include 
creation and deletion of master records and changes to fields. Each change document 
header record in table CDHDR specifies: Client, Object Class of the master record, 
e.g. category of vendor, customer, general ledger account, cost centre, etc., Object 
Value, i.e. vendor number, cost centre code, Change Document Number, User Name 
who made the change, Date, Time, and Transaction Code (for example, FK01 - 
Create Vendor Master Record, FK02 - Change Vendor Master Record).  
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For every change document number, there is a corresponding change document item 
in a CDPOS table (Padhi 2010 ; Best et al. 2009 ; Hirao 2009 ; Best 2005). Change 
document items have the following fields: Client, Object Class (of the master record, 
for example, category of vendor, customer, general ledger account, cost centre, etc.), 
Object Value, (i.e. vendor number, cost centre code), Change Document Number, 
Table Name (for example, LFBK – Vendor Master Bank Details), Table Record Key, 
Field Name, Change Type - U(pdate), I(nsert), E(delete single field), D(elete) 
Record. Tables CDHDR and CDPOS are linked by the Object Id field. Thus it is 
possible to identify an individual user making these changes. 
 
Table 4.1: Source of data to detect known fraud symptoms 
Method Evidence 
Extract all vendors that have a change in payment details 
followed by a change back to the original after a short time 
(flipping) with payment(s) made in the interim period 
Vendor Master 
Perform trend analysis of vendor invoices and payments. 
Perform Benford's Law analysis of vendor invoices and 
payments 
Vendor Master 
Invoice / Payment 
Stratify vendor payments on approval limits (e.g. many $999 
payments when approval limit is $1 000) 
Invoice / Payment 
Identify duplicate payments  Invoice / Payment 
Extract same vendors having different payment details Invoice / Payment 
Identify multiple vendors sharing same payment details Vendor Master 
List vendors that become active after long periods of being 
dormant 
Invoice / Payment 
Extract all invoices with round dollar amounts Invoice / Payment 
Extract vendors where payments exceed last largest payment by 
a significant amount e.g. 200% 
Invoice / Payment 
Extract vendors with similar names  Vendor Master 
 
Source: adapted from (Lanza 2003 ; Wells 2008 ; Best et al. 2009) 
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Figure 4.3: SAP audit trails 
  
 - 147 - 
 
  
 - 148 - 
 
  
 - 149 - 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 - 150 - 
Accounting audit trails are stored in tables BKPF – Accounting Document Header, 
BSEG – Accounting Document Line Item, SKAT – General Ledger Account Texts, 
and LFA1- Vendor General Data (Figures 4.6 to 4.9). Tables BKPF and BSEG store 
posting histories for both general ledger accounts and subsidiary ledger records. This 
facilitates integration of data and automatic reconciliation of subsidiary ledgers with 
control accounts. General ledger account texts (names) are stored in table SKAT. 
Vendor general data including vendor name, date created and creating user are stored 
in table LFA1 (Best et al. 2009). Thus it is possible to identify an individual user 
performing these activities. 
 
As can be noted from the preceding discussion, data describing user activities is 
well-documented in audit trails of a SAP enterprise system. Detecting user activities 
and analysing them for potential fraud, however, is a difficult task if done manually. 
The prototype developed in this research automates fraud detection, thereby making 
it feasible to monitor an organisation's business processes at an unprecedented level 
of detail in a near real-time basis with minimal auditor involvement.  
4.4. Catalogue of fraud symptoms 
The prototype's process module (Figure 4.10) uses a catalogue of fraud symptoms to 
potentially detect fraudulent activities. The catalogue consists of critical 
combinations of user activities, and known fraud symptoms. Each of these is 
discussed in the following sections.  
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4.4.1. Critical combinations  
This study supports the principles of segregation of duties (SoDs) discussed in 
section 3.3.1. SAP audit trails provide detailed descriptions of functions performed 
by each user.  Every SAP function has a unique transaction code (t-code) associated 
with it. Critical combinations may be identified by examining t-codes of functions 
performed by users.  A list of t-codes pertinent to each of the SoDs principles is 
proposed in Table 4.2 (derived from SAP table TSTCT). 
 
The prototype interrogates user activities in search of SAP t-codes matching critical 
combinations as shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Users that perform these combinations 
are identified as having violated segregation of duties principles.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Process module 
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Table 4.2: SAP transaction codes 
 
T-Code SAP Description 
Vendor Maintenance 
FK01 Create Vendor (Accounting) 
FK02 Change Vendor (Accounting) 
XK01 Create Vendor (Centrally) 
XK02 Change Vendor (Centrally) 
Enter Invoice 
FB60 Enter Vendor Invoice 
F-43 Enter Vendor Invoice: Header Data 
FB01 
Post Document (allows posting of any financial 
transaction) 
FB10 Invoice/Credit Memo Fast Entry 
Post Payment 
F-53 Post Outgoing Payment 
F-58 Post Payment with Printout 
FBZ2 Post Outgoing Payments 
FBZ4 Payment with Printout 
F110 Automatic Payments 
Source: adapted from SAP table TSTCT 
 
SoDs Principle 1: Users who can create and modify vendor master records should 
 not be able to post accounting transactions.  
 
Table 4.3 lists the combination of activities a user has to perform in order to violate 
SoDs principle 1. If such a violation is detected then further investigation is 
necessary to determine whether a user has perpetrated any fraudulent transactions. 
  
 - 153 - 
Table 4.3: Violation of SoDs principle 1 
 
  ENTER INVOICE POST PAYMENT 
  FB60 F-43 FB01 FB10 F-53 F-58 F110 FBZ2 FBZ4 
FK01 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
FK02 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
XK01 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
V
EN
D
O
R
 
M
A
IN
T.
 
XK02 √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: adapted from SAP table TSTCT 
 
SoDs Principle 2:  Payments should be performed by someone other than the person 
 who enters vendor invoices.  
 
Table 4.4 lists the combination of activities a user has to perform in order to violate 
SoDs principle 2. If such a violation is detected then further investigation is 
necessary to determine whether a user has perpetrated any fraudulent transactions. 
 
Table 4.4: Violation of SoDs principle 2 
 
  POST PAYMENT 
  F-53 F-58 FBZ2 FBZ4 F110 
FB60 √ √ √ √ √ 
F-43 √ √ √ √ √ 
FB01 √ √ √ √ √ 
EN
TE
R
  
IN
V
O
IC
E 
FB10 √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: adapted from SAP table TSTCT 
 
4.4.2. Known fraud symptoms 
User activities that violate SoDs principles require further investigation to determine 
whether they match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. A 
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catalogue of known fraud symptoms informs this process (Table 4.5). Design 
specifications for fraud detection strategies shown in Table 4.5 are discussed in the 
following section.  
4.5. Design specification for fraud detection strategies 
Algorithms for fraud detection are coded within the prototype's process module. 
They represent the core logic of the detection engine. Extracted SAP transaction data 
are pre-processed by the detection engine and a series of reports and visualisations 
are produced. The catalogue of fraud symptoms is a key component in this process 
(Table 4.5). In this section a comprehensive design specification, specific to the SAP 
Enterprise System, is produced. 
 
Audit trails required for fraud detection were discussed in section 4.3.1. These audit 
trails are the basis for providing data required by the prototype. Fraud detection 
occurs in two phases: i) identification of critical combinations of user activities; and 
ii) investigation of activities that match known fraud symptoms or appear otherwise 
anomalous.   
Critical combinations  
Critical combinations of user activities were discussed in section 4.4.1. In this section 
algorithms to detect violation of SoDs principles are designed. 
 
The following algorithm may be used to detect violation of SoDs principle 1 
(Figure 4.4). 
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Table 4.5: Known AP fraud symptoms 
Symptom General Detection Strategy 
Change in vendor payment details 
followed by a change back to the 
original after a short time (flipping) 
and payments are made in the interim 
period 
 
 
§ Detect changes to vendor master data 
that result in a vendor having different 
bank details over a period of time. 
Payment of invoices is made in the 
interim period. The previous bank 
details are subsequently reinstated after 
being updated with new details.  
Duplicate transactions 
 
§ Check for flipping of bank details. 
§ Check if the same payment details are 
used by more than one vendor. 
Invoices with round dollar amounts § Extract all invoices with round dollar 
amounts (e.g. $1000.00). 
Invoices with amounts consistently 
below approval limit 
 
§ Extract all vendors with multiple 
invoices below approval limit (e.g. 
several $999 payments to vendor when 
limit is $1000). 
Vendors with payments exceeds the 
last largest payment by a significant 
amount  
§ Extract all vendors where payment is 
larger than the last largest payment by a 
percentage e.g. 200%. 
Excessive use of one-time vendors  
 
§ Extract all payments that use the one-
time account. 
Vendors with similar names § Extract all vendors whose names are 
similar to other companies. 
Vendors that become active after 
long periods of being dormant 
§ Extract all vendors that become active 
after long periods of inactivity. 
Same vendor  having different 
payment details 
§ Extract all vendors with multiple master 
records, each having different payment 
details. 
§ Check for multiple payments using 
different bank account details. 
Multiple vendors sharing the same 
payment details 
§ Extract all vendors that share the same 
payment details. 
Benford's Law (Invoices and 
Payments) 
§ Extract all vendor invoices (or 
payments) and plot values against 
Benford's expected frequencies. 
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Figure 4.5: Detection strategy- users violating SoDs principle 1 
 
 
CREATE TABLE Risky_MaintInvPmt AS 
SELECT user-id, t-code, vendor-id  
FROM BKPF JOIN CDHDR 
ON vendor-id = object-id 
AND t-code IN invoice-tcode-list 
AND t-code IN payment-tcode-list 
AND t-code IN vend-maint-tcode-list 
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The following algorithm may be used to detect violation of SoDs principle 2 
(Figure 4.5). 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Detection strategy- users violating SoDs principle 2 
 
 
CREATE TABLE Risky_InvPmt AS 
SELECT user-id, t-code, vendor-id  
FROM BKPF JOIN LFA1 
ON vendor-id = vendor-id 
AND t-code IN invoice-tcode-list 
AND t-code IN payment-tcode-list 
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Known fraud symptoms 
General detection strategies for known fraud symptoms were discussed in section 
4.4.2. In this section algorithms for detection of these symptoms are designed. 
 
Fraud symptom 1: Flipping vendor bank account details (Figure 4.7) 
 
CREATE TABLE VEND_BKPF_BSEG AS 
 SELECT * 
 FROM BKPF  JOIN BSEG 
 ON bkpf.docno = bseg.docno 
 AND.tcode IN invoice-tcode-list 
 OR tcode IN payment-tcode-list 
 
CREATE TABLE VEND_FK_LFBK_ALL AS 
 SELECT *  
 FROM CDHDR JOIN CDPOS 
 ON cdhdr.changenr = cdpos.changenr 
 
CREATE TABLE VEND_HISTORY  AS 
 SELECT docdat as udate ,0 as  utime, ,docno usnam,  
  tcode, amount, vendno, " " as bkdetail 
 FROM VEND_BKPF_BSEG 
 UNION 
 SELECT udate, utime, changenr, username, 
  tcode, 0, objectid, bkdetail  
 FROM  VEND_FK_LFBK_ALL 
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Figure 4.7: Detection – flipping vendor bank account 
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Fraud symptom 2: Duplicate transactions (Figure 4.8) 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Detection – duplicate transactions 
 
 
CREATE TABLE DUPLICATE_TRANS AS 
 SELECT cocode, vendno, fiscyr, docno, amount, drcr,  
 glaccno, usnam, tcode, count (*) as count  
 FROM BSEG JOIN BKPF 
 ON bseg,docno = bkpf.docno 
 AND  bseg.fiscyr = bkpf.fiscyr 
 AND bseg.cocode = bkpf.cocode 
 GROUP BY cocode, vendno, fiscyr, docno, amount, drcr,  
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 glaccno, usnam, tcode 
 HAVING count > 1 
 
Fraud symptom 3: Invoices with round dollar amounts (Figure 4.9) 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Detection – invoices with round dollar amounts 
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CREATE TABLE BKPF_BSEG_INVOICE AS 
 SELECT cocode, usnam, tcode, docdat, posdat, amount, vendno 
 FROM BKPF JOIN BSEG 
 ON bkpf.cocode = bseg.cocode 
 AND bkpf.docno = bseg.docno 
 AND bkpf.fiscyr = bseg.fiscyr 
 WHERE vendno IS NOT NULL  
 AND tcode IN invoice-tcode-list 
 
CREATE TABLE BSEG_ROUND_DOLLAR  AS 
 SELECT * 
 FROM BKPF_BSEG_TRANS 
 WHERE amount = INT(amount) 
 
 
Fraud symptom 4: Invoices with amounts consistently below approval limit 
(Figure 4.10) 
 
CREATE TABLE INVOICE_BELOW_APPROVAL 
 SELECT * 
 FROM BKPF_BSEG_INVOICE 
 WHERE (amount <= amounthigh) 
  AND (amount >= amountlow)       
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Figure 4.10: Detection – invoices below approval limit 
 
 
Fraud symptom 5: Vendors with payments that exceed the last largest payment 
by a significant amount (Figure 4.11)  
 
CREATE TABLE BKPF_BSEG_PAYMENT AS 
 SELECT cocode, usnam, tcode, docdat, posdat, amount, vendno 
 FROM BKPF JOIN BSEG 
 ON bkpf.cocode = bseg.cocode 
 AND bkpf.docno = bseg.docno 
 AND bkpf.fiscyr = bseg.fiscyr 
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 WHERE vendno IS NOT NULL  
 AND tcode IN PAYMENT-tcode-list 
 GROUP BY vendno, amount DESCENDING 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Detection – vendor payments exceeding last largest 
 
 
 
Fraud symptom 6: Excessive use of one-time vendors (Figure 4.12) 
 
CREATE TABLE ONETIME_VENDORS 
 SELECT cocode, usnam, tcode, docdat, posdat,  
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 amount, vendno, count (*) as count 
 FROM BKPF_BSEG_INVOICE 
 WHERE (vendno = onetimevendor) 
 AND count > threshhold 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Detection – use of one time vendors 
 
Fraud symptom 7: Vendors with similar names (Figure 4.13) 
 
CREATE TABLE VENDORS_SIMILAR 
 SELECT lifnr, name1 
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 FROM LFA1 
 WHERE (name1 = searchname) 
  
 
 
Figure 4.13: Detection – vendors with similar names 
 
 
Fraud symptom 8: Vendors becoming active after long periods of being 
dormant (Figure 4.14) 
 
CREATE TABLE VENDOR_ACTIVITY AS 
 SELECT cocode, usnam, tcode, docdat, posdat, amount, vendno 
 FROM BKPF JOIN BSEG 
 ON bkpf.cocode = bseg.cocode 
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 AND bkpf.docno = bseg.docno 
 AND bkpf.fiscyr = bseg.fiscyr 
 WHERE vendno IS NOT NULL  
 AND tcode IN incoice-tcode-list 
 AND tcode IN payment-tcode-list 
 GROUP BY vendno, docdat, amount ASCENDING 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Detection – vendors becoming active after long period 
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Fraud symptom 9: Multiple vendor accounts with different payment details 
(Figure 4.15) 
 
CREATE TABLE VENDOR_MBANKACC AS 
 SELECT objectid, name1, bkdetail, udate, utime, username 
 FROM CDHDR_CDPOS_LFA1 
  
CREATE TABLE VENDOR_MULTIBANKACC AS 
 SELECT objectid, count (*) as count 
 FROM VENDOR_MBANKACC 
 GROUP BY objectid 
 HAVING count > 1 
 
CREATE TABLE VENDOR_MULTIBANK_ALL AS 
 SELECT * 
 FROM VENDOR_MULTIBANKACC 
 WHERE vendor_mbankacc.objectid IN 
  (SELECT objectid FROM VENDOR_MULTIBANKACC) 
 ORDER BY objectid ASCENDING 
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Figure 4.15: Detection – multiple vendors with different payment details 
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Fraud symptom 10: Multiple vendors sharing the same payment details 
(Figure 4.16) 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Detection – multiple vendors sharing payment details 
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CREATE TABLE BANK_ACCS AS 
 SELECT bkdetail, objectid, name1 
 FROM CDHDR_CDPOS_LFA1 
 ORDER BY bkdetail 
 
CREATE TABLE BANKACCSHARING AS 
 SELECT bkdetail, count (*) as count 
 FROM BANKACCS 
 GROUP BY bkdetail 
 HAVING count > 1 
 
CREATE TABLE BANKACCSHARING_ALL AS 
 SELECT *  
 FROM BANKACCS 
 WHERE bankaccs.bkdetail IN 
  (SELECT bkdetail FROM bankaccsharing) 
 ORDER BY bkdetail ASCENDING 
 
Fraud symptom 11: Benford's Law analysis of invoices (Figure 4.17) 
Benford's law gives expected frequencies of digits in numerical data. Benford found 
that contrary to belief, digits in tabulated data are not equally likely and are biased 
towards lower digits. The basic digits tests are tests of the first digits, second digit 
and first-two digits. These are called the first-order tests. The first digit test is a high-
level test of reasonableness that is actually too high-level to be of much use. For 
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accounts payable and other data sets involving prices, the first-two digits test is a 
more focused test that detects abnormal duplications of digits and possible biases in 
the data (Nigrini 2011). The system performs a basic digits test of the first-two digits. 
Spikes may be indicative of fraud and require further investigation. 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Detection – Benford's Law analysis of invoices 
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DATA BEN_INVOICE 
 SET BKPF_BSEG_INVOICE 
 wrbtrstr = INPUT (amount, $12.) 
  IF amount  > 0 
  frstloc = INDEXC (wrbtrstr, '0123456789') 
  frstdig = SUBSTR (wrbtrstr, frstloc, 1) 
CREATE TABLE BEN_BENFORD AS 
 SELECT frstdig, count (*) as cnt 
 FROM BEN_INVOICE 
 GROUP BY frstdig 
 
 SELECT SUM (cnt) INTO: n 
 FROM BEN_BENFORD 
 
DATA BEN_EXPECTED 
 INPUT  @1 edig  $1 
  @3 eprcnt  5.3 
 enum = INT (eprcnt * &n) 
 
1  0.301 
2  0.176 
3  0.125 
4  0.097 
5  0.079 
6  0.067 
7  0.058 
8  0.052 
9  0.046 
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CREATE TABLE BEN_FINAL AS 
 SELECT frstdig, cnt, prcnt, enum, eprcnt 
 FROM BEN_BENFORD, BEN-EXPECTED 
 WHERE frstdig = edig 
   
 
Fraud Risk Index 
 
The Fraud Risk Index determines the propensity for fraud occurring in an 
organisation being investigated. It is calculated from the variables shown in 
Table 4.6 (this definition is purely for demonstration, further research is 
recommended in Section 6.4.1 to obtain evidence to adjust values of weights and 
potentially improve accuracy of the Index). 
 
FRAUD RISK INDEX  =  riskyusers + vendsharingbank +  
  vendmultibank +  vendbankchanges + 
  beninv + benpmt + rinv + rpmt 
 
 
The calculated value is out of 10. For example:  
 
FRAUD RISK INDEX = 7 / 10 
 
The Fraud Risk Index is intended to create awareness for the potential of fraud 
occurring in an organisation. A high value does not necessarily indicate that fraud 
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has occurred or vice versa. Individual circumstances within an organisation must be 
taken into account when basing decisions on the value of the index.  
 
 
Table 4.6: Risk Index variables 
Input Variable Range Output Variable Value 
Risky users >= 5 
>= 1 
riskyusers 2.0 
1.0 
Vendors sharing bank accounts >= 100 
>= 50 
>=20 
>=10 
>=1 
vendsharingbank 2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.1 
Vendors with multiple bank 
accounts 
>= 100 
>= 50 
>=20 
>=10 
>=1 
vendmultibank 2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.1 
Vendors with multiple changes to 
bank accounts 
>= 100 
>= 50 
>=20 
>=10 
>=1 
vendbankchanges 2.0 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.1 
Benford's invoice deviations >= 50 
>= 25 
>= 10 
>= 1 
Beninv 0.5 
0.4 
0.25 
0.1 
Benford's payment deviations >= 50 
>= 25 
>= 10 
>= 1 
Benpmt 0.5 
0.4 
0.25 
0.1 
Value of invoices by risky users >= 100,000 
>= 50,000 
>= 20,000 
>=5,000 
Rinv 1.0 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
Value of payments by risky users >= 100,000 
>= 50,000 
>= 20,000 
>=5,000 
Rpmt 1.0 
0.75 
0.50 
0.25 
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4.6. Storage  
Audit trail data is required to detect potential fraud in SAP enterprise systems. 
Additionally, historical data is required to detect frauds that are perpetrated over a 
period of several days, weeks, or months, for example, flipping of a vendor's bank 
details, with payments being processed in the interim period (fraud symptom 1, 
Figure 4.7). Furthermore, the detection engine creates several tables during pre-
processing. Data storage is therefore an essential element of the prototype 
(Figure 4.18).   
 
A data warehouse provides storage for extracted SAP data tables (CDHDR, CDPOS, 
BKPF, BSEG and LFA1). The system accumulates data for users and vendors and 
produces reports and visualisations. Tables created during pre-processing are 
temporarily stored, and continually reused by the detection engine. Imported data is 
retained for a period of one year in the data warehouse.  
 
Data structure of SAP tables is shown in Figures 4.4 to 4.9 and in Table A8.1. This 
structure is duplicated in the prototype. Relationships between tables are preserved. 
The following relationships exist. 
 
· BKPF and BSEG: client, cocode, docno, fiscyr 
· CDHDR and CDPOS: client, cocode, objectclas, objectid, changenr 
· BSEG and LFA1: vendno 
· BSEG and SKAT: client, glaccno 
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Figure 4.18: Storage module  
 
 
4.7. Output   
The output module (Figure 4.19) provides summarised and detailed reports and 
visualisations (graphs, charts and diagrams) of user and vendor activities.  
 
 
Figure 4.19: Output module  
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Enterprise systems generate hundreds of thousands to millions of transactions 
annually. While most of these are legal and routine transactions, a small number may 
be fraudulent. The enormous amount of generated transactions makes it difficult to 
find these few instances among legitimate transactions. For a large organisation, this 
means monitoring hundreds of thousands of transactions and then investigating 
suspicious ones in depth at considerable expense. The problem becomes 
overwhelming and is growing worse (Chang et al. 2007).  
 
Visualisation is a general term used to describe any technology that enable users to 
'see' information in order to help them better understand and put it in an appropriate  
context (TechTarget 2010 ; GraphViz 2010).  Visualisation tools go beyond the 
standard charts and graphs, displaying data in more sophisticated ways such as dials 
and gauges, heat maps, tree maps and detailed bar and pie charts. Patterns, trends and 
correlations that might go undetected in text-based data can be exposed and 
recognised easier with visualisation. Visualisation replaces blind querying and 
extended analysis of transaction data, with contextual analysis. The strength of 
visualisation lies in its capacity for discovery and the recognition of new insights that 
are unexpected by users. Empirical evidence confirms that using visualisations 
results in improved user performance in information seeking tasks (Fetaji 2011). It 
can therefore be concluded that using visualisations enable an auditor to effectively 
and efficiently identify anomalous activities in transaction data without the burden of 
'information overload'. 
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Visualised data is frequently displayed in dashboards (Figure A5.1). Dashboards 
provide users with high-level views of corporate information, metrics and key 
performance indicators. The images may include interactive capabilities, enabling 
users to manipulate them or drill into the data for querying and analysis. Indicators 
designed to alert users when data has been updated or predefined conditions occur, 
can also be included (Selby 2009).     
 
Output produced by the prototype includes a combination of reports and 
visualisations. User activity reports include: 
 
· user profiles; activities performed by all system users (Table 4.7, Figures 4.20 
and 4.21); 
· critical combinations; users that violate segregation of duties; and 
· individual user analysis reports; activities performed by an individual being 
investigated. 
 
Vendor reports include: 
 
· Benford's Law analysis; determines conformity of numbers; 
· vendors with multiple bank accounts; 
· vendors sharing bank accounts; 
· vendors with similar names; and 
· individual vendor analysis reports: transaction analysis for an individual 
vendor being investigated (Figure 4.22). 
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Table 4.7: Activity summary 
T-Code Transaction Name Activity 
FB60 Enter Incoming Invoices 2305 
F-53 Post Outgoing Payments 2135 
FK02 Change Vendor (Accounting) 252 
 
User Activities Summary
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Figure 4.20: Visualisation - activity summary  
 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Visualisation - user profile 
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These reports and visualisations are accessed via a web browser interface. The web 
browser provides a simple, intuitive and graphical user interface. An auditor may use 
these reports to initiate further investigation of anomalous activities. The intention is 
to promptly identify potentially fraudulent activities and report these without 
overwhelming an auditor with excessive information. 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Visualisation – interaction between users and individual vendor 
 
 
 
4.8. User interface 
The user interface is the space where interaction occurs between an auditor and the 
prototype. The goal of interaction is effective operation and control of the prototype, 
and feedback from the prototype which aids an auditor in making decisions. Web-
based user interfaces accept input and provide output by generating web pages which 
are viewed using a web browser program. Usability is a main characteristic of the 
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interface as it ensures that the prototype can be used for its intended purpose by its 
target audience efficiently and effectively.  
 
Contents Main Display Area 
1. AP Summary 
· Dashboard 
2. User Profiles 
· Summary 
· Vendor Maintenance 
· Invoices 
· Payments 
· All Combinations 
3. Critical Combinations 
· Invoice & Payments 
· Vendor Maint. & Invoice 
· Vendor Maint & Payments 
· All Combinations 
4. User Activity Analysis 
· Risky Users 
· Analyze Users 
5. Vendor Analysis 
· Analyze Vendors 
· Benford's Law 
· Sharing Payment Details 
· Multiple Bank Accounts 
· Similar Names 
6. Configure System 
· Setup Options 
7. HOME 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS AREA DISPLAYS 
 
SELECTED 
 
REPORT 
 
OR 
 
VISUALISATION 
 
Figure 4.23: User-interface  
 
The interface for the prototype is web-based. It comprises two frames: i) a 
hyperlinked contents frame; and ii) a main display frame for viewing reports and 
visualisations (Figure 4.23). The main goal of the web-interface is to ensure that the 
prototype is easy to learn and use, is user friendly, and provides adequate on-screen 
instructions and feedback. 
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4.9. Errors 
The purpose of the prototype is to demonstrate the concept of automating fraud 
detection in enterprise systems. With any scientific or real-world process, there is no 
such ideal as total proof or total rejection. It is therefore necessary to work with 
probabilities. This means that, whatever level of detection is reached, there is still the 
possibility that results may be wrong. Errors in detection fall into two categories, 
Type I and Type II. 
 
A Type I error, also known as  a false positive, occurs when a test rejects a true null 
hypothesis or general position (Shuttleworth 2008). For example, if the null 
hypothesis states that round dollar invoices are a symptom of fraud, and round dollar 
invoices do indeed exist, but the prototype rejects this hypothesis, it may falsely 
ignore potentially fraudulent transactions.  
 
A Type II error, also known as a false negative, occurs when a test fails to rejects a 
false null hypothesis or general position (Shuttleworth 2008).  For example, if the 
null hypothesis states that round dollar invoices are a symptom of fraud, and there 
are no round dollar invoices present, but the prototype rejects this hypothesis, it may 
falsely identify transactions as potentially fraudulent.  
 
A false positive results in legitimate transactions being classified as fraudulent. A 
false negative results in fraudulent transactions being classified as legitimate. 
Incorrect detection may occur due to several factors including; poor or lack of 
segregation of duties within an organisation's enterprise system; collusion between 
employees to circumvent segregation of duties; new techniques to perpetrate fraud; 
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incorrectly defined fraud symptoms; inadequate transaction data; or errors in 
implementation of the prototype.   
 
It is crucial to recognise that the prototype is intended to assist an auditor by 
facilitating early detection of potentially fraudulent activities.  The onus is then on 
the auditor to further investigate these anomalous activities. 
 
4.10. Verification and validation of prototype 
Software verification and validation is the process of checking that a software system 
meets specifications and that it fulfils its intended purpose (Figure 4.24). It is a 
disciplined approach to assessing software products that strives to ensure that quality 
is built into the software and that it satisfies user requirements (IEEE 2004 ; Wallace 
et al. 1996). 
 
Figure 4.24: Verification and validation 
Source: adapted from (Adrion et al. 1982 ; IEEE 2004) 
 
Verification is an attempt to ensure that the product is built correctly and that the 
outputs of activities meet specifications imposed on them during the design phase. 
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Software verification looks for consistency, completeness, and correctness of the 
software and its supporting documentation. Software testing is one of many 
verification activities intended to confirm that software development output meets its 
input requirements. Other verification activities may include code and document 
inspections, walkthroughs, and other techniques (USDoHHS 1997).  
 
Validation is an attempt to ensure that the right product is built and that the product 
fulfils its specific intended purpose. Validation therefore is the confirmation by 
examination and provision of objective evidence that software specifications 
conform to user needs and intended uses, and that the particular requirements 
implemented through software can be consistently fulfilled. Validation includes 
useability testing and user feedback.  
 
The prototype as Expert System intended to support a human expert in the decision 
making process. It is based on computational rules and a knowledge base. The power 
of the prototype is in the effectiveness and quality of the knowledge it contains. To 
ensure quality, the knowledge base needs to be verified. Potential problems can be 
grouped into (Cojocariu et al. 2005): 
· consistency problems – caused by unnecessary conditions, redundant or 
conflicting rules; and 
· completeness problems – caused by missing rules, errors, or gaps in the 
inference chains. 
 
The knowledge base may be logically correct without being valid. Validation 
measures how well the prototype conforms to what is being modelled. Possible 
measures may include (Cojocariu et al. 2005): 
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· productivity measures – to evaluate impact on decisions 
· process measures – to evaluate impact on decision making 
· perception measures – to evaluate impact on decision makers; and 
· product measures – to evaluate technical merits of the prototype. 
 
Verification of the prototype is achieved by performing a series of tests using 
simulated test data involving simulated activity over a period of one month. Tests 
include: 
User profiles: Users are profiled to determine the scope of 
activities they have performed. Activities include 
vendor maintenance, invoicing and payment 
transactions. Summary and detailed reports are 
produced. 
Critical combinations: Users that violate segregation of duties are 
identified and a report of potentially risky users 
is produced. 
User activity analysis: An individual user is identified from the risky 
users list and selected for detailed investigation. 
Reports documenting individual user activities 
are produced. 
Vendor analysis: A series of investigations are performed on 
active vendors, including vendors sharing bank 
accounts, vendors with multiple bank accounts, 
vendors with multiple master records, and 
Benford's law. 
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These tests serve to assess whether the software performs correctly, that it meets the 
specifications imposed on it, and to provide a demonstration of the potential use of 
the prototype. 
 
Validation of the prototype is achieved by obtaining independent reviews from 
auditing practitioners. The reviewer(s) are provided with a summary paper (Singh et 
al. 2011), a one-hour presentation and demonstration of the prototype. The 
demonstration involves processing and analysing of actual transaction data. 
Feedback is requested on the following issues. 
1. The importance of such a project for auditing in your organisation. 
2. The role that automated fraud detection software could play as an 
auditing tool for internal auditors. 
3. The desirability of a retrospective analysis software tool implemented 
on a standalone computer system as compared with a system embedded 
within an enterprise system.  
4. The functionality of the prototype, in particular the user interface, 
reporting and graphical features. 
5. Any further comments or suggested improvements to the prototype.  
 
Feedback is also obtained from a panel of experts from CPA Australia - Queensland 
Division (IT Discussion Group) and ISACA4, Queensland Chapter. A short 
presentation and demonstration is made to panel members (20 minutes). Members 
are provided an opportunity for a hands-on session using the prototype. Their 
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feedback is sought using a survey (Appendix 3) on the following key issues, namely 
operation, reporting and visualisations, accuracy & efficiency, and impact on 
auditor productivity.  
 
Verification is a formal or informal argument that the prototype works on all possible 
inputs and validation is a process designed to increase our confidence that the 
prototype works as intended (Cojocariu et al. 2005). A series of tests and feedback 
from experts assesses the prototypes suitability as a proactive fraud detection tool.  
 
4.11. Prototype design and propositions addressed 
This Chapter addresses the following three research propositions. 
 
RP1a: Enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
 retrospective monitoring of user activities. 
 
SAP audit trails are examined. It is established that they provide detailed descriptions 
of functions performed by users within an enterprise system.  Each function has a 
transaction code associated with it (for example, FB60 – Enter Vendor Invoice). 
Each transaction code executed by a user is recorded in the audit trail (Best 2000). 
Audit trail data is stored in several tables within the SAP enterprise system 
(Figure 4.3).  This data documents changes to master records and accounting audit 
trails. Thus, it is established that enterprise system audit trails document adequate 
data to allow retrospective monitoring of user activities. RP1a is therefore supported. 
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RP1b: Violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit 
 trails for critical combinations of user activities. 
 
This study supports the principles of segregation of duties within accounts payable 
(AP) as proposed by Little and Best (2003) and discussed in Chapter 3. Evidence 
supporting these principles is obtained by examining data from SAP audit trails. It 
was determined that this data allows association of actions with users'. Critical 
combinations of user activities have been designed in section 4.4.1. Table 4.3 and 4.4 
lists the combination of activities a user has to perform in order to violate each of the 
SoDs principles. If any of these violations are identified then further investigation of 
an offending user's activities is necessary to determine whether any fraudulent 
transactions have been performed. Therefore, it is feasible to detect violations in 
segregation of duties with available data. Thus, it is established that violations in 
segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit trails for critical 
combinations of user activities. RP1b is therefore supported. 
 
RP1c: Potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating user 
 activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
 symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. 
 
Given the ability to identify violations in segregation of duties, it is feasible to detect 
potentially fraudulent transactions made possible by these violations. For example, 
the ability to identify users who have changed vendor details, entered an invoice and 
paid the invoice permits detection of potential accounts payable fraud. In addition, 
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further potential fraud can be detected through examination of other anomalous 
activities. A catalogue of known fraud symptoms informs this process (Table 4.5). 
Thus, it is established that potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by 
investigating user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. RP1c is therefore supported.  
4.12. Conclusion  
This Chapter addresses research propositions RP1a, RP1b and RP1c. The SAP 
enterprise system was investigated and it was concluded that it documents adequate 
data in its audit trails to allow retrospective monitoring of user activities. A 
conceptual design of a prototype is proposed. The objective of the prototype is to 
analyse audit trail data for critical combinations of user activities and to report these 
to an auditor. Individual users or vendors may subsequently be selected for further 
detailed investigation to determine whether fraud has potentially been perpetrated.   
 
The conceptual design of the prototype consists of four interrelated modules i.e. 
Input, Process, Storage and Output. Detailed design specifications are produced for 
each of these modules. A logical design is subsequently developed (Figure 4.25) 
from the design specifications. A two phase strategy for proactive detection of 
potential fraud is proposed. In phase one, transaction data is periodically extracted 
from SAP tables CDHDR, CDPOS, BKPF, BSEG, and LFA1.  In phase two, the 
extracted transaction data are pre-processed and, reports and visualisations are 
produced.  
 
The design objectives defined in this Chapter are implemented in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 4.25: Prototype logical design 
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 CHAPTER 5  
Prototype Implementation and Testing 
5. Prototype Implementation and Testing 
5.0. Introduction 
Increasing use of information technology has made it essential for auditors to 
perform their practice using software tools that run on personal computer systems 
(Kotb and Roberts 2011). This Chapter examines the implementation and testing of 
the prototype software designed in Chapter 4, for detection of potential fraud.  The 
prototype is implemented as a stand-alone MCL-based software application. The 
issue of verification and validation of the prototype is addressed. Verification ensures 
that a product has been built according to the requirements and design specifications. 
Validation ensures that a product meets the users' needs, and that the specifications 
were correct in the first place. Verification is addressed by testing the prototype 
using simulated data. Validation is addressed by obtaining survey feedback from an 
expert panel and by independent reviews. 
 
This Chapter addresses the following three research propositions. 
 
§ RP2a:  Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent 
 activities and report these using an intuitive visual interface. 
§ RP2b:  Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented 
 on a stand-alone external computer system operating 
 independently of an organisation's enterprise system. 
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§ RP2c: Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by 
 using  technology to perform continuous monitoring of an 
 organisation's enterprise system. 
 
5.1. Prototype implementation 
This section summarises the implementation of the prototype. It describes the 
environment used for developing the prototype, requirements for execution, data 
extraction and pre-processing. A process map lists fundamental steps in using the 
prototype. An analysis process is proposed for a novice system user. 
5.1.1. Workstation environment 
The prototype has been developed using an Intel Core i5-based computer system 
with 500 gigabytes hard disk storage and 4 gigabytes of RAM. This is a standard 
configuration these days and therefore could act as a benchmark for the prototype. 
The operating system is Windows 7 Home Premium. All results reported in this 
Chapter are based on experiments performed using this configuration.  
5.1.2. Development environment 
The primary development environment for the prototype is SAS v9.2 for Windows. 
The system requires Base SAS and SAS/GRAPH to run. The user interface is web- 
browser based and requires Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0 or above. Aspects of the 
web programs are written in VBScript. Visualisation components are written in 
GraphViz v1.01.  
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The purpose of the prototype is to demonstrate the feasibility of the concept of 
implementing proactive detection of potential fraud in practice, thereby satisfying 
research propositions RP2a, RP2b and RP2c. A development tool is needed to 
generate quality programs rapidly having querying, reporting and analytical 
capabilities. The tool needs the ability to process large datasets. SAS was selected, 
instead of a specialised language (for example, SQL or Java), because it is a scalable, 
integrated software environment specifically designed for data access, transformation 
and reporting. SAS also provides a range of tools for generating visualisations. The 
user interface, being web-based, provides a simple, intuitive, graphical user interface 
that most users are already familiar with (Figure 5.1). 
 
The programs used to implement the 'detection engine' and the 'user interface' 
components of the prototype are developed in accordance with the design 
specifications discussed in Chapter 4. The total disk storage requirements for all of 
the programs are 3.9 megabytes. 
 
Sample screens produced by the prototype are provided in Appendix 4. The system is 
GUI-based, requiring an auditor to select (click) an option from the menu. To 
illustrate, Figure A4.1 displays the Start-up Screen. Clicking 'Configure System' 
displays the system configuration options (Figure A4.12) 
5.1.3. Data extraction and pre-processing 
Data requirements for fraud detection in SAP enterprise systems are discussed in 
Section 4.3.1. Accounting audit trails are routinely extracted from a SAP system and 
imported into the prototype for pre-processing and analysis. These audit trails are  
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Figure 5. 1: User interface 
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stored in tables BKPF, BSEG, CDHDR, and CDPOS. Vendor general data is stored 
in table LFA1. Table A8.1 provides details of tables and fields required for data 
extraction. 
 
SAP data tables may be accessed through the SAP menu or by using transaction 
codes (t-codes) as shown below (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Source of data to detect known fraud symptoms 
T-Code Menu path 
SE11 
(ABAP Dictionary) 
SAP Menu > Tools > ABAP Workbench > 
Development > ABAP Dictionary 
SE16 
(Data Browser) 
SAP Menu > Tools > ABAP Workbench > Overview > 
Data Browser 
 
Table A8.2 summarises the procedure for extraction of the data tables. Each table 
requires a different filter for extraction. For example, table BKPF may be extracted 
by date range, but there is no such filter for table BSEG. Individual extraction 
requirements are documented in Table A8.3. This document also serves as a record 
for data extraction. 
 
Extracted data tables are imported, and preformatted before being pre-processed by 
the prototype (Figure A4.16). No data manipulation occurs during pre-formatting. 
Pre-formatting is required as different versions of SAP output extracted data in 
different formats. Pre-formatting ensures that extracted data is imported into the 
prototype in a standard format. An auditor has the option to: i) create a new data 
warehouse (on first use); or ii) append data to an existing data warehouse (Figure 
A4.17). Filter parameters for date range (Figure A4.12) and approval limits for 
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invoices and payments (these vary among organisations) are also required (Figure 
A4.14). On completion of pre-processing reports and visualisations are produced 
(note: total disk requirements for one year's data storage is approximately one 
gigabyte – estimate is based on six months data from case study). Further detailed 
investigation of user (Figure A4.6) or vendor (Figure A4.9) transactions may occur at 
the discretion of an auditor.   
 
The process map shown (Figure 5.2) lists nine fundamental steps in using the 
prototype (last two steps are initiated by an auditor) 
i). Extract SAP tables as text files. 
ii). Copy text files to system folder. 
iii). Pre-process text files. 
iv). Create new data warehouse or append data to existing data warehouse. 
v). Set date range for analysis. 
vi). Set approval limits. 
vii). Prepare reporting data. 
viii). Perform analyses. 
ix). Document findings. 
 
5.1.4. Reporting system 
Several reporting options are available to an auditor. The following analysis process 
is proposed for a novice system user (Figure 5.3).  
 
Analysis is initiated by examining the dashboard (Figure 5.4). The dashboard 
provides a high-level overview of various activities performed in an accounts  
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Figure 5.2: Process map – complete 
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Figure 5.3: Analysis process 
 
payable system. Several indicators on the dashboard are hyperlinked to detailed 
reports. The Fraud Risk Index determines the propensity for fraud occurring in an  
organisation being investigated. Analysis proceeds by examining user profiles or 
vendor activities. 
 
User profiles menu (Figure A4.3) provides access to reports documenting overall 
activities performed by users in an enterprise system. Figure A4.4 provides several 
reports identifying users that violate segregation of duties principles (discussed in 
section 4.4.1).   
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Figure 5.4: Dashboard 
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A report of risky users (Figure A4.5) provides an auditor with a basis for further 
investigation of individual users (Figure A4.6). Figure 5.5 shows a list of reports 
produced dynamically for an individual user. Activity reports for individual users 
include: i) bank account changes; ii) invoice transactions; iii) payment transactions; 
iv) duplicate transactions; and v) vendors that individual user has interacted with. 
 
Vendors may be examined to identify anomalous transactions. Figure A4.8 shows a 
list of reports available to assist an auditor in this process. The following reports are 
available for investigating vendors: i) Benford's analysis of invoices and payments; 
ii) vendors with multiple bank accounts; iii) vendors sharing bank accounts; iv) 
vendors with multiple changes to their banking details; v) top 5 vendors by invoices; 
and v) top 5 vendors by payments. Vendor names may also be investigated to 
determine whether any similarities exist (Figure A4.14). 
 
Individual vendors may be selected for further investigation (Figure 5.6). Figure 
A4.10 shows a list of reports produced dynamically for an individual vendor. Reports 
for individual vendors include: i) summary transaction statistics; ii) bank account 
changes; iii) transaction history; iv) duplicate transactions; and v) vendor payments.  
 
Drill-down reporting capabilities enable an auditor to investigate detailed activities 
for any individual user or vendor. Charts and visualisations enhance the usability of 
the software and enable rapid identification of patterns and trends of activity without 
the need to analyse pages of reports, thereby reducing information overload on an 
auditor. 
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Figure 5.5: User activity reports 
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Figure 5.6: Individual vendor reports 
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The analysis process described above is intended for novice users. Expert users may 
follow a process of their own design. The user interface is designed with this 
capability in mind. All options are hyperlinked allowing an auditor to navigate 
through the interface in no particular order. 
 
In the next section the prototype is verified and tested to determine whether it 
conforms to the specifications designed in Chapter 4. 
5.2. Verification and testing of prototype 
Verification attempts to ensure that products are built correctly, and that outputs of 
activities meet specifications imposed on them. In terms of evaluating software, 
verification is a process that determines whether products satisfy the conditions 
imposed during the development phase (IEEE 2004 ; Wallace et al. 1996).  
 
Tests of the prototype were conducted in three phases. 
 
1. Test data - the system was tested using a set of test data 
involving simulated activity over a period of one month. This test 
served to assess whether the software performed correctly, and 
that it met the specifications imposed in the fraud detection 
framework developed in Chapters 3 and 4. A detailed trace of the 
processing of this test data is included in Appendix 5. This trace 
also acts as a demonstration of the potential use of this software. 
2. Case study 1a - six months of actual transaction data was 
processed using the prototype. This data was obtained from a large 
international manufacturing company. These tests exposed the 
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prototype to live data. This test serves to provide support for 
research propositions RP2a and RP2b. Data was also collected on 
processing time and serves as a basis for determining auditor 
productivity. A detailed trace of the processing of this data is 
included in Appendix 6. 
3. Case study 1b - one week of actual transaction data from the 
above organisation was processed using the prototype. This test 
provides data on processing times and additional support for the 
research propositions.  
 
Each of the tests is discussed in the following sections.  
5.2.1. Test data 
Analysis period 01/12/2003 to 31/12/2003 – 1 month 
 
A series of 'manual' experiments were performed on the test data to establish control 
values for several indicators as described in section 4.10. These experiments were 
performed using Microsoft Excel. The same experiments were subsequently 
performed using the prototype and the values produced were reconciled with the 
control values. Inconsistencies in results were used to correct errors in the prototypes 
computational rules and knowledge base. 
Control values 
Control values were produced by manual tests. These are shown in Tables 5.2 to 5.6.  
 
Table 5.2 lists activities performed by users. 
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Table 5.2: Control values - activities performed by users 
# Transactions Description of Activity # Users 
5,996   posting document (FB01) 64 
3,094   parameters for automatic payment (F110) 2 
741  change vendor – accounting (FK02) 5 
51  change vendor – centrally (XK02) 10 
41  post outgoing payments (FBZ2) 3 
 
Table  5.3 lists the number of violations of segregation of duties that have occurred. 
Table 5.3: Control values - violation of segregation of duties 
# Users Combination 
3  vendor maintenance & invoices 
2  vendor maintenance & payments 
1  invoices & payments 
1  vendor maintenance & invoices & payments 
 
 
Table  5.4 lists activities performed by user 1USRARSCP. This user was selected for 
further investigation due to having violated segregation of duties.  
Table 5.4: Control values - activities performed by user 1USRARSCP 
Activity # Total value 
Bank account changes 19 n/a 
Invoices 7 $ 1,363.13 
Payments 38 $ 5,214,477.05 
Round Dollar Invoices 0 0 
Round Dollar Payments 4 $ 710.00 
Invoices 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Payments 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Duplicate transactions 0 0 
Vendors touched 40 n/a 
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Table  5.5 provides a summary of vendor transactions.  
Table 5.5: Control values - summary of vendor transactions 
Activity Value 
number of invoices entered  5,996 
number payments processed 3,135 
total value of invoices entered $ 10,045,281.90 
total value of payments processed $ 13,226,457.57 
top vendor by invoice 0001001516 
total value of invoices for this vendor $ 1,472,887.36 
top vendor by payment 0001001516 
total value of payments for this vendor $ 1,472,887.36 
no. active vendors 3,634 
no. vendors sharing bank accounts 131 
no. vendors with multiple bank accounts 39 
no. vendors with multiple bank changes 19 
 
Table  5.6 is a summary of Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor 
invoices and payments.  
Table 5.6: Control values – Benford's Law 
 Invoice Spikes Payment Spikes 
10 10 
11 11 
19 12 
24 14 
49 18 
 19 B
en
fo
rd
's 
La
w
 
 22 
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Experimental values 
A detailed trace of this test performed by the prototype is included in Appendix 5 and 
is discussed below. The dashboard (Figure A5.1) provides a high-level overview of 
various activities performed in the accounts payable system. 
User profiles 
A total of 5,996 invoice, 3,185 payment and 792 vendor maintenance activities were 
recorded during the analysis period (Figure A5.2). Details of each type of activity are 
provided in Figures A5.3 – A5. 8. 
 
There were 81 active users (note: sum of users in the table below may add up to more 
than 81 as some users may have performed more than one type of activity). They 
performed the following activities (Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Activities performed by users 
# Transactions Description of Activity # Users 
5,996   posting document (FB01) 64 
3,094   parameters for automatic payment (F110) 2 
741  change vendor – accounting (FK02) 5 
51  change vendor – centrally (XK02) 10 
41  post outgoing payments (FBZ2) 3 
 
 
Critical combinations 
In all, 4 / 81 users were identified as having violated segregation of duties. Details of 
these violations are provided in Figures A5.9 – A5. 16. Activities performed by these 
risky users are summarised below (Table 5.8). 
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Table 5.8: Violation of segregation of duties 
# Users Combination 
3  vendor maintenance & invoices 
2  vendor maintenance & payments 
1  invoices & payments 
1  vendor maintenance & invoices & payments 
*Note: a user may have made multiple violations 
Investigation of user 1USRARSCP 
This user was identified as having performed vendor maintenance, invoice entry and 
payment processing i.e. violating segregation of duties. The user interacted with 40 
vendors, performing various activities. These activities were further investigated and 
are summarised below (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.9: Activities performed by user 1USRARSCP 
Activity # Total value 
Bank account changes 19 n/a 
Invoices 7 $ 1,363.13 
Payments 38 $ 5,214,477.05 
Round Dollar Invoices 0 0 
Round Dollar Payments 4 $ 710.00 
Invoices 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Payments 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Duplicate transactions 0 0 
Vendors touched 40 n/a 
 
In all, 5,996 invoices were entered for a total dollar value of $10,045,281.90. 
Anomalous activities include invoices ($1,363.13) and round dollar invoices 
($710.00). Details of activates performed by this user are provided in 
Figures A5.17 – 5. 23.  
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Analysis of vendor activities 
There were 3,634 active vendors during the analysis period. The dashboard 
(Figure A5.1) provides a high-level overview of vendor transactions. Vendor 
transactions were investigated and the findings are summarised below (Table 5.10).  
 
Table 5.10: Summary of vendor transactions 
Activity Value 
number of invoices entered  5,996 
number payments processed 3,135 
total value of invoices entered $ 10,045,281.90 
total value of payments processed $ 13,226,457.57 
top vendor by invoice 0001001516 
total value of invoices for this vendor $ 1,472,887.36 
top vendor by payment 0001001516 
total value of payments for this vendor $ 1,472,887.36 
no. active vendors 3,634 
no. vendors sharing bank accounts 131 
no. vendors with multiple bank accounts 39 
no. vendors with multiple bank changes 19 
 
In all, there were 3,634 active vendors. Anomalous vendor activities include 131 
vendors sharing bank accounts, 39 vendors having multiple bank accounts, and 19 
vendors having multiple changes to their bank accounts. Details of vendor 
transactions are provided in Figures A5.24 - A5. 31. Vendor transaction history, a 
useful tool in detecting flipping of payment details, is shown in Figure A5.36. 
Visualisation of users interacting with an individual user is shown in Figure A5.37. 
Visualisation of an individual vendor's transaction history is shown in Figure A5.38.  
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Findings also indicate that unlike a financial statement audit which is designed to 
detect material misstatements (Singleton and Singleton 2007), the prototype analyses 
'all' activities looking for anomalies associated with fraud symptoms. Investigations 
performed using the prototype as not susceptible to 'materiality' concerns. The 
prototype does not consider materiality in its processes or in analysis of audit trail 
data. This characteristic may improve efficiency and effectiveness of the audit 
process.  
Benford's Law analysis 
Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor invoices revealed spikes at 
10, 11, 19, 24 and 49.  Spikes also occurred at 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 19 and 22 for 
vendor payments. The largest of these spikes was 49 for invoices (Figures A5.32 and 
A5.33) and 22 for payments (Figures A5.34 and A5.35).  
Conclusion 
Verification is an attempt to ensure that the product is built correctly and that the 
outputs of activities meet specifications imposed on them during the design phase. 
This test verified that the prototype functioned as planned, and that it met the 
specifications imposed in the fraud detection framework developed in Chapters 3 and 
4. Known anomalies were highlighted and dashboard values corresponded with 
control values (Table 5.11). It is therefore a logical conclusion that results of 
subsequent tests performed by the prototype may be dependable. This test also acts 
as a demonstration of the potential use of this software. 
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Table 5.11: Correspondence between control values and experimental values 
Test Control value Experimental value 
Activities performed by users identical identical 
Violation of segregation of duties identical identical 
Activities performed by user 
1USRARSCP 
identical identical 
Analysis of vendor transactions identical identical 
Benford's Law - invoices identical identical 
Benford's Law - payments identical identical 
 
 
5.2.2. Case study 1a: Data from large international manufacturing company 
Analysis period 01/01/2011 to 30/06/2011 – 6 months 
(Note: User and vendor names have been masked for confidentiality reasons). 
 
This test exposed the prototype to live data and provides support for research 
propositions RP2a and RP2b. A detailed trace of this test case study is included in 
Appendix 6 and is discussed below. The dashboard (Figure A6.1) provides a high-
level overview of various activities performed in the accounts payable system. 
User profiles 
A total of 45,368 invoice, 8,862 payment and 264 vendor maintenance activities 
were recorded during the analysis period (Figure A6.2). Details of each type of 
activity are provided in Figures A6.3 – A6. 8. 
 
There were 58 active users. They performed the following activities (Table 5.12). 
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Table 5.12: Activities performed by users 
# Transactions Description of Activity # Users 
24,690   invoice entry (FB60) 42 
20,678   posting document (FB01) 26 
8,343   parameters for automatic payment (F110) 24 
459  post outgoing payments (FBZ2) 7 
255  change vendor – centrally (XK02) 6 
68  create vendor – centrally (XK01) 6 
60  payment with printout (FBZ4) 5 
9  change vendor – accounting (FK02) 2 
1  Create vendor – accounting (FK01) 2 
 
Critical combinations 
In all, 26 / 58 users were identified as having violated segregation of duties. Details 
of these violations are provided in Figures A6.9 – A6. 16. Activities performed by 
these risky users are summarised below (Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13: Violation of segregation of duties 
# Users Combination 
26  invoices & payments 
4  vendor maintenance & invoices 
4  vendor maintenance & payments 
4  vendor maintenance & invoices & payments 
*Note: a user may have made multiple violations 
 
Users 1USRA, 1USRMI, 1USREEWAH and 1USRN have performed vendor 
maintenance, invoice entry and payment processing. Activities performed by these 
users were further investigated and are summarised below. 
 
  
 - 214 - 
User 1USRA performed 11 changes to vendor bank accounts, entered 263 invoices 
and processed 18 payments (Table 5.14). These activities violate segregation of 
duties. Performing these activities does not necessarily indicate that fraud has 
occurred, however, it creates an opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated by this user.  
Table 5.14: Summary of activities by 1USRA 
Activity # Total value 
Bank account changes 11 n/a 
Invoices 263 $2,085,287.04 
Payments 18 $298,368.48 
Round Dollar Invoices 46 $471,089.00 
Round Dollar Payments 1 $210,000.00 
Invoices 5% below approval limit 2 $2,861.13 
Payments 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Duplicate transactions 31 $9,300,000.00 
Vendors touched 32 n/a 
 
In all, 45,368 invoices were entered for a total dollar value of $186,449,162.56. 
Anomalous activities include round dollar invoices ($471,089.00) round dollar 
payments ($210,000.00), invoices below approval limit ($2,861.13) and duplicate 
transactions ($9,300,000.00). Potential fraud implications are: 
1. round dollar transaction values (invoices and payments) have a 
higher probability of being fabricated;  
2. invoices below an organisations approval limit may indicate 
attempts at bypassing management review; and 
3. duplicate transactions are unexpected and may indicate payment 
to a fraudster's personal bank account and a subsequent payment 
to a legitimate vendor (see Table 2.5 and Figure 3.5).  
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These transactions require further review by internal audit to determine whether they 
are genuine or fraudulent. 
 
User 1USRMI performed 37 changes to vendor bank accounts, entered 737 invoices 
and processed 320 payments (Table 5.15). Anomalous activities include round dollar 
payments ($18,136.00), invoices below approval limit ($2,932.67), payments below 
approval limit ($2,915.77) and duplicate transactions ($8,528.28). 
Table 5.15: Summary of activities by 1USRMI 
Activity # Total value 
Bank account changes 37 n/a 
Invoices 737 $5,077,562.14 
Payments 320 $1,285,577.19 
Round Dollar Invoices 115 $3,006,978.00 
Round Dollar Payments 5 $18,136.00 
Invoices 5% below approval limit 2 $2,932.67 
Payments 5% below approval limit 2 $2,915.77 
Duplicate transactions 51 $8,528.28 
Vendors touched 147 n/a 
 
User 1USREEWAH performed 17 changes to vendor bank accounts, entered 2 
invoices and processed 3 payments (Table 5.16).  
 
Anomalous activities include invoices ($53,760.00), payments ($10,016.84), round 
dollar invoices ($53,760.00), and round dollar payments ($18,136.00). 
User 1USRN performed 263 changes to vendor bank accounts, entered 26 invoices 
and processed 14 payments (Table 5.17). Anomalous activities include invoices 
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($8,572.18), payments ($7,304.83), round dollar invoices ($2.131.00), and round 
dollar payments ($30.00). 
 
Table 5.16: Summary of activities by 1USREEWAH 
Activity # Total value 
Bank account changes 17 n/a 
Invoices 2 $53,760.00 
Payments 3 $10,016.84 
Round Dollar Invoices 2 $53,760.00 
Round Dollar Payments 2 $6,010.00 
Invoices 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Payments 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Duplicate transactions 0 0 
Vendors touched 20 n/a 
 
 
Table 5.17: Summary of activities by 1USRN 
Activity # Total value 
Bank account changes 263 n/a 
Invoices 26 $8,572.18 
Payments 14 $7,304.83 
Round Dollar Invoices 8 $2.131.00 
Round Dollar Payments 2 $30.00 
Invoices 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Payments 5% below approval limit 0 0 
Duplicate transactions 0 n/a 
Vendors touched 256 n/a 
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Analysis of vendor activities 
There were 1,091 active vendors. The dashboard (Figure A6.1) provides a high-level 
overview of vendor transactions. Vendor transactions were investigated and the 
findings are summarised below (Table 5.18).  
 
In all, there were 1,091 active vendors. Anomalous vendor activities include 20 
vendors sharing bank accounts, 89 vendors having multiple bank accounts, and 36 
vendors having multiple changes to their bank accounts. Details of vendor 
transactions are provided in Figures A6.17 - A5. 24.  
 
Table 5.18: Summary of vendor transactions 
Activity Value 
number of invoices entered  45,368 
number payments processed 8,862 
total value of invoices entered $186,449,162.56 
total value of payments processed $28,106,039.65 
top vendor by invoice 0000030044 
total value of invoices for this vendor $114,660,580.29 
top vendor by payment 0000100027 
total value of payments for this vendor $2,933,273.73 
no. active vendors 1091 
no. vendors sharing bank accounts 20 
no. vendors with multiple bank accounts 89 
no. vendors with multiple bank changes 36 
 
Benford's law analysis 
Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor invoices revealed spikes at 
11, 22, 27, 36, 45, 54 and 67.  Spikes also occurred at 22, 27, 36, 37 and 45 for 
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vendor payments. Other smaller spikes were also observed for invoices and 
payments. The largest of these spikes was 36 for invoices (Figures A6.25 and A6.26) 
and 22 for payments (Figures A6.27 and A6.28).  
 
This case exposed the prototype to live data. Data was also collected on processing 
time and serves as a basis for determining auditor productivity.   
 
5.2.3. Case study 1b: Subset of case study 1a data 
Analysis period 01/06/2011 to 07/06/2011 – 7 days 
One week of actual transaction data from was processed using the prototype. This 
test provides data on processing times and additional support for the research 
propositions. Results of this test also provide support for determining auditor 
productivity. 
 
A limited trace of this test case study is included in Appendix 7 and is discussed 
below. The dashboard (Figure A7.1) summarises activities performed in the accounts 
payable system. 
User profiles 
A total of 2,021 invoice, 335 payment and 333 vendor maintenance activities were 
recorded during the analysis period (Figure A7.2). 
 
There were 36 active users. They performed the following activities (Table 5.19). 
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Table 5.19: Activities performed by users 
# Transactions Description of Activity # Users 
1,235   invoice entry (FB60) 22 
786   posting document (FB01) 13 
315   parameters for automatic payment (F110) 9 
255  change vendor – centrally (XK02) 6 
68  create vendor – centrally (XK01) 6 
19  post outgoing payments (FBZ2) 2 
9  change vendor – accounting (FK02) 2 
1  payment with printout (FBZ4) 1 
1  Create vendor – accounting (FK01) 2 
 
 
Critical combinations 
In all, 11 / 36 users were identified as having violated segregation of duties. 
Activities performed by these risky users (Figure A7.3) are summarised below 
(Table 5.20) 
Table 5.20: Violation of segregation of duties 
# Users Combination 
8  invoices & payments 
3  vendor maintenance & invoices 
0  vendor maintenance & payments 
0  vendor maintenance & invoices & payments 
*Note: a user may have made multiple violations 
 
Analysis of vendor activities 
There were 522 active vendors. Vendor transactions (Figure A7.1) are summarised 
below (Table 5.21).  
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Table 5.21: Summary of vendor transactions 
Activity Value 
number of invoices entered  2,021 
number payments processed 335 
total value of invoices entered $9,104,867.14 
total value of payments processed $1,433,507.66 
top vendor by invoice 0000030044 
total value of invoices for this vendor $3,200,005.03 
top vendor by payment 0000100027 
total value of payments for this vendor $344,021.55 
no. active vendors 522 
no. vendors sharing bank accounts 20 
no. vendors with multiple bank accounts 89 
no. vendors with multiple bank changes 36 
 
Benford's law analysis 
Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor invoices revealed spikes at 
13, 18, 22, 27, 36, 42, 45 and 91 (Figure A7.4).  Spikes also occurred at 11, 21, 22, 
25, 27, 32, 45 and 91 for vendor payments (Figure A7.5). Other smaller spikes were 
also observed for invoices and payments.  
 
This test was performed on one week's of actual transaction data. The purpose of this 
test is to provide additional data on processing times in support of determining 
auditor productivity. 
5.2.4. Case study 1a: Summary of findings and recommendations  
Given the available data, it appears that support staff 1USRMGR, 1USREAM, 
1USRADMIN and 1USRRTING are performing functions of normal users – 
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entering invoices and paying vendors. Several financial transactions having 
significantly large dollar values have been posted by support staff. This is not 
recommended practice and violates normal segregation of duties principles 
(separating users from SAP support functions, and separating entry of 
invoices/postings and payment functions). This situation presents a considerable 
fraud risk and requires review by internal audit. It is recommended that posting of 
financial transactions be restricted to users with relevant authorisations. 
 
Roles of all users that have violated segregation of duties should be reviewed and 
appropriate restrictions applied to their SAP profiles.  
 
It is generally recommended that users not use FB01 Post Document for entry of 
transactions. This transaction code allows a user to post any financial transaction i.e. 
general ledger, customer, vendor, inventory, or asset. A user enters a document type 
(e.g. SA, for GL postings) as part of the header data and then enters relevant data. 
Security guidelines usually recommend that no user be granted access to this 
transaction code; rather their profile should allow access to the set of specific 
transaction codes associated with their position, e.g. accounts payable clerk.  Access 
to transaction code FB01 Post Document should be restricted. Implementing this 
restriction will ensure proper segregation of duties. 
 
Several postings with round dollar amounts have been entered. Round dollar values 
have a higher possibility of being fraudulent. These transactions should be checked 
to determine whether they are genuine. 
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Several vendors were found to be sharing bank accounts. These appear to involve 
vendors with multiple vendor numbers for the same vendor. These vendors should be 
examined to check that they are genuine. There are also several vendors with 
multiple bank accounts. These appear to involve vendors with multiple master 
records. Duplicate vendor master records are a potential fraud risk and should be 
eliminated. It is recommended that the vendor master file be periodically examined 
and cleaned to remove any duplicate vendor accounts. 
 
Several cases of 'flipping' of banking details were observed. These should be 
examined by internal audit to ensure that all bank account changes were authorised.  
 
Benford's Law analysis of the first two digits for vendor invoice and payment 
transaction revealed several deviations from the expected frequency of these digits.  
Each of these needs to be investigated to determine the reason for deviation. Large 
deviations (spikes) are indicative of potential fraud. An investigation was conducted 
on invoices with spike 36 as this was the largest spike. It was found that several 
identical amounts have been recorded for the same vendors. These transactions were 
entered by different users. Similarly, an investigation was conducted on payments 
with spike 22 as this was the largest spike present in payment data. A comparable 
pattern of several identical payment amounts recorded for the same vendors was 
observed (refer to Figures A6.25 and A6.27). These transactions require further 
investigation by internal audit to determine whether they are genuine, erroneous or 
fraudulent.  
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The above findings require close examination by an internal auditor to determine 
whether these vulnerabilities/anomalies are actually associated with fraudulent 
activities. 
5.3. Processing times 
Table 5.22 summarises processing times associated with stage 1 tests (test data).  
 
These tests were performed on 1 month of simulated test data using the bench-mark 
workstation configuration. The majority of the total time is consumed in the data 
extraction activity. Total time taken for table extraction and pre-processing is 
37 minutes and 47 seconds. Time taken to process individual investigations was also 
tested. This involved selection of individual users or vendors and dynamically 
producing a series of reports for the selected entity (Figures A4.6, A4.7 and A4.9 to 
A4.11). Processing times for these activities were all below one minute. Table 5.23 
summarises the number of records processed during these tests. 
Table 5.22: Processing time - stage 1 test 
Activity Processing Time (h:mm:ss) 
Extract SAP tables 0:35:00 
Copy text files to system folder 0:01:00 
Data conversion 0:00:30 
Data import 0:00:10 
Set data range 0:00:12 
Set approval limits 0:00:10 
Pre-process and prepare reports  0:00:40 
Extract /Pre-processing Total 0:37:47 
  
Query individual risky user activities 0:00:25 
Query individual vendor transactions 0:00:22 
Generate Benford's reports 0:00:15 
Search vendors for similar names 0:00:13 
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Table 5.23: Number of records processed  
Table Name # Records 
BKPF (accounting document header)  15,281 
BSEG (accounting document line items)  27,126 
CDHDR (change document header)  2,235 
CDPOS (change document line items)  5,182 
LFA1 (vendor general data)  58,844 
 
 
 
Table 5.24 summarises the processing times associated with stage 2 tests 
(case study 1a). These tests were performed on 6 months of actual transaction data 
using the bench-mark workstation configuration. Although the tests were performed 
on a significantly larger time period with more transactions, processing times are 
almost identical. Table 5.25 summarises the number of records processed during 
these tests.  
 
Table 5.24: Processing time – stage 2 test 
Activity Processing Time (h:mm:ss) 
Extract SAP tables 0:35:00 
Copy text files to system folder 0:01:00 
Data conversion 0:00:30 
Data import 0:00:10 
Set data range 0:00:10 
Set approval limits 0:00:10 
Pre-process and prepare reports  0:00:45 
Extract /Pre-processing Total 0:37:45 
  
Query individual risky user activities 0:00:30 
Query individual vendor transactions 0:00:22 
Generate Benford's reports 0:00:15 
Search vendors for similar names 0:00:12 
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Table 5.25: Number of records processed 
Table Name # Records 
BKPF (accounting document header)  112,718 
BSEG (accounting document line items)  113,748 
CDHDR (change document header)  46,497 
CDPOS (change document line items)  301,918 
LFA1 (vendor general data)  4,689 
 
 
Table 5.26 summarises the processing times associated with stage 3 tests 
(case study 1b). These tests were performed on 7 days of actual transaction data 
using the bench-mark workstation configuration. Again, processing times are almost 
identical to the previous two tests. Table 5.27 summarises the number of records 
processed during these tests.  
 
Table 5.28 and Figure 5.4 summarise the number of records processed across all 
tests. Table 5.29 provides the average processing time for all tests. From this data it 
can be concluded that processing time is not dependant on the number of records 
processed by the prototype. Processing time remains comparatively constant 
regardless of the size of the data-set extracted from the SAP system. 
Table 5.26: Processing time – stage 3 test 
Activity Processing Time (h:mm:ss) 
Extract SAP tables 0:35:00 
Copy text files to system folder 0:01:00 
Data conversion 0:00:30 
Data import 0:00:10 
Set data range 0:00:10 
Set approval limits 0:00:10 
Pre-process and prepare reports  0:00:40 
TIME 0:37:40 
  
Query individual risky user activities 0:00:25 
Query individual vendor transactions 0:00:22 
Generate Benford's reports 0:00:15 
Search vendors for similar names 0:00:12 
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Table 5.27: Number of records processed 
Table Name # Records 
BKPF (accounting document header)  19,896 
BSEG (accounting document line items)  20,152 
CDHDR (change document header)  414 
CDPOS (change document line items)  1,178 
LFA1 (vendor general data)  4,689 
 
Table 5.28: Summary of records processed for all tests 
 Test case Actual case 
 3 months 6 months 7 days 
Table Name # Records # Records # Records 
BKPF 15,281 112,718 19,896 
BSEG 27,126 113,748 20,152 
CDHDR 2,235 46,497 414 
CDPOS 5,182 301,918 1,178 
LFA1 58,844 4,689 4,689 
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 Figure 5.7: Number of records processed 
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Table 5.29: Average processing time for all tests 
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The following conclusions can be justified based on the above test results. 
1. Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities 
and report these using an intuitive visual interface (RP2a). Stage 1 tests 
provide evidence that the concept of automated fraud detection is 
feasible in practice. This is achieved by analysing simulated test data 
from a SAP enterprise system and producing reports and visualisations 
identifying potentially fraudulent user behaviours or anomalous 
activities. An auditor has the additional ability to investigate individual 
users or vendors in greater detail. In each case, the time taken to query 
and produce user or vendor centric reports is approximately 30 seconds. 
 
2. Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on 
a stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an 
organisation's enterprise system (RP2b). The prototype was developed 
as a stand-alone application and installed on a separate computer 
system. Tests were conducted on a variety of data-sets. The prototype 
was able to handle real data volumes from a real organisation without 
difficulty. Findings from analysis of case study data revealed that the 
prototype successfully identified and reported potential threats on a 
laptop computer, independent of the case study organisation's SAP 
enterprise system. 
 
3. Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by 
using  technology to perform continuous monitoring of an 
organisation's  enterprise system (RP2c). Experiments were performed 
using larger and small case study data-sets. Processing time remained 
comparatively constant regardless of the size of the data-set. 
Transaction data can be extracted, downloaded, and pre-processed in 
approximately 40 minutes. An auditor then has the rest of the working 
day to analyse the data and conduct further detailed investigations of 
users or vendors.  These tests indicate that auditor productivity may be 
improved when using the prototype to support the audit process. 
Independent reviews and an expert panel demonstration, discussed in 
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the following section, provide further evidence in support of this 
conclusion. 
 
 
In this section tests were conducted on the prototype to verify whether it satisfied the 
conditions imposed during the development phase, i.e. that it could identify 
potentially fraudulent activities in a short time.  In the next section, an examination 
of whether it is the correct product that meets the requirements of the task (i.e. 
detection of potential fraud) and intended consumer (i.e. an internal auditor) is 
undertaken. 
 
5.4. Validation and independent review of prototype 
Validation is an attempt to ensure that the right product is built, i.e. it fulfils the 
specific intended purpose and meets the needs of the user. Software evaluation 
during or at the end of the development process is intended to determine whether it 
satisfies specified requirements. This is done through dynamic testing and reviews 
(IEEE 2004 ; Wallace et al. 1996).    
 
Independent reviews were requested from auditing practitioners to obtain feedback 
on the prototype. In each case, the reviewer(s) were provided with a summary paper 
(Singh et al. 2011), a one-hour presentation and demonstration of the prototype. The 
demonstration involved processing and analysing both simulated test data and actual 
transaction data. The reviews are presented in their entirety in Appendix 9. 
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The first review was conducted by Mr John Halliday, Executive Director Advisory, 
BDO, Australia. His comments are stated below: 
 
"A project of this nature is considered to be of high importance to 
organisations. It provides a mechanism to pro-actively monitor fraud 
risk, a key risk in any organisation. It also demonstrates a commitment 
to compliance with Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations as outlined by ASX Corporate Governance Council. 
 
Automated fraud detection software can provide internal auditors with 
a tool to efficiently assess the presence of fraud within an 
organisation. This may also be applied to testing the effectiveness of 
the controls that management may have in place. A tool of this nature 
can ensure that the management of the risk of fraud can be undertaken 
on a more regular or continual basis. 
 
In general, I found the functionality of the tool to be useful. The user 
interface would require a minimal level of training and some level of 
understanding of the SAP application, which is a reasonable 
constraint. The graphs and visualisations clearly communicated a 
message for the reader. The speed of running the queries was 
impressive." 
 
The second and third reviews were conducted by K.M., Financial Manager (Internal 
Audit) and N.J., Financial Director, of the case study site (note: names have been 
withheld for confidentiality reasons). Feedback was requested on the following 
issues. 
1. The importance of such a project for auditing in your organisation. 
2. The role that automated fraud detection software could play as an 
auditing tool for internal auditors. 
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3. The desirability of a retrospective analysis software tool implemented 
on a standalone computer system as compared with a system embedded 
within an enterprise system.  
4. The functionality of the prototype, in particular the user interface, 
reporting and graphical features. 
5. Any further comments or suggested improvements to the prototype.  
 
Feedback was also sought from a panel of experts from CPA Australia (Queensland 
Division - IT Discussion Group) and ISACA5 (Queensland Chapter). In total, 20 
Certified Practicing Accountants (CPAs) constituted the expert panel. A short 
presentation and demonstration was made to panel members (20 minutes). Members 
had an opportunity for a hands-on session using the prototype. Their feedback was 
sought using a survey (Appendix 3) on the following key issues, namely operation, 
reporting and visualisations, accuracy and efficiency, and impact on auditor 
productivity. They were asked to rate these aspects on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being 
'Strongly disagree' and 7 being 'Strongly agree'. Twenty three (23) responses were 
received. A summary of these responses is presented below. 
 
 
Operation. Panel members rated the prototype as being easy to use, user friendly, 
and providing adequate on-screen instructions (Table 5.30). 
Table 5.30: Operation 
Operation 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance 
Std 
Dev. 
Easy to use 5.87 0.45 0.81 
User-friendly 5.78 0.45 0.67 
Navigation of user interface is simple 5.65 0.60 0.78 
Onscreen instructions/ help is adequate  5.78 0.36 0.60 
Data entry is straightforward 5.70 0.40 0.63 
N=23 
                                               
5 Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
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Reports and visualisations. Panel members rated reports as being easy to 
understand, useful in identifying potential fraud and in aggregating enormous amount 
of information. Visualisations were also seen as enabling identification of 
relationships or patterns in data that would otherwise be difficult in textual data. 
Overall, the group rated reports and visualisations as important tools in a fraud 
investigator's toolkit (Table 5.31 and 5.32). 
Table 5.31: Reports 
Reports 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance 
Std 
Dev. 
Easy to understand 5.91 0.63 0.79 
Contains adequate information  5.87 0.48 0.69 
Helpful in identifying potential fraud 6.22 0.36 0.60 
Are an important tool in a fraud investigators toolkit 6.17 0.33 0.58 
N=23 
Table 5.32: Visualisations 
Visualisations (charts & diagrams) 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance 
Std 
Dev. 
Easy to understand 5.87 0.87 0.92 
Useful in aggregating an enormous amount of information 6.09 0.54 0.73 
Enables effective exploration of data in a graphical format  6.13 0.57 0.76 
Enables identification of relationships or patterns in data 
that are otherwise difficult to do in textual data 
6.17 0.60 0.78 
Enhances investigation and analysis for potential fraud 6.22 0.54 0.74 
Are an innovative way of presenting information 6.35 0.42 0.65 
Are an important tool in a fraud investigators toolkit 6.04 0.77 0.88 
N=23 
 
 
 
Accuracy, efficiency and performance. The prototype was rated as producing 
quality, useful and accurate results. Panel members agreed that the prototype was an 
improvement over basic analytical tools and that results were produced in a much 
faster time than if done manually. They also felt that there was potential to save costs 
and reduce future fraud by early detection of suspicious user activities (Table 5.33). 
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Table 5.33: Accuracy, efficiency and performance 
Accuracy, Efficiency and Performance 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance 
Std 
Dev. 
Produces quality results that are useful in identifying 
potential fraud 
5.96 0.50 0.71 
Results are  accurate and dependable 6.09 0.36 0.60 
Produces the same results as a human expert 6.00 0.55 0.74 
Generates results much faster than doing a similar task 
manually 
6.35 0.42 0.65 
Is an improvement over basic analysis as it replaces blind 
querying of data with contextual analysis 
5.96 0.59 0.77 
Significantly enhances the internal auditing process 5.87 0.30 0.55 
Potential to save costs due to improved fraud detection 6.13 0.39 0.63 
Potential to reduce future fraud by early detection of 
suspect user activity 
6.22 0.45 0.67 
N=23 
 
 
Auditor productivity. Panel members collectively agreed that the prototype may 
reduce time taken to identify potential fraud (Table 5.34). They were asked to rate 
the number of person days it would take to review a system for fraud based on 
30,000 transactions. Their responses are shown in Tables 5.35 to 5.37. 
 
Table 5.34: Auditor productivity 
Auditor Productivity 
 (Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance 
Std 
Dev. 
This software may reduce time taken to identify potential 
fraud in an organisation 
6.30 0.49 0.70 
N=23 
 
 
Panel members generally agreed that it would take 20+ days (39.1%) or it would be 
an impractical task (60.9%) to audit the stated number of transactions, if done 
manually (Table 5.35). 
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Table 5.35: Time to process data manually 
Q 4.1a Value (days) Count % 
How long would it take to review for fraud, if 
done manually? 
Impractical U 14 60.9% 
  20+ 9 39.1% 
  10 0 0.0% 
  5 0 0.0% 
  3 0 0.0% 
  1 0 0.0% 
 Less than 1 <1 0 0.0% 
N=23 
  
 
 
Table 5.36: Time to process data with other software 
Q 4.1b Value (days) Count % 
How long would it take to review for fraud, if 
done using other software? 
Impractical U 0 0.0% 
  20+ 8 34.8% 
  10 9 39.1% 
  5 3 13.0% 
  3 1 4.3% 
  1 2 8.7% 
 Less than 1 <1 0 0.0% 
N=23 
  
 
Panel members agreed that it would take between 1 and 20+ days to audit the stated 
number of transactions using other software (i.e. ACL, Access, Excel, etc.) 
(Table 5.36).  
 
Panel members agreed that it would take between <1 to 5 days to audit the stated 
number of transactions using the prototype. Most agreed that 3 days (43.5%) was 
standard, 21.7% said 1 day and 17.4% said either 5 days or <1 day (Table 5.37). 
From these ratings, it may be concluded that using the prototype as a tool for 
detection of potential fraud improves auditor productivity. 
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  Table 5.37: Time to process data with prototype 
Q 4.1c Value (days) Count % 
How long would it take to review for fraud, if 
done using the prototype software? 
Impractical U 0 0.0% 
  20+ 0 0.0% 
  10 0 0.0% 
  5 4 17.4% 
  3 10 43.5% 
  1 5 21.7% 
 Less than 1 <1 4 17.4% 
N=23 
 
Table 5.38: Overall evaluation 
Overall Evaluation 
(Questionnaire scale 1 to 7) Mean Variance 
Std 
Dev. 
This software represents substantial advances over other 
tools currently available in the market 
5.96 0.41 0.64 
If available,  I am likely to use this software 5.70 0.68 0.82 
If available,  I am likely to recommend this software to 
others 
6.04 0.59 0.77 
Overall, this software is a useful auditing tool  6.22 0.72 0.85 
N=23 
 
 
Overall evaluation. Panel members considered the prototype a useful auditing tool 
that represented substantial advances over other tools currently available in the 
market. They are likely to use or recommend this tool should it be commercially 
available (Table 5.38). 
 
Panel members were asked to provide their comments on the following matters. 
i) Features of the software that were useful 
Selected comments are given below. 
"Visualisations and drill-downs are good." 
"Segregation of duties looks good. Flipping looks good." 
"Dashboard a great idea." 
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"Ability to find out details from the dashboard within a few seconds." 
"Ability to do different views." 
"Identifying user behaviour and eliminating patterns that don't breach SoD." 
"Useful in fraud prevention and identification in [accounts payable]." 
 "A great framework to begin to look at [accounts payable]." 
 
ii) Features of the software that could be improved  
Selected comments are given below. 
"Broaden scope to include other areas such as [accounts receivable], 
[general ledger], [sales and distribution], [inventory], etc." 
"Detect collusion." 
"Identify missing fields in data entered by users." 
 
Most panel members agreed that the dashboard and visualisations were especially 
useful in promptly identifying activities in an accounts payable system. They also 
agreed that it was an excellent tool for fraud prevention and detection. Some 
commented that the prototype should be extended to include other areas of the 
accounting cycle including accounts receivable, general ledger and inventory 
systems (these comments are addressed in section 5.6). 
5.5. Prototype implementation and testing and propositions 
This Chapter addresses the following three research propositions. 
 
RP2a:  Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities and 
 report these using an intuitive visual interface. 
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Prototype software is developed on a Windows-based computer system. The user 
interface is web browser based. Aspects of the web programs are written in 
VBScript. Visualisation components are written in GraphViz v1.01. The web based 
user interface provides a simple, intuitive, graphical interface that most users are 
already familiar with. Accounting audit trails are routinely extracted from the SAP 
system and imported into the prototype for pre-processing and analysis. Extracted 
data tables are imported, cleansed (to remove any inconsistencies) and preformatted 
before being pre-processed by the prototype. On completion of pre-processing, 
reports and visualisations are produced. Thus, it is established that software can be 
developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities and report these using an 
intuitive visual interface. RP2a is therefore supported.  
 
RP2b: Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on  a
 stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an 
 organisation's enterprise system. 
 
Prototype software is developed as a stand-alone application and installed on a 
separate computer system. Tests are conducted on a variety of data-sets. The 
prototype is able to handle real data volumes from a real organisation without 
difficulty. Findings from analysis of case study data reveals that the prototype 
successfully identifies and reports potential threats on a laptop computer, 
independent of an organisation's SAP enterprise system. Feedback received from 
independent reviews and expert panel members indicate support for a stand-alone 
prototype. Thus, it is established that threat monitoring and potential fraud detection 
can be implemented on a stand-alone external computer system. RP2b is therefore 
supported. 
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RP2c: Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by using 
 technology to perform continuous monitoring of an organisation's 
 enterprise system. 
 
Experiments are performed with the prototype to provide information on processing 
times. Results indicate that processing times remain comparatively constant 
regardless of the size of the data-set. Transaction data can be extracted, downloaded, 
and pre-processed in approximately 40 minutes. An auditor then has the rest of the 
working day to analyse the data and conduct further detailed investigations of users 
or vendors.  These tests indicate that auditor productivity may improve when using 
the prototype to support the audit process. Feedback from the panel of experts 
indicate that the prototype is capable of producing results in a very short time period 
and that there is potential to save costs and reduce propensity for future fraud due to 
early detection. Thus, it is established that efficiency and effectiveness of the audit 
process may be improved by using technology to perform continuous monitoring. 
RP2c is therefore supported. 
5.6. Conclusion 
This Chapter addresses research propositions RP2a, RP2b and RP2c. Implementation 
and test results of the prototype are described with reference to a number of 
Appendices. Results indicate that the following: 
i) Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities and 
report these using an intuitive visual interface. The reporting system provides 
an auditor with a simple, intuitive web-based interface that permits effective 
interrogation of user and vendor activities. 
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ii) Threat monitoring and fraud detection can be effectively implemented on a 
stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an 
organisation's enterprise system. The prototype was successfully developed 
as a stand-alone application and installed on a separate computer system.  
iii) Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by using 
technology to perform continuous monitoring of an organisation's enterprise 
system. Experimentation with case study data and feedback from experts 
indicate that auditor productivity may be improved when using the prototype. 
 
Verification of the prototype was achieved by performing a series of tests using test 
data involving simulated activity over a period of one month. These tests assessed 
the functionality of the prototype to ensure that it met the specifications imposed in 
the fraud detection framework developed in Chapters 3 and 4. Known anomalies 
were highlighted and dashboard values corresponded with control values. It was 
concluded that results of subsequent tests performed by the prototype may be 
dependable.  
 
Case study data from a large international manufacturing was processed using the 
prototype. These tests exposed the prototype to live data and served to provide 
support for research propositions RP2a and RP2b.  
 
Validation was achieved by requesting independent reviews from auditing 
practitioners and an expert panel demonstration. Feedback was very positive and 
indicated support for the prototype. Panel members felt that the dashboard and 
visualisations were especially useful in promptly identifying anomalies. They also 
believed that performing analysis on large transaction data-sets (i.e. 30,000 or more) 
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is not practical if done manually. They agreed that the prototype was capable of 
producing results in a very short time period and that there was a potential to save 
costs and reduce propensity for future fraud due to early detection. An expert 
independent reviewer stated, "…the speed of running queries was impressive". Panel 
members also indicated that there would be support for such a product if it was 
commercially available.  
 
Timing experiments were conducted using the prototype. They indicated that 
processing time remained comparatively constant regardless of the size of transaction 
data. The prototype was able to handle real data volumes from a real organisation 
without difficulty. Comments received from the case study organisation indicated 
that they were impressed with the prototypes ability to highlight anomalies in the 
dashboard within a few seconds of processing. Processing time estimates indicate 
that transaction data can be extracted, downloaded, and pre-processed in 
approximately forty minutes. An auditor then has the rest of the working day to 
analyse the data and conduct further detailed investigations of users or vendors.  
These tests provide evidence that auditor productivity may improve when using the 
prototype as a tool for detecting the possibility that fraud has occurred.  
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CHAPTER 6  
Conclusion and Further Research 
6. Conclusion 
6.0. Introduction 
This research seeks to answer the question whether a generalised model for 
proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems can be developed.  The approach 
adopted was to develop prototype software to provide evidence that the concept of 
proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems is feasible in practice. Conclusions 
from results of this research are summarised in this Chapter. Contributions from 
these results to the study of proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems are 
described. Perceived limitations of the prototype are discussed and potential 
extensions to the current prototype are identified. Opportunities for further research 
are also discussed.  
6.1. Summary of results from this study 
The primary objective of this research is to explore and develop innovative methods 
for proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems. The intention was to 
build a model for fraud detection based on analysis of patterns or signatures. This 
objective is addressed by answering the main question. Two research sub-questions 
and five research propositions were formulated. The results achieved pertaining to 
these research propositions are summarised below. 
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SQ1: How do enterprise systems support proactive detection of potential fraud in 
 financial transactions? 
This question examined the possibility of detecting fraudulent activities in an 
enterprise system. To address this sub-question, three propositions were formulated. 
 
RP1a: Enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
 retrospective monitoring of user activities. 
 
SAP audit trails were examined. It was established that they provide detailed 
descriptions of functions performed by users within an enterprise system.  Each 
function has a transaction code associated with it (for example, FB60 – Enter Vendor 
Invoice). Each transaction code executed by a user is recorded in the audit trail (Best 
2000). Audit trail data is stored in several tables within the SAP enterprise system 
(Figure 4.3).  This data documents changes to master records and accounting 
audit trails.  
 
Changes to master records are stored in two tables (Figures 4.4 and 4.5) namely 
CDHDR (Change Document Headers) and CDPOS (Change Document Items) 
(Padhi 2010 ; Best et al. 2009 ; Hirao 2009 ; Best 2005). Changes to master records 
include creation and deletion of master records and changes to fields (for example, 
FK01 - Create Vendor Master Record, FK02 - Change Vendor Master Record). Thus 
it is possible to identify an individual user making these changes. 
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Accounting audit trails are stored in tables BKPF (Accounting Document Header), 
BSEG (Accounting Document Line Item), SKAT (General Ledger Account Texts), 
and LFA1 (Vendor General Data) (Figures 4.6 to 4.9). Tables BKPF and BSEG store 
posting histories for both general ledger and subsidiary ledgers. This facilitates 
integration of data and automatic reconciliation of subsidiary ledgers with control 
accounts. General ledger account texts (names) are stored in table SKAT. Vendor 
general data including vendor name, date created and creating user are stored in table 
LFA1 (Best et al. 2009). Thus it is possible to identify an individual user performing 
these activities.  
 
It was established that enterprise system audit trails document adequate data to allow 
retrospective monitoring of user activities. Thus RP1a is supported.  
 
RP1b: Violations in segregation of duties can be identified by analysing audit 
 trails for critical combinations of user activities. 
 
This study supports the following principles of segregation of duties within the 
accounts payable (AP) function as proposed by Little and Best (2003) (Figure 3.11). 
 
SoDs Principle 1: Users who can create and modify vendor master records should 
 not be able to post accounting transactions.  
 
SoDs Principle 2:  Payments should be performed by someone other than the person 
 who enters vendor invoices.  
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Evidence supporting these principles was obtained by examining data from SAP 
tables CDHDR (Change Document Headers) and CDPOS (Change Document 
Items), BKPF (Accounting Document Header), BSEG (Accounting Document Line 
Item), and LFA1 (Vendor General Data). It was determined that this data allows 
association of actions with users'. Critical combinations of user activities have been 
designed in section 4.4.1. Table 4.3 and 4.4 lists the combination of activities a user 
has to perform in order to violate each of the SoDs principles. If any of these 
violations are identified then further investigation of the offending user's activities is 
necessary to determine whether any fraudulent transactions have been performed. 
Therefore it is feasible to detect violations in segregation of duties with available 
data. 
 
It was established that violations in segregation of duties can be identified by 
analysing audit trails for critical combinations of user activities. Thus RP1b is 
supported. 
 
RP1c: Potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by investigating user 
 activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
 symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. 
 
Given the ability to identify violations in segregation of duties, it is feasible to detect 
potentially fraudulent transactions made possible by these violations. For example, 
the ability to identify users who have changed vendor details, entered an invoice and 
paid the invoice permits detection of potential accounts payable fraud. In addition, 
further potential fraud can be detected through examination of other anomalous 
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activities. A catalogue of known fraud symptoms informs this process (Table 4.5). 
The following analyses are available to an auditor. 
 
i). Bank account 'flipping' – checks for changes to banking details, a change 
back to original, with transactions processed in the interim period. 
ii). Duplicates test - checks for any duplicates, for example, invoices, 
payments or vendors. 
iii). Trend analysis - compares activities over two or more periods, to identify 
variances over time, for example, vendors with minimal payments in 
prior periods but large payments in current period may be fraudulent 
payments. 
iv). Benford's Law - gives expected frequencies of digits in numerical data. 
Spikes may be indicative of fraud and require further investigation. 
v). Stratification - identifies the number and dollar value of vendor payments 
that occur within a specified interval, for example 5% below an approval 
limit. 
vi). Graphing - provides a visual means of documenting anomalous 
activities. 
 
It was established that potentially fraudulent transactions can be identified by 
investigating user activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. Thus RP1c is supported. 
 
 
 
SQ2:  How can detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems be effectively 
 and efficiently automated to facilitate auditor productivity? 
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This question examined the possibility of automating fraud detection in an enterprise 
system. To address this research sub-question, three propositions were formulated. 
 
RP2a:  Software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent activities and 
 report these using an intuitive visual interface. 
 
Prototype software was developed using an Intel Core i5-based computer system 
running the Windows 7 operating system. The primary development environment 
was SAS v9.2 for Windows. The user interface was web browser based and required 
Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0 or above. Aspects of the web programs were written 
in VBScript. Visualisation components were written in GraphViz v1.01. The 
intention of the prototype was to demonstrate the feasibility of the concept of 
proactive fraud detection in practice. The web based user interface provided a 
simple, intuitive, graphical interface that most users were already familiar with. 
 
Data requirements for fraud detection in SAP enterprise systems have been discussed 
in Section 4.3.1. Accounting audit trails were routinely extracted from the SAP 
system and imported into the prototype for pre-processing and analysis. SAP data 
tables were accessed through the SAP menu or by using transaction codes 
(Table 5.1). Extracted data tables were imported, cleansed (to remove any 
inconsistencies) and preformatted before being pre-processed by the prototype 
(Figure A4.16). On completion of pre-processing, reports and visualisations were 
produced. Further detailed investigation of user (Figure A4.6) or vendor (Figure 
A4.9) was also possible. 
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The following experiments were conducted using the prototype. 
1. Test data - the system was tested using a set of test data involving simulated 
activity over a period of one month. This test served to assess whether the 
software performed correctly, and that it met the specifications imposed in 
the fraud detection framework developed in Chapters 3 and 4. Based on tests 
run, the prototype did meet expectations. 
2. Case study - six months of actual transaction data was processed using the 
prototype. This data was obtained from a large international manufacturing 
company. These tests exposed the prototype to live data. Again, the 
prototype met expectations and identified potential frauds for future 
investigations. 
 
It was established that software can be developed to identify potentially fraudulent 
activities and report these using an intuitive visual interface (See Figure A5.1). Thus 
RP2a is supported.  
 
RP2b: Threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be implemented on  a
 stand-alone external computer system operating independently of an 
 organisation's enterprise system. 
 
Prototype software was developed as a stand-alone application and installed on a 
separate computer system. Tests were conducted on a variety of data-sets. The 
prototype was able to handle real data volumes from a real organisation without 
difficulty. Findings from analysis of case study data revealed that the prototype 
successfully identified and reported potential threats on a laptop computer, 
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independent of the case study organisation's SAP enterprise system. The following 
comments were received from the case study organisation: 
"It is an advantage that we can operate this software on a standalone 
computer system rather than embedded in our main SAP system as it 
minimizes the disruptions to routine operations and allows retrieving 
reports at any given time even when the on-line system is not 
available."  
 
It was established that threat monitoring and potential fraud detection can be 
implemented on a stand-alone external computer system. Thus RP2b is supported. 
 
RP2c: Efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be improved by using 
 technology to perform continuous monitoring of an organisation's 
 enterprise system. 
 
The following experiments were conducted using the prototype to provide 
information on processing times 
1. Case study 1a - six months of actual transaction data - to determine the time 
it would take to process a large data-set.   
2. Case study 1b - one week of actual transaction data – to provide a 
comparative analysis of the time it would take to process a small data-set. 
 
Processing time remained comparatively constant regardless of the size of the data-
set. Transaction data can be extracted, downloaded, and pre-processed in 
approximately 40 minutes (Figure 5.3). An auditor then has the rest of the working 
day to analyse the data and conduct further detailed investigations of users or 
vendors.  These tests indicated that auditor productivity could be improved when 
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using the prototype to support the audit process. The following feedback was 
received from the case study organisation. 
"As one of Asia's6 largest companies who is operating in a SAP 
environment, it is extremely vital to have system based controls on 
detecting and preventing fraudulent activities. Considering the 
number of transactions that take place every day, it has become 
impractical to check each transaction in detail manually unless they 
are covered by way of controls in place. In such an environment this 
software will immensely help our internal auditors to carry out 
various tests in detecting frauds and errors." 
 
Feedback from the panel of experts indicated that the prototype is capable of 
producing results in a very short time period and that there is potential to save costs 
and reduce propensity for future fraud due to early detection. They were also 
impressed with the prototypes ability to highlight anomalies in the dashboard within 
a few seconds of processing.  Findings also indicate that unlike a financial statement 
audit which is designed to detect material misstatements (Singleton and Singleton 
2007), the prototype analyses 'all' activities when identifying anomalies associated 
with fraud symptoms. Investigations performed using the prototype are not 
susceptible to 'materiality' concerns. The prototype does not consider materiality in 
its processes or in analysis of audit trail data. This characteristic may improve 
efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process.  
 
It was established that efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process can be 
improved by using technology to perform continuous monitoring. Thus RP2c is 
supported. 
                                               
6 Name of location has been changed to maintain confidentiality. 
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These results support the conclusion that software can be developed to identify 
potentially fraudulent activities and report these using an intuitive visual interface that 
permits effective interrogation of user and vendor activities. Threat monitoring and 
fraud detection can be effectively implemented on a separate standalone computer 
system. Auditor productivity could be improved when using the prototype to support 
the audit process. Feedback obtained from the panel of experts was very positive and 
indicated support for the prototype. They collectively agreed that using the prototype 
may reduce time taken to identify potential fraud. They also felt that there would be 
support for such a product if it was commercially available. Mr. John Halliday, 
Executive Director Advisory, BDO, Australia commented that;  
"Automated fraud detection software can provide internal auditors 
with a tool to efficiently assess the presence of fraud within an 
organization. This may also be applied to testing the effectiveness of 
the controls that management may have in place. A tool of this nature 
can ensure that the management of the risk of fraud can be 
undertaken on a more regular or continual basis." 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that a generalised model for proactive fraud detection in 
enterprise systems can be developed, thereby providing support for the primary 
research question. 
6.2. Contributions 
There are a number of contributions this study makes to both the literature and 
auditing practice. The following sub-sections highlight the contributions of this 
research to the development of fraud detection models and how it can be applied to 
real-world organisations. 
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6.2.1. Theoretical contributions 
The research problem addressed in this study is not new. The first recorded financial 
fraud was perpetrated by a Greek merchant in 300 B.C. (Beattie 2009). This study, 
therefore, intended to determine the feasibility of using technology to proactively 
detect potential fraud in enterprise systems. As business processes become more 
complex and integrated, and organisations implement large-scale enterprise systems, 
the need for proactive fraud detection becomes a necessity. Furthermore, fraudsters 
are becoming more sophisticated in their use of technology and in their ability to 
commit and conceal fraudulent activities. Several gaps in the literature relating to 
fraud detection are identified in Chapter 2. The contributions made by this study 
address these gaps and add to the understanding of fraud detection in enterprise 
systems, in general, and SAP, in particular.  
 
There appears to be limited research in continuous monitoring and fraud detection 
(Du and Roohani 2007 ; Kuhn Jr and Sutton 2010). Furthermore, there appears to be 
no published research in developing a generalised model for proactive detection of 
potential fraud in enterprise systems. This study develops and tests a conceptual 
model for proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems. The model 
recommends the following process: i) identify the types of frauds that can occur; ii) 
catalogue the fraud symptoms; iii) use computer technology to detect fraud 
symptoms; and iv) analyse the results (Figure 3.3). A Monitoring and Control Layer 
(MCL) based model was recommended as it has the following inherent 
characteristics:  
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i). It is not limited to sampling a subset of an organisation's 
transactions, as is the case with the traditional manual audit. 
Therefore there is no sampling risk. 
ii). It provides frequent opportunities for identifying potential 
fraud. This will most likely lead to a reduction in the time 
taken to detect fraud, from several months to days or hours. 
iii). In-built data analytics will assist in determining the propensity 
for frauds occurring in the future. This attribute may be used in 
identifying, and proactively correcting deficiencies in internal 
controls thereby leading to a possible reduction in fraud in an 
organisation. 
iv). Access to an enterprise system is only required for data 
extraction purposes. A separate system is used for continuous 
monitoring and analysis.  Impact on the enterprise system 
being monitored is therefore negligible as there is no overhead 
of running additional software. Independence of auditors' 
computer systems is also preserved. 
 
The conceptual model developed in this study characterises i) the fundamental nature 
of fraud, and ii) its detection. Firstly, it identifies mental states that fraudsters 
experiences prior to perpetrating a fraud. Once a fraudster determines what to steal, 
the next decision is how to steal it (Figure 2.8). A fraudster subsequently decides on 
a specific fraud method to achieve the desired outcome of; i) perpetrating a fraud 
and, ii) concealing it to avoid detection (Figure 2.9). Secondly, the model focuses on 
detection of potential fraud in an organisation. This is achieved by: 
  
 - 253 - 
i). creation of a catalogue of fraud symptoms; 
ii). translation of fraud symptoms into detection strategies;  
iii). design and development of a prototype; 
iv). experimentation with enterprise system data; and 
v). validation of prototype by an expert panel. 
 
In summary, this study contributes to the literature by developing a conceptual 
model for proactive detection of potential fraud in enterprise systems. 
 
Prior research on continuous auditing does not appear to deliver a model that allows 
an audit to be carried out proactively and continuously without difficulties (Hunton 
et al. 2004). Additional study is required to develop approaches of continuous 
auditing that are specifically applicable to auditing of financial transactions in 
enterprise systems. When considering an automated solution for proactive fraud 
detection, the focus has to be on questions that can be answered with the aid of 
computerised tools (Lanza 2007). Some questions are too subjective, for example, 
"Are the vendor's goods or services of good quality?" Any effort to develop an 
automated solution requires evidence that i) is documented in an enterprise systems 
audit trails, and ii) can be investigated using data analytics tools. The model 
developed in this study makes a contribution to proactive detection of potential 
billing fraud schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors. 
Detection methods are grouped into two categories:  i) critical combinations of user 
activities; and ii) known fraud symptoms.  
 
Many frauds occur because fraudsters exploit the lack of internal controls or they 
may override existing internal controls that are poorly implemented. Users with the 
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ability to violate segregation of duties are in a position to perpetrate fraud. 
Identifying these users is an important first step. Subsequent further analysis of the 
activities performed by these offending users may be helpful in identifying 
potentially fraudulent activities. For example, a user that creates or modifies a vendor 
master record should not be able to enter an invoice. Having this capability does not 
indicate that a fraud has taken place, but it does create an opportunity for a fraud to 
be perpetrated. By detecting these critical combinations of user activities i) an auditor 
can further investigate transactions that match known fraud symptoms, or appear 
otherwise anomalous, and ii) an organisation can take steps to correct the situation 
thereby reducing the possibility of future fraud. This study contributes a catalogue of 
methods to detect symptoms of known frauds schemes (Table 3.2) and data sources 
required to detect these fraud symptoms in the SAP enterprise system (Table 4.1 and 
Figures 4.3 to 4.9). SAP audit trails provide detailed descriptions of functions 
performed by each user.  Every SAP function has a unique transaction code (t-code) 
associated with it. Critical combinations may be identified by examining t-codes of 
functions performed by users.  This study contributes a list of t-codes pertinent to 
each of the SoDs principles previously discussed (Tables 4.2 to 4.4). Users that 
perform these combinations are identified as having violated segregation of duties 
principles. Their activities require further investigation to determine whether they 
match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. This study 
contributes a catalogue of known fraud symptoms that informs this process 
(Table 4.5). Further contributions include design specifications and algorithms for 
proactive detection of potential fraud as discussed in section 4.5.   
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Enterprise system audit logs are not enabled by default. Furthermore, they may be 
turned off at any time to conserve storage space (SAP-AG 2009). Any system 
designed to detect potential fraud may be rendered ineffective should audit logs be 
disabled or turned off. An important contribution is that the model developed for this 
study uses actual enterprise system transaction data for detection of potential fraud, 
instead on relying on system generated audit logs. In doing so it avoids situations 
where audit logs may be turned off. 
 
In summary, this study makes a contribution by developing a model for proactive 
detection of potential billing fraud schemes involving shell companies and non-
accomplice vendors. It contributes a catalogue of methods to detect symptoms of 
known frauds schemes and data sources required to detect these fraud symptoms in 
SAP. It also contributes a list of transaction codes required to detect violation of each 
of the principles of segregation of duties and known fraud symptoms in SAP. Further 
contributions include design specifications and algorithms for proactive detection of 
potential fraud in SAP.  
 
Research is required in the development of innovative approaches to continuous 
fraud detection in organisations that use enterprise systems, and to demonstrate how 
this can be done efficiently and effectively (Rezaee et al. 2002). Information 
overload from alerts when implementing continuous fraud detection systems (Alles 
et al. 2008 ; Alles et al. 2006 ; Kuhn and Sutton 2006) appears to be a problem. 
Integrity of the data used for continuous fraud detection is of concern (Kuhn Jr and 
Sutton 2010).  Enterprise systems generate hundreds of thousands to millions of 
transactions annually. While most of these are legal and routine transactions, a small 
number may be fraudulent. The enormous amount of generated transactions makes it 
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difficult to find these few instances among legitimate transactions. For a large 
organisation, this means monitoring hundreds of thousands of transactions and then 
investigating suspicious ones in depth at considerable expense. The problem 
becomes overwhelming and is growing worse (Chang et al. 2007). One approach is 
to use visualisation to present information graphically (Fetaji 2011 ; Liang and 
Miranda 2001).   
 
Visualisation is a general term used to describe any technology that enable users to 
'see' information in order to help them better understand and put it in an appropriate  
context (TechTarget 2010 ; GraphViz 2010).  Visualisation tools go beyond the 
standard charts and graphs, displaying data in more sophisticated ways such as dials 
and gauges, heat maps, tree maps and detailed bar and pie charts. Patterns, trends and 
correlations that might go undetected in text-based data can be exposed and 
recognised easier with visualisation.  
 
This study makes a contribution to literature by developing and implementing 
methods for visualising user activities in an enterprise system's transaction data. 
These visualisation methods serve to reduce the problem of information overload by 
presenting voluminous information graphically. For large organisations that generate 
an enormous amount of information daily, of which only a small percentage may be 
fraudulent, these visualisation methods may assist in highlighting suspicious 
activities with minimal effort. 
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6.2.2. Contributions to the practice of fraud detection 
In practice, this study makes contributions by developing prototype software for 
detection of potential fraud. The prototype is an implementation of the concepts 
discussed in the theoretical contributions above. The intention is to improve auditor 
productivity developing software to support the auditing function in an effective and 
efficient way. 
 
Visualisation is an important aspect in reducing information overload.  The prototype 
produces a combination of user- and vendor-centric reports and visualisations. A 
Fraud Analytics Dashboard provides a high-level overview of activities performed 
in the system (Figure A5.1). Transaction activities are summarised using pie and bar 
charts (Figure A5.32) and link node diagrams (Figure A5.12). These presentation 
methods augment standard reports produced by the prototype and support a reduction 
in information presented to an auditor.   
 
Another contribution is the practical implementation of Benford's Law. This law 
gives expected frequencies of digits in numerical data. Spikes may be indicative of 
potential fraud and require further investigation. The prototype analyses invoice and 
payment data and produces visualisations in the form of vertical bar charts. By 
plotting actual transaction data frequencies against Benford's expected frequencies, 
an auditor can visually inspect and identify anomalies promptly (Figure A5.32). 
The prototype's user-interface is web browser based. All user-interaction, including 
access to reports and visualisations, occur via the web browser. Usability is a main 
characteristic of the web browser interface as it ensures that the prototype is used for 
its intended purpose by its target audience efficiently and effectively. It provides a 
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simple, intuitive and user friendly interface that is easy to learn and use as most users 
are already familiar with. 
 
The prototype is developed as a stand-alone application and installed on a computer 
system independent of an organisation's enterprise system. Being independent 
ensures that an auditor can perform analytics at any time without requiring access to 
an enterprise system. Integrity of data used for the auditing process, as well as the 
process itself, is maintained as these tests are performed independently of an 
organisation and its employees. 
 
Feedback from the panel of experts indicate that the prototype is an improvement 
over basic analytical tools (such as Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, ACL, etc.) 
and results are produced in a much faster time than if done manually. They consider 
the prototype as being easy to use and user friendly. The dashboard and 
visualisations are especially useful in promptly identifying potentially fraudulent 
activities. Participants commented that visualisations enable identification of 
relationships or patterns in data that would otherwise be difficult in textual data. 
They stated that the prototype may potentially save costs and reduce future fraud by 
early detection of suspicious user activities. 
 
In summary, this study contributes prototype software to the practice of fraud 
detection. The prototype implements concepts such as the catalogue of fraud 
symptoms, visualisations and Benford's Law analysis to detect potential fraud in 
enterprise systems. Feedback from expert panel members and the case study 
organisation indicate that the prototype effectively and efficiently identifies 
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potentially fraudulent activities and that it improves auditor productivity. The 
following comment was received from Mr John Halliday, Executive Director 
Advisory - BDO, Australia. 
 
In general I found the general functionality of the tool to be useful. The 
user interface would require a minimal level of training and some 
level of understanding of the SAP application, which is a reasonable 
constraint. The graphs and visualisations clearly communicated a 
message for the reader. The speed of running the queries was 
impressive." 
 
As an exploratory study, the findings and contributions need to be considered within 
the limitations of the study. 
6.3. Limitations 
The first limitation of this study is that there is insufficient access to data to 
determine the level of fraud prevalent in organisations.  Many frauds that occur are 
handled quietly by the victim organisations as they are more concerned about the 
embarrassment of making frauds public and the costs associated with fraud 
investigations. Consequently, organisations with and without fraud experiences are 
not prepared to provide access to their transaction data. This situation is confirmed in 
a survey conducted by AuditNet (2011) where it was found that one of the 10 key 
challenges for data analytics is the difficulty of getting data to perform analyses. 
Therefore, the single case study approach was adopted for this study. Data from the 
same case was investigated to determine how it changed over time and whether these 
changes are indicative of potentially fraudulent activities. A concern often expressed 
with single case designs is the ability to generalise from a single case. Multiple case 
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designs are preferable as the evidence from multiple cases are considered more 
compelling (Yin 2009).  Several unsuccessful attempts were made to access more 
case studies. Limited access to organisations transaction data made it impractical to 
follow an inductive approach to the design of proactive fraud detection tools.  
 
The second limitation of this study is the generalisability of results is limited. The 
focus of this study is on a single category of occupational fraud, namely, asset 
misappropriation. Within asset misappropriation, the study focuses on billing fraud 
schemes involving shell companies and non-accomplice vendors in accounts 
payable. This limits identification of potential threats or frauds. Generalising the 
findings to other categories of fraud (such as accounts receivable) therefore must be 
made with caution. 
 
A third limitation of this study is that the prototype was validated by a limited 
number of experts. Twenty Certified Public Accountants, all members of CPA 
Australia (Queensland Division - IT Discussion Group) and ISACA7 (Queensland 
Chapter) participated in the expert panel. Three independent reviews were also 
conducted by auditing practitioners. The voluntary nature of participation may refer 
to a situation where only those interested in proactive fraud detection chose to 
attend. Comments and views expressed regarding validation of the prototype are 
based on feedback obtained from these experts. Generalisability of this feedback 
must therefore be made with caution. 
 
A fourth limitation of this study is that the prototype may incorrectly identify 
anomalous activities. Type I and Type II errors were discussed in Section 4.8.  
                                               
7 Information Systems Audit and Control Association 
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Failing to correctly profile users, identify users that violate segregation of duties, and 
identify anomalous vendor transactions, including unusual activities related to 
vendor payments, is of primary concern. Complete segregation of duties may not be 
feasible in organisations with small accounting sections. In these instances, the 
prototype may incorrectly identity legitimate activities as anomalous or vice versa. It 
is therefore necessary to evaluate output produced by the prototype in the context of 
the organisation being investigated. 
6.4. Recommendations  
This section identifies opportunities for future research. Such research is 
recommended to address the limitations of the current study and to justify further the 
applicability of the conceptual model developed in this study. 
6.4.1. Recommendations for further research 
There are a few issues that arise from this study which may provide opportunities for 
further research. Data collected for this study is limited to a single case. This is 
mainly due to organisations not being prepared to provide access to their transaction 
data. Future research could extend this study by replication in other organisations 
locally and internationally to test whether the same findings are observed or not. 
 
This study is limited to billing fraud schemes involving shell companies and non-
accomplice vendors within accounts payable thereby restricting generalisability of 
results. The ACFE fraud tree (ACFE 2010) provides a detailed classification of 
occupational fraud. Extending the focus of the catalogue of fraud symptoms and 
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fraud detection algorithms developed in this study to include other fraud schemes 
will extend identification of potential threats or frauds.  
 
A limited number of experts were involved in validation of the prototype. 
Participation was voluntary. To reduce possible bias from feedback, future research 
could extend this study by inviting and selecting experts from a wider group. A call 
for experts could be issued and the recruiting process could possibly be managed by 
an external organisation. Applications could be selected on the basis of criteria 
developed for the study. Additionally, a single panel session of 60 minutes was 
conducted in this study. Future research could extend this to multiple sessions, 
incorporating feedback from each of these sessions into the design of the conceptual 
model and prototype. Further independent reviews could also be commissioned to 
offer more diverse feedback and validation comments. 
 
The prototype may incorrectly identify anomalous activities due to Type I and Type 
II errors. Future research could incorporate organisational profiles within the 
prototype design. These profiles could be developed in conjunction multiple 
participating organisations and be based on their implementation of segregation of 
duties and internal control policies. A database of diverse profiles could be 
developed. By applying the relevant profile prior to performing data analytics, a 
reduction on Type I or Type II errors may possibly be observed. Further 
enhancements to the prototype to reduce potential errors and improve potential 
detection are discussed in Section 6.4.2. 
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An effective fraud risk management process has three objectives: prevention, 
detection and response (Albrecht et al. 2009 ; Romney and Steinbart 2009 ; Wells 
2008 ; KPMG 2006). The focus of this study is on fraud detection. An outcome 
identified in this study is that proactive fraud detection enables organisations to 
quickly and efficiently identify frauds that circumvent preventative measures and 
take appropriate corrective action thereby reducing the propensity for losses 
associated with future fraud. Expert panel members confirmed this outcome by 
commenting that the prototype could potentially reduce the propensity for future 
fraud due to early detection. This outcome is embodied in the conceptual model 
(Figure 3.3). Future research could collect and examine empirical data from 
organisations that implement proactive fraud detection software to determine the 
actual effect it has on occurrence of fraud. 
 
This study develops a Fraud Risk Index that determines the propensity for potential 
fraud occurring in an organisation being investigated. The value of the index is 
calculated from variables shown in Table 4.6. The following formula is used to 
calculate the index.  
 
FRAUD RISK INDEX  = riskyusers + vendsharingbank + vendmultibank + 
 vendbankchanges +  beninv + benpmt + rinv + rpmt 
 
Weights assigned to variables are based on estimates of the importance of individual 
variables and by defining ranges within variables. By replicating this study in 
multiple organisations, future research could collect empirical evidence on the 
accuracy of the index and use this evidence to adjust values of weights. This may 
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improve accuracy of prediction. The calculated result is a value out of 10.  The index 
is intended to create awareness of the potential of fraud occurring in an organisation; 
however, individual circumstances within an organisation must be considered when 
basing decisions on this value. 
 
Fraud, by it very nature, does not lend itself to being measured very accurately due to 
its clandestine nature (ACFE 2010). Any measurement of fraud is at best an estimate. 
Although this study recognised underlying factors that motivate an individual to 
commit fraud, it did not examine empirical evidence to confirm the relationship 
between these factors and perpetration of fraud. Future research could examine these 
factors to determine behavioural aspects of an organisation's employees and its 
influence on fraud. It is these underlying factors that create opportunities for 
committing fraud in organisations.  
 
6.4.2. Recommendations for extensions to prototype 
The prototype developed in this research is intended to address the primary research 
question by providing evidence that "a generalised model for proactive detection of 
potential fraud in enterprise systems can be developed". Such a prototype is meant to 
demonstrate that the "concept of proactive fraud detection" is feasible in practice. It 
is a limited version meant for showcasing the concept and for testing purposes only.  
 
Audit trails maintained in a SAP enterprise system form the basis of the fraud 
detection process. Accordingly, the integrity of these audit trails is of vital 
importance in assessing usefulness and accuracy of the detection process. System 
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and security administrators have the capability to create and/or maintain users. They 
may create fake users and act in their name. Users identified through the fraud 
detection process must be investigated by an auditor to determine whether they are 
real or not.  
 
Fraudsters may be aware of the implementation of a fraud detection system in an 
organisation and hence be cautious of having their activities monitored. 
Consequently, there is the threat of collusion between users. In this scenario no one 
user performs all required tasks to perpetrate a fraud, making it difficult to identify 
potential fraud. They may also use a combination of fraud perpetration methods.  The 
prototype is capable of identifying multiple users performing transactions on the 
same vendor; however, it does not conclusively detect collusion.  The obligation is 
on an auditor to further investigate activities of users identified through this process.  
 
Every installation of SAP is unique due to its modular architecture (refer to 
Section 2.9). The financial and controlling sub-system (FICO) is common across all 
SAP installations. The prototype makes no assumption about individual SAP 
installations. It relies exclusively on transaction data obtained from the FICO sub-
system. Extending the prototype to operate on additional sub-systems may improve 
effectiveness. 
 
The scope of fraud detection may be broadened to incorporate other sub-systems 
including accounts receivable (AR), general ledger (GL), sales and distribution (SD), 
materials management (MM) and human resources (HR). This requires extending the 
database of critical combinations and known fraud symptoms to incorporate 
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transaction codes and rules pertinent to these areas. A desirable extension would be 
to identify possible collusion between users across functional areas in an 
organisation. This could be achieved by tracking associations between users and 
vendors in a Collusion database.  Additionally, incorporating data from the human 
resources (HR) sub-system would facilitate matching of vendor details with 
employee details. Unless employees are paid as vendors, there should be no match. 
Furthermore, vendor address details may be validated with online business address 
databases to ensure legitimacy.  
 
A concept relevant to the analysis of user activity is the 'role' of a user in an 
organisation. The prototype could be extended to provide an optional user roles 
feature. The 'role' of each user (such as accounts payable clerk, payroll clerk, SAP 
support, accounts receivable clerk) could be maintained in a Settings database. 
Reporting facilities could be made available which focus on differences in profiles 
among users performing the same role in an organisation.   
 
Masquerading occurs when a fraudster logs in to an enterprise system as a target 
user, using their user identification and password. The fraudster may act in the name 
of the target user, and perform vendor maintenance or accounting transactions.  
Where the target user has elevated privileges, the intruder may use system utilities to 
modify the security characteristics of the system, such as adding new users, changing 
passwords and inflating privileges.  Browsing refers to attempts by authorised users 
to obtain private information (such as user-ids) to assist in the above methods, or to 
perform unauthorised functions, such as accessing sensitive transaction data, 
changing user privileges, printing or displaying transaction and vendor data (Best et 
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al. 2004). Anomalous computer workstation usage may be indicative of 
masquerading or browsing attempts described above. This may be indicative of 
potential fraud. The prototype could be extended to maintain a Settings database 
defining sets of incompatible workstations and to report on users who access 
multiple workstations in a specified period.  
 
Data extraction is a manual process requiring a user with elevated SAP privileges to 
perform an extraction. A desirable extension to the prototype would be to automate 
the data extraction process. This may be achieved by developing ABAP programs 
that run within a SAP system or by using third-party applications such as Direct 
Link for SAP from ACL. Automating data selection and extraction will enhance data 
access, analysis, and reporting capabilities of the prototype. 
 
It is envisaged that an auditor may wish to investigate a group of users who have 
been associated with anomalous activity during a given period. Apart from 
monitoring their activities during the period under review, the auditor may wish to 
look back at actions during other earlier periods. The prototype does provide limited 
archiving of audit trails for a period of one year. A desirable extension to the system 
would be to provide an optional archiving and retrieval feature. Such a facility 
would require an auditor to specify the retention period for audit trails and provide 
the ability to retrieve and analyse records for a specified time period.  
Figure 6.1 illustrates an extended model of the prototype. The proposed optional 
features in such a system are: 
 
i) access to online business directories for vendor address validation; 
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ii) extended critical combinations and known fraud symptoms databases 
incorporating additional t-codes and rule-sets; 
iii) multiple workstation monitoring; 
iv) user role monitoring; 
v) automated data extraction; and 
vi) archiving and retrieval of audit trails. 
 
From the preceding discussion it can be noted that several research opportunities 
exist for extending the prototype. Research is also recommended to justify further the 
applicability of audit trail analysis for proactive fraud detection, to assess the 
potential application of data visualisation to expose patterns of activity, and to gauge 
the potential social impact of monitoring user activity. These opportunities are 
discussed below. 
Visualisation for fraud detection 
The eye processes information more efficiently when presented as images as opposed 
to textual information. As our instincts develop over time so does our ability to 
process complex concepts through visual identification. By representing information 
spatially and with images, humans are able to grasp its meaning, to group similar 
ideas and to connect it with prior knowledge effortlessly. Using illustrations or 
diagrams to represent large amounts of information facilitates easier understanding 
and helps reveal patterns and relationships (Pashler et al. 2008). 
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Figure 6.1:  Model of extended prototype 
Note: Extensions recommended are shaded 
  
 - 270 - 
Visualisation facilitates investigation of large data sets and makes it possible to find 
new trends, patterns and threats that would otherwise take hours or days using 
conventional techniques. While the size of transaction data-sets continues to grow 
exponentially, tools and techniques to visualise and discover what is in the data has 
not significantly changed. 
 
The complex nature of fraud and other 'white-collar' crimes requires visualisation 
tools that can view and leverage the enormous amount of information being 
generated in this digital age. Thousands of transactions daily generate thousands of 
lines of data in an enterprise system. Hidden among these gigabytes of data may 
possibly be fraudulent transactions that are near impossible to detect. Forensic 
analysts and auditors need as much assistance as they can get to find these threats. 
Previous attempts at visualisation have yielded limited success having relied mainly 
on finding one-to-one relationships between entities (Marane 2008).  
 
This study has demonstrated some, albeit limited, use of visualisation to detect fraud. 
Feedback from expert panel members indicated that visualisations were especially 
useful in promptly identifying anomalies. Further research is recommended on the 
potential use of visualisation for fraud detection. 
Analysis of EFTPOS transactions 
EFTPOS transactions are a special type of accounting transaction. These are 
transactions initiated by customers of financial institutions to deposit or withdraw 
cash from savings or cheque accounts, to transfer funds between accounts or to make 
payments to suppliers of goods or services. They are conducted using an automatic 
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teller machine (ATM) linked to the financial institution's computer system or another 
EFTPOS terminal on a supplier's premises. Authorisation for these transactions is 
established by the customer having an appropriate transaction card in their 
possession and knowing the personal identification number (PIN). While the 
EFTPOS system is used heavily throughout the financial community, there is 
widespread concern regarding the extent of transaction card fraud. Theft of cards or 
use of fake cards, coupled with PIN guessing techniques, is of major concern to 
financial institutions. In 2010, fraud perpetrated on Australian issued payment 
instruments exceeded $211 million (ACPA 2011). EFTPOS scams are regularly 
reported in the press (ABCNews 2010 ; WAToday 2009).  
Social implications of audit trail analysis 
Organisations are increasingly using technology with policy to monitor and manage 
employees' productivity and to minimise litigation, security and other risks (AMA 
2007). Whilst the IT department may most frequently be responsible for the 
monitoring, their main concern is that employees are not abusing resources such as e-
mail or downloading large files from the Internet (D'Agostino 2006). Managers, on 
the other hand usually want to monitor what their staff are doing. That kind of 
monitoring may create a stressful work environment, which may lead to higher staff 
turnover, job dissatisfaction and erosion of trust between employee and employer. 
 
Employers justify electronic monitoring as promoting business interests. Yet the 
practice raises concerns from all areas of society, business organisations, employee 
interest groups, lawyers, and civil libertarians.  Each group cites economic, legal and 
ethical rationales in support of their position. No argument, however, is conclusive 
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and each raises important managerial and moral issues (Young 2011 ; Riedy and 
Wen 2010 ; Nancherla 2008). 
 
A primary concern may be the possible impact on individuals who are wrongly 
accused by a software tool that is merely applying rules and procedures to identify 
patterns of activity. The limitations of the system and its output may be poorly 
understood by an auditor. The targeted user may have limited opportunities to prove 
their innocence. Safeguards are needed to protect the rights of individuals in such 
cases. In the case of the prototype, proper education of auditors and users are crucial 
for the effective use and interpretation of its output. Further research is recommended 
on the potential social impact of audit trail analysis. 
6.5. Conclusion 
Australia has an estimated $3 billion per year financial fraud problem that continues 
to worsen (Standards Australia 2008). Enhancing the ability of organisations to 
detect potential fraud may have a positive impact on the economy. An effective 
model that facilitates proactive detection of potential fraud may potentially save costs 
and reduce the propensity of future fraud by early detection of suspicious user 
activities.  
 
Enterprise systems generate hundreds of thousands to millions of transactions 
annually. While most of these are legal and routine transactions, a small number may 
be fraudulent. The enormous amount of generated transactions makes it difficult to 
find these few instances among legitimate transactions. Without the availability of 
proactive fraud detection tools, investigating suspicious activities becomes 
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overwhelming. The prototype developed in this study may assist auditors in detecting 
potential fraud by retrospective monitoring of enterprise system audit trails and 
reporting these using an intuitive visual interface. Violations in segregation of duties 
may be identified by analysing audit trails for critical combinations of user activities. 
Potentially fraudulent transactions may be identified by investigating user activities 
that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise 
anomalous.  
 
The prototype may be a valuable tool to organisations with large-scale 
implementations of enterprise systems as it automates routine data analytics thereby 
improving auditor productivity and reducing time taken to identify potential fraud.  
 
This research has demonstrated the feasibility of implementing proactive detection of 
potential fraud in enterprise systems. 
ooOoo 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Fraud cases 
 
1. Changes in vendor bank details 
A member of staff employed in a finance post exploited access to and knowledge of 
the supplier database and payment systems to create a new supplier record including 
a new bank account which appeared to relate to a satellite site for an existing supplier 
(though it was actually one for a similarly named company registered by the 
employee) and to raise and pay two illegitimate invoices for circa £81K to the newly 
registered bank account. In addition it is believed that the staff member inadvertently 
changed the bank account details of the original supplier and caused two legitimate 
payments intended for the original supplier to be redirected to the newly registered 
bank account. These redirected payments totalled £9.2 million. The failure of these to 
reach the intended recipient caused enquiries to be made which brought the matter to 
light (UK Treasury 2006). 
2. Duplicate invoices 
During a routine meeting with numerous employees the newly appointed internal 
auditor at a dental supply wholesaler discovered that one of the accounting clerks 
handled invoice processing as well as the occasional overpayment received in the 
mail. This was clearly a breach of security and needed immediate attention. Further 
investigation revealed that Veronica, the accounting clerk in question, was 
processing certain invoices twice. When confronted, she confessed and admitted that 
her favourite target was her employer's largest supplier, a dental appliance 
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manufacturer that printed its simple invoices in black ink on plain paper. When she 
required money she made a copy of the manufacturers invoice before stamping the 
original. The two were almost indistinguishable. Then she would process the first 
invoice, send it for approval, and process the invoice again in a few days using the 
copy she had made. The company would pay the bill twice. When the supplier 
realised the overpayment, it sent a refund cheque that landed on Veronica's desk, 
which she took home, got her husband to forge the company's endorsement with a 
specially made rubber stamp and deposited the cheque into his business account. In 
less than two years Veronica had embezzled more than US$250,000 (Wells 2002b). 
3. Fake vendor 
The IIA San Francisco Chapter (1993) reported a case of non-existent vendor fraud. 
In this instance there was no verification of existing vendors and cheques were 
returned to the requesting sales people for delivery to vendors. The audit findings 
showed that the sales manager had stolen US$430,000 by means of cheques written 
to non-existent vendors and diverted to his bank account (Vanasco 1998). 
4. Fake invoices 
A secretary for a public company interceded on behalf of an unpaid legitimate 
vendor and the accounts payable department could not locate the original invoice, it 
nonetheless agreed to pay the vendor based on a fax copy. The secretary seized this 
opportunity and together with two non-employee accomplices set up three phony 
companies, and submitted fax copies of doctored original invoices for "consulting 
fees". The fraud was discovered when a manager questioned a huge variation in the 
budget – but not until four years and US$1.7 million later (Wells 2004).  
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5. Shell Companies (with address same as employee) 
A creative writer at a large advertising company opened a business account in the 
name of SJR Enterprises (a title reflecting his initials), operating from his girlfriends 
address.  He printed an invoice in the name of SJR Enterprises on his home 
computer. He then colluded with his girlfriend, who worked in the accounting 
department of the same firm, and following her instructions, billed their employer for 
US$4,900 for "services performed under contract 15-822," a description similar to 
that found on many other invoices. The amount was chosen because the company 
rarely scrutinised invoices for amounts less than US$5,000. The girlfriend then 
created a new vendor file and phony documents to go with it. Once SJR Enterprises 
was recorded as a vendor, the girlfriend simply put the invoice into a stack of much 
larger invoices for processing and payment. The scheme worked so well that the pair 
tried it numerous times successfully. Ultimately the pair defrauded the company of 
almost US$700,000 over two years before the scheme was discovered by internal 
auditing (Wells 2002a). 
6. Security firm boss pleads guilty to $1.4 million fraud 
(from: National Business Review, 27 January 2011) 
The general manager of an Auckland security equipment supplier has been sentenced 
to three years and three months in jail after pleading guilty to Serious Fraud Office 
charges involving a $1.4 million fraud. 
 
Martyn Tewsley Scott, 51, used his access to National Fire and Security's accounting 
system to transfer $1.4 million to his own bank accounts and pay personal invoices 
amounting to $6,243. 
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Seven charges were laid by the SFO in September, relating to accessing a computer 
for dishonest purpose. Scott worked at the Penrose-based firm for six years. 
 
The SFO said Scott committed the fraud by diverting genuine supplier invoices to his 
bank account – preventing creditors from being paid, and making double-paying 
genuine invoices, with he second payment going to one of his bank accounts. He also 
created false supplier invoices to support other payments covertly paid to his bank 
account. Scott's early guilty plea and a repayment of almost $700,000 to National 
Fire and Security were taken in to account in the sentencing today. 
 
Yesterday, an employee from an air conditioning company in Gore plead guilty to 
six SFO charges relating to the theft of $600 thousand. John William Jackson, 61, 
tapped into the computer system of air conditioning company Aire Res-Comm, 
where he was a director, to divert $604,779.87 into his own account over a three-year 
period. (Bond 2011) 
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Appendix 2: Expert panel protocol 
 
Expert Protocol 
Validation of Fraud Detection Prototype 
Moderator: ____________________ Date: _________________ 
No. of Participants: __________ Time: _________________ 
Assistant: ______________________ Venue: _____________________ 
Ask participants to arrive 10-15 minutes early for registration. Room must be set up at 
least 30 minutes prior (incl. all equipment installation and testing). Each participant will 
be welcomed by the moderator. Tea and coffee to be served. 
 
Stage 1: Greeting and Introduction by Moderator - 5 minutes  
§ Purpose: Welcome participants and express appreciation  
§ Things to include in welcome: 
- Introduce self – first name basis 
- Introduce the purpose of the group meeting 
 
Stage 2: Utilities -  2 minutes (combined 7 minutes) 
§ Purpose: Set the stage for the session 
- Confidentiality: highlight definition of confidentiality in the context of 
the study and information being provided by the group 
- Recording: highlight presence of audio/video recording equipment 
§ Script: These sessions are being recorded in order to gain the 
maximum  information from the comments you make. The 
recordings will be used  only in strict confidentiality. Your 
comments will only be used for improvement of the prototype 
developed for this study.  
 
- Observers/assistant: highlight their purpose, introduce them, assure 
confidentiality  
 
Stage 3: Icebreaker - 2 minutes (combined 9 minutes)  
§ Purpose: Preliminary fun question that every one can relate to. Develops rapport, 
comfort, and an initial relationship.  
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- Allow chatter, then quickly refocus without talking over anyone.  
 
Stage 4: Introduce Research Study  - 10 minutes (combined 19 minutes)  
§ Purpose: introduce the research study 
- PowerPoint presentation  
§ background to the study 
§ work accomplished thus far in the study 
§ demonstrate the prototype– inform participants that they will 
have an opportunity to individually use the software 
 
Stage 5: Hands-On Session - 20 minutes (combined 39 minutes) 
§ Purpose: users get an opportunity to use the software – moderator interacts with 
individuals during this session 
 
Stage 6: Feedback/Discussion Session 12 minutes (combined 51 minutes) 
§ Purpose: users discuss their experience and provide feedback on the software 
- Inform users that they are evaluating software on ; operation, reporting 
and visualisations, accuracy & efficiency, and impact on auditor 
productivity. 
 
Stage 7: Summary - 5 minutes (combined 56 minutes) 
§ Purpose: summarise pertinent points noted in the discussion – ensures no points 
have been overlooked 
 
Stage 8: Closing thank participants 4 minutes (combined 60 minutes) 
§ Purpose: express appreciation  
- Things to include:  
§ Emphasise the importance of their comments  
§ Assure that their ideas will count towards refining the software  
§ Communicate that results will be made available  
§ Dismiss participants with a big Thank You  
 
Stage 9: Wrap up 20-30 minutes 
§ Purpose: collect materials  
- Ensure that all materials and recordings are collected  
- Ensure venue is in a tidy state and all equipment returned 
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Appendix 3: Prototype evaluation questionnaire 
 
 
 
EVALUATION OF PROTOTYPE FRAUD DETECTION 
SOFTWARE 
 
Dear Respondent: Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. This 
software is in the prototype stage and your feedback and comments will assist in 
improving it. Some features may not yet be implemented. 
 
Demographic Information (x all that apply) 
 
Are you a: CPA ¨ IT Professional ¨ Other  
Member of: ISACA ¨ CISA ¨ Other  
 
(Please S one option only) 
# Item 1  Rating 7 
  Strongly  Strongly  
Disagree Agree 
1. Operation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.1 Easy to use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.2 User-friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.3 Navigation of user interface is simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.4 Onscreen instructions/ help is adequate  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.5 Data entry is straightforward 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
2. Reports        
2.1 Easy to understand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.2 Contains adequate information  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.3 Helpful in identifying potential fraud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2.4 Are an important tool in a fraud investigators 
toolkit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
3. Visualisations (charts & diagrams)        
3.1 Easy to understand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.2 Useful in aggregating an enormous amount of 
information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.3 Enables effective exploration of data in a 
graphical format  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.4 Enables identification of relationships or 
patterns in data that are otherwise difficult to 
do in textual data 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.5 Enhances investigation and analysis for 
potential fraud 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.6 Are a innovative way of presenting 
information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3.7 Are an important tool in a fraud investigators 
toolkit 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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4. Auditor Productivity 
(Assume 30 000 transactions during period of 
review) 
       
 Question 4.1 is based on person days (U= impractical) 
4.1 How long would it take to review for fraud, if 
done… 
       
 Manually <1 1 3 5 10 20+ U 
 Using other software, e.g. MS Access, MS 
Excel, ACL, etc. 
<1 1 3 5 10 20+ U 
 Using this software, give an estimate <1 1 3 5 10 20+ U 
         
4.2 Based on your response to 4.1, this software 
may reduce time taken to identify potential 
fraud in an organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
5. Accuracy, Efficiency and Performance        
5.1 Produces quality results that are useful in 
identifying potential fraud 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
 
 
 
# Item 1  Rating 7 
  Strongly  Strongly  
Disagree Agree 
5.2 Results are  accurate and dependable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.3 Produces the same results as a human expert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.4 Generates results much faster than doing a 
similar task manually 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.5 Is an improvement over basic analysis as it 
replaces blind querying of data with 
contextual analysis 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.6 Significantly enhances the internal auditing 
process 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5.7 Potential to save costs due to improved fraud 
detection 
       
5.8 Potential to reduce future fraud by early 
detection of suspect user activity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
6. Overall Evaluation        
6.1 This software represents substantial advances 
over other tools currently available in the 
market 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.2 If available,  I am likely to use this software 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.3 If available,  I am likely to recommend this 
software to others 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6.4 Overall, this software is a useful auditing tool  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
7. Comments        
7.1 Features of the software you found useful 
  
  
  
  
7.2 Features of the software that could be improved 
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7.3 Suggest any additional features to include in the software 
  
  
  
  
7.4 Do you currently use a software tool for 
auditing? 
Yes ¨ No  ¨ 
 If Yes, please provide details below 
  
  
  
7.5 Other comments 
  
  
  
7.6 Optional: Should you wish to receive more information on this software or 
research please complete contact information 
    
 Name:   
    
 Email:   
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire 
© K Singh 
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Appendix 4: Prototype menu navigation 
 
 
Figure A4.1: Start-up screen 
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Figure A4. 2: Accounts payable summary menu 
 
 
Figure A4. 3: User profiles menu 
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Figure A4. 4: Critical combinations menu 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 5: User activity analysis menu 
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 Figure A4. 6: Detailed user activity analysis menu 
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Figure A4. 7: User activity reports menu 
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Figure A4. 8: Vendor analysis menu 
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Figure A4. 9: Analyse vendor transactions menu 
  
 - 303 - 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 10: Analysis of vendor transactions (reports) menu 
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Figure A4. 11: Search vendor menu 
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Figure A4. 12: Configure system menu 
 
 
Figure A4. 13: Set date range for analysis menu 
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Figure A4. 14: Set approval limit for invoices & payments menu 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 15: File processing menu 
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Figure A4. 16: Data conversion &  import menu 
 
 
Figure A4. 17: Update/create data warehouse selection screen 
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Appendix 5: Results from test data 
Period of analysis: 01/12/2003 to 31/12 2003 (1 Month) 
 
Analysis procedures 
User profiles Users are profiled to determine the scope of activities they 
have performed. Activities include vendor maintenance, 
invoicing and payment transactions. Summary and detailed 
reports are produced. 
Critical 
combinations 
Users that violate segregation of duties are identified and a 
report of potentially risky users is produced. 
User activity 
analysis 
An individual user is identified from the risky users list and 
selected for detailed investigation. Reports documenting 
individual user activities are produced. 
Vendor analysis A series of investigations are performed on active vendors, 
including vendors sharing bank accounts, vendors with 
multiple bank accounts, vendors with multiple master records, 
and Benford's law. 
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Figure A5.1: Dashboard 
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User profiling 
 
Figure A5. 2: User activities summary 
 
 
Figure A5. 3: User profile – vendor maintenance 
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Figure A5. 4: User profile – invoice transactions 
 
 
Figure A5. 5: User profile – payment transactions 
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Figure A5. 6: User profile – invoices or payment transactions 
 
 
 
Figure A5. 7: User profile – all combinations 
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Figure A5. 8: Visualisation – all combinations 
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Critical combinations 
 
 
Figure A5. 9: Violation of SoDs – users entering invoices and payments 
 
 
Figure A5. 10: Visualisation - users entering invoices and payments 
 
 
 
Figure A5. 11: Violation of SoDs – users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering invoices
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Figure A5. 12: Visualisation - users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering invoices 
 
 
 
Figure A5. 13: Violation of SoDs – users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering payments 
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Figure A5. 14: Visualisation - users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering payments 
 
 
 
Figure A5. 15: Violation of SoDs – users performing vendor maintenance,  
entering invoices and payments 
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Figure A5. 16: Visualisation - users performing vendor maintenance,  
entering invoices and payments 
 
 
User activity analysis 
Investigation of user: 1USRARSCP 
 
 
Figure A5. 17: Bank account changes by user - 1USRARSCP 
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Figure A5. 18: Invoice transactions by user - 1USRARSCP 
 
 
Figure A5. 19: Payment transactions by user - 1USRARSCP 
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Figure A5. 20: Round dollar payments by user - 1USRARSCP 
 
 
Figure A5. 21: Vendors touched by user - 1USRARSCP 
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Figure A5. 22: Visualisation – vendors touched by user - 1USRARSCP 
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Figure A5. 23: User 1USRARSCP interacting with vendor 0002000041 
 
  
 - 322 - 
Vendor analysis 
 
 
Figure A5. 24: Vendors sharing bank accounts  
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Figure A5. 25: Visualisation - vendors sharing bank accounts  
 
  
 - 324 - 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5. 26: Vendors with multiple bank accounts  
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Figure A5. 27: Visualisation - vendors having multiple bank accounts  
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Figure A5. 28: Vendors with multiple changes 
to their bank accounts  
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Figure A5. 29: Vendors with multiple master records  
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Figure A5. 30: Top 5 vendors by sum of invoices  
 
 
 
 
Figure A5. 31: Top 5 vendors by sum of payments  
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Figure A5. 32: Benford's Law – analysis of vendor invoices  
 
 
 
Figure A5. 33: Benford's Law – investigation of spike at digit 49  
  
 - 330 - 
 
 
Figure A5. 34: Benford's Law – analysis of vendor payments  
 
 
Figure A5. 35: Benford's Law – investigation of spike at digit 22 
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Figure A5. 36: Transaction history for vendor – showing flipping  
 
 
Figure A5. 37: Visualisation - users interacting with vendor  
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Figure A5. 38: Visualisation – vendor transaction history 
  
 - 333 - 
Appendix 6: Results from case study 1a 
Actual data from large international manufacturing company 
Period of analysis : 01/01/2011 to 30/06/2011 (6 Months) 
 
Analysis procedures 
User profiles Users are profiled to determine the scope of activities they 
have performed. Activities include vendor maintenance, 
invoicing and payment transactions. Summary and detailed 
reports are produced. 
Critical 
combinations 
Users that violate segregation of duties are identified and a 
report of potentially risky users is produced. 
User activity 
analysis 
An individual user is identified from the risky users list and 
selected for detailed investigation. Reports documenting 
individual user activities are produced. 
Vendor analysis A series of investigations are performed on active vendors, 
including vendors sharing bank accounts, vendors with 
multiple bank accounts, vendors with multiple master records, 
and Benford's law. 
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Figure A6.1: Dashboard 
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User profiling 
 
Figure A6. 2: User activities summary 
 
 
Figure A6. 3: User profile – vendor maintenance 
  
 - 336 - 
 
 
Figure A6. 4: User profile – invoice transactions 
 
 
Figure A6. 5: User profile – payment transactions
  
 - 337 - 
 
 
Figure A6. 6: User profile – invoices or payment transactions 
 
 
Figure A6. 7: User profile – all combinations 
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Figure A6. 8: Visualisation – all combinations 
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Critical combinations 
 
Figure A6. 9: Violation of SoDs – users entering invoices and payments 
 
 
Figure A6. 10: Violation of SoDs – users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering invoices 
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Figure A6. 11: Visualisation - users entering invoices and payments 
 
 
Figure A6. 12: Visualisation - users performing vendor maintenance   
and entering invoices 
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Figure A6. 13: Violation of SoDs – users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering payments 
 
 
Figure A6. 14: Violation of SoDs – users performing vendor maintenance,  
entering invoices and payments 
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Figure A6. 15: Visualisation - users performing vendor maintenance  
and entering payments 
 
 
Figure A6. 16: Visualisation - users performing vendor maintenance,  
entering invoices and payments 
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Vendor analysis 
 
Figure A6. 17: Vendors sharing bank accounts  
 
 
Figure A6. 18: Vendors with multiple bank accounts 
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Figure A6. 19: Visualisation - vendors sharing bank accounts  
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Figure A6. 20: Visualisation - vendors having multiple bank accounts  
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Figure A6. 21: Vendors with multiple changes 
to their bank accounts  
 
 
 
Figure A6. 22: Vendors with multiple master records  
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Figure A6. 23: Top 5 vendors by sum of invoices  
 
 
Figure A6. 24: Top 5 vendors by sum of payments  
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Figure A6. 25: Benford's Law – analysis of vendor invoices 
 
 
Figure A6. 26: Benford's Law – investigation of spike at digit 36 
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Figure A6. 27: Benford's Law – analysis of vendor payments  
 
Figure A6. 28: Benford's Law – investigation of spike at digit 22 
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Appendix 7: Results from case study 1b  
Actual data from large international manufacturing company 
Period of analysis : 01/06/2011 to 07/06/2011 (7 days) 
 
Figure A7.1: Dashboard 
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Figure A7. 2: User activities summary 
 
 
 
Figure A7. 3: Risky user list 
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Figure A7. 4: Benford's Law – analysis of vendor invoices 
 
 
 
 
Figure A7. 5: Benford's Law – analysis of vendor payments  
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Appendix 8: Data extraction 
 
Tables and fields required for data extraction 
Table A8.1: SAP tables and field requirements 
 
CDHDR  CDPOS 
MANDANT Client  MANDANT Client 
OBJECTCLAS Change doc. Object  OBJECTCLAS Change doc. object 
OBJECTID Object Value  OBJECTID Object value 
CHANGENR Document Number  CHANGENR Document Number 
USERNAME Name  TABNAME Table Name 
UDATE Date  TABKEY Table Key 
UTIME Time  FNAME Field Name 
TCODE Transaction Code  CHNGIND Change ID 
 
BKPF  BSEG 
MANDANT Client  MANDANT Client 
BUKRS Company Code  BUKRS Company Code 
BELNR Document Number  BELNR Document Number 
GJAHR Fiscal Year  GJAHR Fiscal Year 
BLART Document Type 
 
AUGBL 
Clearing Document 
Number 
BLDAT Document Date  BSCHL Posting Key 
BUDAT Posting Date  SHKZG Debit / Credit Indicator 
MONAT Posting Period  WRBTR Amount 
CPUDT Entry Date  HKONT G/L Account 
CPUTM Entry Time  KUNNR Customer Number 
USNAM User Name  LIFNR Vendor Number 
TCODE Transaction Code  
   
LFA1  
MANDT Client  
LIFNR Vendor Number  
ERDAT Created On  
ERNAM Created By  
NAME1 Name   
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Summary extraction process 
Table A8.2: Summary data extraction procedure 
Enter table name for extraction and 
click on Enter. 
 
 
è 
In the following screen click on 
Settings > Format List > Choose 
Fields. Deselect all fields and just 
select the required fields. Click on 
Transfer.  
 
In the following screen check 
Number of Entries. Set Maximum 
No. of Hits (default is 200). Click 
Execute. 
 
è 
Export the file for external analysis. 
Click System > List > Save > Local 
File.  
 
  
 - 355 - 
 
Choose unconverted format to save 
file. Click Enter. 
 
è 
Enter directory and file name. Click 
Generate. 
 
 
Table extraction 
Table A8.3: SAP table extraction documentation 
Step Table Procedure Description Complete Sign. 
1 BKPF SE16 
Enter table name 
 
Display Table 
Contents (Enter) 
 
Settings > Format List 
> Choose Fields 
Select fields (as shown 
in field requirements, 
section 7.2) 
 
Check Number of 
Entries 
Set Maximum No. of 
Hits 
 
Enter filter parameters, 
e.g. Document Date, 
Fiscal Year  
(If a specific field is not 
Accounting 
Document 
Header 
 
¨ 
 
 
 
_____ 
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Step Table Procedure Description Complete Sign. 
present it may be added 
to the selection screen 
by clicking on Settings 
> Fields for Selection) 
 
Execute 
 
System > List > Save > 
Local File > 
Unconverted 
Choose Directory 
Enter Filename:  
BKPF.TXT 
 
2 BSEG As above (step 1) 
Enter filter parameters, 
e.g. Fiscal Year. 
 
Enter Filename:  
BSEG.TXT 
 
Accounting 
document Line 
Item 
 
¨ 
 
 
 
_____ 
3 CDHDR As above (step 1) 
Enter filter parameters, 
e.g. Date. 
 
Enter Filename:  
CDHDR.TXT 
 
Change 
Document 
Header 
 
¨ 
 
 
 
_____ 
4 CDPOS As above (1) 
(OPTIONAL: Enter 
filter parameters, e.g. 
Table Name=LFBK, 
Field Name=KEY, 
Change ID=I). 
 
Change Width of 
Output List to 400 
Enter Filename:  
CDPOS.TXT 
 
 
Change 
Document Line 
Item 
 
 
¨ 
 
 
 
_____ 
5 LFA1 As above (step 1) 
 
Enter Filename:  
LFA1.TXT 
 
Vendor General 
Data 
 
 
¨ 
 
 
 
_____ 
  
 - 357 - 
 
Appendix 9: Feedback on prototype 
Feedback letter 1 – from BDO 
 
Kishore Singh 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of Southern Queensland 
Toowoomba Queensland 
 
Dear Kishore, 
 
COMMENT ON DOCTORAL RESEARCH 
 
Thank you for demonstrating the prototype software developed for your doctoral 
research entitled " A Conceptual Model for Proactive Fraud Detection In Enterprise 
Systems: Exploiting SAP Audit Trails to Detect Asset Misappropriation" 
 
You have outlined that the objective of this research is to: 
....... determine the feasibility of using technology to automate fraud detection in 
enterprise systems. Large scale enterprise systems provide the necessary 
infrastructure for ongoing use of continuous monitoring applications. These 
applications enable analysis of transaction data in a real- or near real-time basis 
against a set of predetermined rules. The prototype software has been developed 
with the intention of assisting an auditor in detecting potentially fraudulent 
activities in accounts payable. The software takes audit trail data from a SAP 
system and analyses it for anomalous activities associated with potential vendor 
fraud. A series of reports and visualisations are produced to support the audit 
function. 
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As requested, I have provided comments on the areas you raised: 
 
1. The importance of such a project for auditing in an organisation. 
 
A project of this nature is considered to be of high importance to organisations. It 
provides a mechanism to proactively monitor fraud risk, a key risk in any 
organisation. It also demonstrates a commitment to compliance with Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations as outlined by ASX Corporate 
Governance Council. In the 2nd Edition of these guidelines, Recommendation 7.2 
states: 
 
"The board should require management to design and implement the risk 
management and internal control system to manage the company's material 
business risks and report to it on whether those risks are being managed 
effectively. 
 
The board should disclose that management has reported to it as to the 
effectiveness of the company's management of its material business risks." 
 
2. The role that automated fraud detection software could play as an auditing tool for 
 
internal auditors. Automated fraud detection software can provide internal auditors 
with a tool to efficiently assess the presence of fraud within an organisation. This 
may also be applied to testing the effectiveness of the controls that management may 
have in place. A tool of this nature can ensure that the management of the risk of 
fraud can be undertaken on a more regular or continual basis. 
 
3. The desirability of a retrospective analysis software tool implemented on a 
standalone computer system as compared with a system embedded within an 
enterprise system.  
 
The benefits of a tool that is outside of the enterprise system is that it can be an 
independent check of the effectiveness of the controls in place within the enterprise 
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system. The desirability will relate to the cost, risk and value propositions to the 
organisation. This will in part be determined by the risk appetite of the organisation, 
the potential for fraud and the effectiveness of the internal control environment. 
 
4. The functionality of the prototype software, in particular the user interface, 
reporting and graphical features.  
 
In general, I found the functionality of the tool to be useful. The user interface would 
require a minimal level of training and some level of understanding of the SAP 
application, which is a reasonable constraint. The graphs and visualisations clearly 
communicated a message for the reader. The speed of running the queries was 
impressive." 
 
5. Any further comments or suggested improvements to the prototype. 
 
There may be potential to automate some of the scripts and perhaps include 
additional data sets (in addition to AP) to enhance the value of the software. 
Regression analysis may be a useful feature along with Benford's law to highlight 
anomalies or unusual patterns. 
 
The above comments are understood to be included in your thesis as an Appendix. 
These should be taken as professional observations and not an endorsement by BDO. 
 
Thank you allowing me this opportunity to comment on your thesis. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
John Halliday 
Executive Director Advisory 
BDO 
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Feedback letter 2 – from case study company 
 
Mr. Kishore Singh 
Doctoral Candidate 
University of Southern Queensland 
Toowoomba 
Australia 
 
Dear Kishore 
 
RE: SAP VENDOR FRAUD DETECTION PROJECT 
 
We are delighted with your prototype software developed with the objective of 
detecting potentially fraudulent activities in accounts payable. As one of Sri Lanka's 
largest companies who is operating in SAP environment, it is extremely vital to have 
system based controls in detecting and preventing fraudulent activities. Considering 
the number of transactions that take place every day, it has become impractical to 
check each transaction in-detail manually unless they are covered by way of controls 
in place. In such an environment this software will immensely help to our internal 
auditors to carry out various tests in detecting frauds and errors. 
 
It is an advantage that we can operate this software on a standalone computer system 
rather than embedded in our main SAP system because it minimises the disruptions 
to routine operations and allow retrieving reports at any given time even the on-line 
system is not available. The dashboard which indicates summary of all reports is a 
very helpful feature in this software. 
 
In our opinion the functionality of the prototype software should be further extended 
to other areas in the FICO module such as accounts receivable, fixed assets, general 
ledger etc., in the near future. 
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We are happy to work with you on this project. Your recent findings based on testing 
your software on our data, and highlighted in your report, has helped us to streamline 
our processes in more meaningful manner. 
 
We wish you all the very best in your future endeavours. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
K.M 
Manager Finance (Internal Audit) 
MAS Intimates (Pvt) Ltd. 
 
 
Feedback letter 3 – from case study company 
(Email received from N.J., Financial Director) 
 
Hi Kishore 
 
Thank you very much for your work with us, it was a new perspective to the risks 
that we carry and methods of identifying some of those using your solution. The 
learning were very important and valid. 
 
We hope to continue working on the areas we have identified with you and hope for 
your continued assistance in this matter. 
 
Regards 
N.J. 
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